Election machine, juggernaut, unstoppable force—these are some of the epithets used for the Bharatiya Janata Party. And why not? In March 2018, before the Karnataka assembly election, the BJP along with its allies ruled almost three-fourths of the country—70 per cent of India’s population and 76 per cent area spread over 21 states.
It doesn’t matter that after the Karnataka election in 2023, their footprints have shrunk to 44 per cent population and 43 per cent area spread across 16 states.
Of these, the BJP has CMs or deputy CMs in 12 states. This downturn in the BJP’s fortune hasn’t impacted its image as a party with an unparalleled organisational machinery. That’s because these reverses are commonly attributed to the growing perception that PM Modi’s enduring popularity works in the Lok Sabha election but not necessarily in the assembly polls. This narrative is convenient to BJP strategists—to the extent that nobody points a finger at them. The fact is that PM Modi can no longer swing elections in states because his ‘double-engine sarkar’ slogan has lost its appeal—not because of his own governance record but despite it. His campaign does give the BJP a boost in the state, but as a Congress strategist in Karnataka told me: “Modi’s campaign in the last few days can swing, say, 7-8 per cent votes. But if we already have a lead of, say, 15 per cent, the PM can’t change the results.” The question for the BJP is: ‘Why does it allow this 15 per cent lead to develop in the first place?’ And that’s where the role of Modi’s colleagues in Delhi comes into play.
They are showing signs of fatigue and lack of imagination even though the BJP remains the most formidable political force in India. At the meeting of the party chiefs of southern states in Hyderabad on Sunday, BJP national president JP Nadda told them that their focus should be on wooing disgruntled leaders from other parties, according to a report in The Hindu.
For a party that has been focusing so much on southern India over the past nine years, continuing dependence on turncoats from other parties doesn’t inspire confidence.
Beyond these turncoats, panna pramukhs, page committee members, and booth-level workers, the BJP seems unsure about its strategy in states. At one point in time, it turns the heat on friendly Andhra Pradesh chief minister, YS Jagan Mohan Reddy, calling him “anti-Hindu’ and accusing him of minority appeasement. It even shows eagerness to renew ties with his bete noir, Chandrababu Naidu, with Amit Shah granting him an audience in Delhi. Then the BJP appoints Naidu’s sister-in-law and detractor, Daggubati Purandeswari, as the party’s Andhra Pradesh chief. BJP workers on the ground must be scratching their heads to understand the party’s strategy. And it’s not limited to Andhra Pradesh. In Bihar, its ‘jungle raj’ jibe against Lalu Prasad has formed the core of its attack against the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). The BJP then appoints Samrat Choudhury, once a minister in the Rabri Devi government during that so-called jungle raj, its state unit chief.
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Missing accountability?
On Friday, Nadda appointed election in-charges and co-in-charges of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Telangana. The list included, among others, four Cabinet ministers—Bhupendra Yadav, Ashwini Vaishnav, Pralhad Joshi, and Mansukh Mandaviya. Nothing new, of course. It’s nobody’s case that ministers shouldn’t be involved in elections. I am citing these appointments to drive home the point about growing casualness and randomness in the party’s decision-making process. For instance, its decision to deploy Vaishnav for election work might prompt its detractors to say that the ruling party hasn’t taken even five weeks to get over the Odisha train accident that killed 293 people.
The opposition demand for railway minister Ashwini Vaishnav’s resignation, though not unjustified on the principles of accountability, was more rhetorical. He is one of the competent and performing ministers in this government. His deployment in elections was certainly not the most sensible thing the BJP high command did in terms of optics. The Odisha train tragedy, one of the biggest in decades, underlined serious problems in the Indian railways, not just in terms of upkeep and upgrade of existing infrastructure but, more importantly, in terms of reviewing priorities to ensure that the system is accountable and fault-proof from top to bottom. Vaishnav’s job didn’t end with the removal of bodies and debris from the accident site in Balasore. His job had to really start after his return to Delhi. For all we know about Vaishnav, he must have started doing exactly that in right earnest. But the BJP president has now chosen to deploy him to Madhya Pradesh as co-in-charge of the election.
Union minister Mansukh Mandaviya was appointed BJP’s co-in-charge of the election in Karnataka. The BJP was routed there. Mandaviya has now got a fresh assignment—co-in-charge of the Chhattisgarh election. Nitin Patel, once an aspiring Gujarat chief minister, was dropped as deputy CM in 2021. He was denied ticket in the assembly election—he ‘declined’ to contest, for the record—ostensibly to make way for the next generation at the age of 66. He has now been drafted as co-in-charge to ensure the party’s victory in Rajasthan. Kuldeep Bishnoi, who had quit the Congress to float his own party, Haryana Janhit Congress (HJC), was the first to break alliance with the BJP after the 2014 Lok Sabha election, in August that year. Bishnoi merged HJC with the Congress two years later. In 2022, he joined the BJP.
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Set the house in order
Lack of meritocracy and accountability in the Congress was one of the principal reasons for its downfall. Let’s look at the BJP’s national general secretaries—the most powerful posts after that of the party president. BL Santhosh, general secretary (organisation), is credited with the BJP’s loss in his home state, Karnataka, thanks to his old rivalry with former CM, BS Yediyurappa. The election defeat hasn’t closed the chapter. Their rivalry has been delaying the appointment of the new state BJP president and leader of opposition in the assembly. The BJP high command can’t decide.
There are nine other general secretaries. One of them, Kailash Vijayvargiya, who presided over the BJP’s defeat in West Bengal assembly election in 2021, was divested of that state’s charge 11 months ago amid trenchant criticism by state BJP leaders about his role. He remains a general secretary though. Tarun Chugh, general secretary in charge of Telangana, never won an election, losing the assembly election from Amritsar Central in 2012 and 2017. Dushyant Gautam, in charge of Uttarakhand, also never won an election, losing twice in Delhi. Arun Singh hasn’t won a direct election either. Another general secretary, CT Ravi, lost in the last assembly election in Karnataka.
Win or lose, these leaders look set to enjoy plum posts in the BJP because the high command can’t take a call. Think of Vijayvargiya, an Amit Shah loyalist. He has been given no party assignment over the past 11 months, but he remains a general secretary. So, what is it that makes non-performing assets so indispensable to the BJP? The answer probably is that if PM Modi decides to fix accountability—from crisis of governance in Manipur, for instance, to electoral defeats in states—heads will roll, starting from the BJP national president from Himachal Pradesh. PM Modi will then find himself lonely at the top.
DK Singh is Political Editor at ThePrint. He tweets @dksingh73. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)