Following the ritual of the last two years, China unleashed information warfare on Twitter weeks ahead of the third anniversary of the ‘stone, fist and club fight’ in the Galwan river to belittle the Indian Armed Forces.
Chinese Twitter handles under pseudonyms posted graphic photographs and videos showing an unequal fight, capitulation and humiliation of Indian soldiers. There was no formal denial or any kind of counter-information campaign by India. However, the concerned Twitter accounts were suspended, probably due to directions/reports made by the government.
There has been no formal detailed statement on the Galwan episode by the government or the Army except for cryptic details given on 16 June 2020. To date, no credible details of the primitive battle, Chinese casualties or Prisoners of War (POW) supported by photographs/videos have been put out. Probably we have no evidence. A section of media and social media activists have been touting speculative reports of ‘much larger than ours’ People’s Liberation Army (PLA) casualties without any supporting evidence.
There is an urgent need for the government and the military to bring closure to the Galwan incident with a detailed report before Parliament and the public.
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A PLA trap
The incident was triggered by the disengagement process agreed to during the first Corps Commander level talks held on 6 June 2020. Under the agreement, 2.5 – 3 km wide buffer zones were to be created at all friction points between India and China.
In the absence of a detailed official account of the unforgettable clash between the PLA and the Indian Army, many versions of it started floating around in the first 10 days. After that, the media too began to parrot the cover-up. As per my assessment, the India Today report of 22 June 2020 is the most authentic in terms of circumstances if not details. As part of the disengagement process, the PLA had dismantled a tent close to Patrolling Point (PP) 14 at the Galwan river bend. However, the tent was erected again on the night of 14-15 June. Colonel B Santosh Babu, 16 Bihar, who was responsible for the area, personally went to resolve the issue along with 35 soldiers just after 7 pm on 15 June 2020.
The earlier interactions between the two sides had been friendly despite the even-handed jostling that had taken place in May at various points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Colonel Babu found that regular troops, instead of the known and friendly Border Guards , were manning the area. Instead of a dialogue, a scuffle broke out within minutes when Colonel Babu was pushed by a PLA soldier. Indian soldiers got the better of the Chinese in a 30-minute fight without weapons and burnt the tent down. Some Chinese soldiers were overpowered and temporarily captured.
In their enthusiasm, Colonel Babu and his troops crossed over to the Chinese side of the LAC. Colonel Babu assessing the developing situation sent back the wounded and asked for reinforcements. The second phase of the encounter began in darkness after the arrival of reinforcements from both sides. The battle seems to have been fought in the area under Chinese control. The Chinese side was preprepared with spikes, nail-headed clubs and stones and was also occupying the higher ground. At approximately 9 pm, Colonel Babu was hit by a stone and he fell into the Galwan river. About 300 soldiers of both sides viciously fought each other for 45 minutes and maximum casualties took place in this phase. Thereafter, there was a lull in the battle till 11 pm with both sides calling for reinforcements. The PLA monitored the battle using a quadcopter.
The third phase of the battle, fought on the Chinese side, began after 11 pm and continued until after midnight. The three phase ‘unarmed battle’ lasted five hours. Ten Indian personnel, including four officers, were taken as POW. However, pictures later shared on social media show the number of captured soldiers three to four times the reported figure. Twenty Indian soldiers including Colonel Babu were killed in action, and as per my assessment, over a hundred were wounded. Details of PLA casualties remain ambiguous. As per India Today, in the debrief of Indian soldiers, there is mention of 16 dead bodies of PLA soldiers. Given the degree of preparation of the PLA for ‘unarmed combat’, I will not rule out the possibility of a deliberate trap by the PLA.
