The much-anticipated meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping took place on 23 August on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg. It is not clear whether it was a ‘pull aside’, a ‘conversation’, an ‘informal meeting’, or a ‘candid and in-depth exchange of views’. However, the talks were soon mired in controversy about who requested the meeting and what transpired between the two leaders. Both sides gave conflicting official statements aimed at their respective domestic audience.
As per initial reports, the two leaders reached a broad understanding to bring about normalcy in relations while simultaneously diffusing the situation on the borders. This approach accommodated the conflicting points of view prevailing for the last three years, wherein India sought maintenance of peace and tranquillity on the borders as a prerequisite for the normalisation of their relationship and China said vice versa. However, the tenor of China’s official statement has put a damper on the optimism for an early breakthrough. China’s cartographic assertion over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin in the 2023 version of the Standard Map published on 28 August, five days after the meeting further queered the pitch. Aforementioned notwithstanding, both leaders are likely to have a formal meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit and may still make a joint statement devoid of rhetoric and oneupmanship signalling the way forward.
Deciphering the official statements
India was first off the mark with a press briefing by Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra. “…Prime Minister underlined the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas and observing and respecting the LAC are essential for the normalisation of the India-China relationship. In this regard, the two leaders agreed to direct their relevant officials to intensify at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation,” he said. This is a reiteration of India’s well-known stand. It is also clear that disengagement/de-escalation/de-induction is still a work in progress.
At his regular press conference on 25 August, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Wang Wenbin said, “President Xi Jinping talked with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at the latter’s request on August 23… President Xi stressed that improving China-India relations serves the common interests of the two countries and peoples, and is also conducive to peace, stability and development of the world and the region. The two sides should bear in mind the overall interests of their bilateral relations and handle properly the boundary question so as to jointly safeguard peace and tranquillity in the border areas.”
He further added, “I would like to reiterate…The boundary question is a historical issue and does not represent the entirety of China-India relations. We should place it appropriately in our bilateral relations and seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement through peaceful and friendly consultations. Before the boundary question is settled, the two sides need to jointly safeguard peace and tranquillity in the border areas.”
At the onset itself, the Chinese spokesperson condescendingly highlighted that it was Prime Minister Modi who had requested the talks, which though not officially denied, was countered through “sources” that there had been a “pending” request from China for a formal bilateral meeting. Like India, China also reiterated its well-known views on the border dispute and overall relations. While it reiterated the need for peace and tranquillity on the borders it remained silent on any agreement for disengagement and de-escalation. India once again seems to have misread Chinese intention. However, it is pertinent to mention that this is also the traditional Chinese style of maintaining an air of superiority to cater for the subsequent failure of detailed negotiations to arrive at the solution agreed upon.
It is evident that it is India that has blinked first and proposed a settlement of the confrontation on the borders. China negotiates from a position of strength. By most conservative estimates, China controls 1000 square km of territory which was controlled/patrolled by India until April 2020. It has physically reclaimed the 1959 Claim Line with or without buffer zones in all areas except the Indus Valley from Fukche to Demchok which, in my view, has been left alone due to some villages in the area.
As per my assessment, China seeks peace on its terms and is unlikely to concede a face-saving agreement to India. So far, it has refused to negotiate its absolute position with respect to Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala (CNN) junction. It did agree to an equidistant buffer zone north of Pangong Tso and on the Kailash Range due to the tactical advantage the latter gave to India. The buffer zones in Galwan River Valley and in areas of Patrolling Points (PP)15 and 16, and PP17 and 17A are largely on the Indian side of the LAC. In fact, the latter two buffer zones due to terrain configuration allow China to dominate the entire Kugrang River Valley which is not disputed. After the vacation of Kailash Range in February 2021, India has no military leverage left to pressurise China.
India’s current predicament is due to political and military failures in misreading China’s intent and passively allowing it to achieve strategic surprise and an uncontested manoeuvre to secure unmanned areas up to the 1959 Claim Line in April-May 2020. That China did not secure larger territory beyond the 1959 Claim Line in 1962 and up to our main defences in 2020 despite being in a position to do so, gives an insight into its negotiation strategy for an interim or possibly even a permanent settlement. In Eastern Ladakh, China is unlikely to make any more compromises with respect to the 1959 Claim Line.
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The way forward for India
It is pertinent to reiterate that decisive wars between nuclear weapons-armed states are passé and the probability of even a limited war is very low. By implication, the borders can not be substantially changed, unless the adversary is given an uncontested opportunity to secure territory at no cost as it happened in late April/early May 2020. Even salami slicing only takes place in unmanned areas with poor surveillance and a lack of quick response to forestall preemption. This can be overcome by Indo-Tibetan Border Police posts in all vulnerable areas, keeping adequate reserves, clearly laying down Red Lines which would trigger a military response and even ambiguously spelling out the nuclear threshold. The prevailing strategic stalemate is manageable in terms of cost and neither side can alter it short of a limited war which due to uncertain outcomes and assured decisive victory is unlikely. Despite the military differential, any embarrassing incident on the border can be neutralised by a quid pro quo and this contingency can be militarily catered for.
Keeping the above in view, India should not be in a hurry to negotiate a settlement on unequal terms merely for the success of the G20 summit or to ward off a perceived threat to electoral success. Of course for long-term economic development and military reforms to be in a position to challenge China, peace on the borders is desirable. However, it must not come at the cost of an agreement on China’s terms allowing it to declare victory and permanently usurp an additional 1000 square km of territory.
An honourable solution for India would be to negotiate an equidistant buffer zone between Y Junction /Bottleneck and the LAC which is two-three km east of PPs 10,11,12 and 13. A similar equidistant buffer zone is required for CNN Junction. In order to maintain our claims, all buffer zones should be either jointly patrolled or as per a mutually agreed schedule for each side. There should be verifiable transparency with respect to de-escalation and de-induction. The quantum of troops that can be retained as reserves must be related to the time it takes for deployment from permanent bases. As part of the agreement, the LAC must be demarcated.
If the above-mentioned face-saving agreement can not be negotiated then it would be prudent to persist with the current strategic stalemate posture which prevents China from declaring victory and the world perceives that India has called a bully’s bluff. India also needs to go full steam ahead for its military transformation. In case an agreement is worked out for Eastern Ladakh then talks can be initiated for a similar agreement with buffer zones along the MacMahon Line. Last, but not least, China is winning the information war and the government’s policy of opacity and obfuscation is giving diminishing returns. Internationally, no one is fooled and fooling one’s own public and Parliament does not augur well for a democracy.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)