A breakthrough to resolve the three years and four months of military confrontation in Eastern Ladakh seems to be in the offing. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping are likely to meet on the sidelines of the ongoing BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, to give formal political approval to begin the process of de-escalation and subsequent de-induction of troops to permanent bases.
The ice seems to have been broken when the two heads of state briefly met at dinner during the G20 summit on 14 November 2022, in Bali, Indonesia. Details of their interaction only came to light eight months later after National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese diplomat (now foreign minister) Wang Yi met on 24 July 2023 on the sidelines of a preparatory BRICS meeting in Johannesburg. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its press release, with respect to Doval- Wang Yi meeting, mentioned that Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping had “reached an important consensus on stabilising China-India relations”, at Bali. After the Chinese statement, spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs also clarified that the two leaders “also spoke of the need to stabilise our bilateral relations”. Foreign Minister S Jaishankar and Wang Yi had also met 10 days earlier on 14 July 2023, at Jakarta on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit. It seems that a proposed agreement to diffuse the crisis in Eastern Ladakh was on the agenda in these two meetings with Wang Yi.
On the ground, there has been hectic military activity to work out the modalities of the proposed agreement. Corps Commander level talks were held on 13 and 14 August on the Indian side at the Chushul-Moldo meeting point on the LAC. This was followed by Division Commander level meetings over three days at Daulat Beg Oldi and Chushul, beginning 18 August to work out the nuts and bolts.
In diplomacy, ‘it is never over until it’s over’. Hence the outcome of the Modi-Xi meeting is eagerly awaited. What are the drivers for this push for peace and what are its likely contours?
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Strategic stalemate
By all yardsticks, by December 2020 the situation prevailing along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh qualified to be called a strategic stalemate. Indeed, China, exploiting strategic surprise, achieved its military aim of re-securing the 1959 Claim Line in all areas except the Indus Valley and prevented development of border infrastructure in sensitive areas. In so doing, it also denied India access to approximately 1000 square km of territory which was controlled and patrolled by it up to April 2020. However, China could not achieve its political aim of imposing its hegemony by forcing India to capitulate to accept the altered status quo. By amassing troops on the borders and securing the strategic Kailash Range on night of 29/30 August 2020, India partially restored its military honour and prevented China from declaring victory and pulling out due to apprehension of a quid pro quo.
The stalemate could not be altered short of a limited war below the nuclear threshold. Fear of a setback and uncertainty of a decisive victory prevented China from escalating. The differential in Comprehensive National Power, particularly with respect to the economic and military components, deterred India from escalating or even a tactical quid pro quo action. Politically, even a minor setback would have been catastrophic for the party in power.
This situation led to torturous diplomatic and military negotiations and creation of buffer zones, which were equidistant north of Pangong Tso and along the Kailash Range, and predominantly on our side in Galwan Valley, Patrolling Points (PP) 15 -16 and Gogra (PPs 17-17A). China refused to negotiate on Depsang Plains where India has been denied access to 600-800 square km of its territory and Charding – Ninglung Nala, south of Demchok. In fact, with respect to Depsang Plains, it has even proposed a bigger buffer zone in Indian territory.
The risk of escalation and limited war notwithstanding, realpolitik prevented de-escalation and de-induction of massed troops. What is it then that has driven the quest of peace?
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The drivers for quest of peace
China’s GDP is 5.4 times that of India and its defence budget three times. India needs to have a GDP of $15 trillion and transformation of its armed forces to be in a position to be a competitor for China, and find its rightful place in the comity of nations. For this, 2047 is a realistic goal. Trade with China is also essential for Indian economy. This is the long-term incentive for an interim if not a final border settlement with China.
The G20 summit is a defining moment for India’s quest for recognition as a major power. The presence of President Xi Jinping and a consensual final declaration/statement are essential for its success. An interim border settlement to diffuse the crisis will certainly contribute to achieving this end. As per its perception, BJP feels it is on course to win a third successive term in parliamentary elections.
As part of the ongoing confrontation in Eastern Ladakh, there is always a possibility of China triggering an incident to launch a high technology driven limited punitive action along the LAC to embarrass Prime Minister Modi before the 2024 parliamentary elections. A setback on the border can be a major impediment for electoral success of the BJP. Diffusion of the crisis and selling it as a victory will certainly contribute toward electoral success.
Last three years have made China realise that it cannot coerce a nuclear India to capitulate. Confrontation on the borders is providing diminishing returns with respect to shaping India’s international conduct. In fact, coercion has produced the opposite effect. While it may be too late to make amends, peace on the borders will inspire India to maintain its strategic autonomy. China also does not want an active southern front in case it is forced to go to war over Taiwan.
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Contours of a likely agreement
The 1959 Claim Line has been central to China’s strategy in Eastern Ladakh for last 64 years. On 7 November 1959, China’s Prime Minister Zhou Enlai proposed an interim agreement with a demilitarised equidistant buffer zone of 20 km on either side of the ‘line of actual control’ (which as per China was the 1959 Claim Line) in Eastern Ladakh and along the McMahon Line in North East Frontier Agency, now Arunachal Pradesh. The 1959 Claim Line was broadly described by the Chinese during the five rounds of talks with officials of India in 1960. In the 1962 War, China secured this line and did not attack beyond it despite being in a position of strength. On 19 November 1962, China declared unilateral ceasefire and ordered its army to withdraw 20 km east of the 1959 Claim Line in Ladakh and its perception of the McMahon Line in the Northeast. From the day it was proposed, India has rejected the 1959 Claim Line as a Chinese ploy to secure territory.
Over the years, India began patrolling the areas which it held before the war in 1962. In Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, PP 15-16, PP 17-17A, Finger 4 to 8, north of Pangong Tso and Charding – Ninglung Nala, these areas, as per Chinese perception, were east of the 1959 Claim Line. It is these areas which the Chinese secured in end April/early May 2020, by achieving strategic surprise through a preemptive offensive manoeuvre. Indus Valley from Fukche to Demchok was physically secured by India, but has been left alone by China despite cutting 30 km across the 1959 Claim Line due to a number of villages in the area.
All agreements over the last three years have centred around the 1959 Claim Line with buffer zones in areas of dispute. A de facto demarcation of the border has taken place. However, with respect to Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala, China has been adamant. In Depsang it wants the entire buffer zone to be in Indian territory. China is negotiating from a position of strength as possession is nine-tenths of law. Only time will tell how much each side is willing to compromise.
Thus, any future interim agreement in Eastern Ladakh will be based on India accepting the 1959 Claim Line with buffer zones in areas in which it differs from its perception of the LAC. If both Modi and Xi show statesmanship and boldness, the proposal of a 20 km demilitarised zone on either side of the new LAC running through the centre of the negotiated buffer zones, may get revived. The same norm can be applied to the McMahon Line. India is not in a position to take back its lost territories in the foreseeable future. The clock has been turned back to 7 November 1959. This time the opportunity must not be lost to cement an interim agreement, which could pave the way for a final solution, with India-China international boundary running along the 1959 Claim Line in Eastern Ladakh and McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh, with mutually acceptable modifications.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)