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Leadership lapses
On the face of it, it seems that the Galwan incident was the result of the disengagement process gone wrong at the unit level. However, the stage had been set over the previous seven weeks, starting from the end of April. This was a result of a political and military misreading of deliberate military actions of the PLA to permanently secure the 1959 Claim Line. Media had broken the story on 10 May. I wrote two detailed articles on 28 May and 4 June 2020, which despite a few factual errors due to lack of information clearly brought out that the PLA had launched deliberate operations to permanently alter the status quo on the borders.
The political and military response was surreal with denial and obfuscation as the principal tools. The crisis was handled as a border management problem — a pattern we had become used to after Depsang 2013, Chumar 2014 and Doklam 2017 — and not as a military operation to contest the preemptive tactical offensive undertaken by the PLA. The obvious signals were missed out—the deployment of up to 6 combined arms brigades moved from Xinjiang under the garb of military exercises, build-up of reserves in the rear, precautionary build-up all along the LAC, the choice of areas of intrusions where, as per Chinese interpretation, the LAC was east of the 1959 Claim Line, and securing of the heights at places of intrusion. India’s intention was to dare and call the Chinese bluff as it had done in the past.
Either to cover its earlier lapses in allowing the intrusions or political pressure, the Indian Army seemed to be in a tearing hurry to complete the disengagement process and report restoration of the status quo. I quote what I wrote on 18 June 2020, “But it is this approach that resulted in the horrendous spectacle of the commanding officer of a unit being clubbed to death in full view of his troops. The military hierarchy itself failed in its professional responsibility to advise the government to use force as per professional norms. The blood of these soldiers is on the hands of the government and the military hierarchy.”
The disengagement process would have been closely monitored by the Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders. What were the directions given to Colonel Babu on 15 June? Once the reports came in about the clash at 7 pm, why was there no intervention to defuse the situation? Did Colonel Babu unilaterally decide to take the battle to the Chinese side or was he given directions “to go and teach them a lesson”? It is one thing to accept spontaneous jostling between enthusiastic troops on the LAC at a small scale, but allowing hundreds of soldiers to engage in a medieval battle without control is unimaginable.
India Today, makes a very interesting observation—“When the sun rose (on 16 June), the situation was handed over to Major Generals on both sides, and talks hinged on the modalities of the exchange.” This implies that no one seemed to have been in control. Colonel Babu may have misjudged the situation but the chain of command, at least up to the Corps Commander, is equally responsible. There are rumours of even a higher Commander giving direct orders to Colonel Babu.
Photographs show that a fair number of soldiers were carrying weapons. Why were weapons not used when the lives of soldiers were threatened? The 1996 border management agreement does lay down restraints on the use of weapons during LAC confrontations. But that is an agreement for border management in normal times and not during military operations, which were ongoing in the intrusion areas. Moreover, when the lives of soldiers or territory is threatened by the enemy, the commander can use all weapons at his disposal, including artillery fire. The decision to not use weapons was deliberate and a wrong one was taken by the military hierarchy, which resulted in a tragedy. All soldiers are taught the story of the Trojan Horse. “Never trust your enemy” is a principle taught to every recruit. Why then the Indian Army fell into the trap of the PLA?
Is only the brave Colonel Babu responsible for all the lapses and errors of judgement? Or the entire military hierarchy is responsible for to sordid fiascos at Galwan?
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Truth be told
Reports of a court of Inquiry held to investigate the Galwan incident and fix accountability were formally denied by the Army implying that neither an inquiry has been held nor there was any need felt to hold one.
In any other nation, not only the armed forces would have inquired into the exceptional incident, but heads would have rolled. Democratic traditions also demand a parliamentary or empowered commission investigation to prevent a cover-up by the Army.
Unless the Indian government and the Army bring closure to the case through a formal inquiry and enforce accountability, exaggerated reports by the adversary will continue to appear credible. Rather than safeguarding the ‘reputation’ through a blanket cover-up, it will end up leaving an indelible mark of shame. Using the ‘bravery and sacrifice’ of soldiers to cover up operational and leadership lapses in order to uphold political and military reputations only results in a recurring pattern.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)