Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan recently concluded a week-long visit to France, where he interacted with top executives of several French defence majors like Dassault Aviation, Safran, and Naval Group. He also interacted with various top military personnel in the French government. The primary agenda was discussing futuristic capabilities of the Indian armed forces.
The CDS’s visit came shortly after the Chief of the French Army Staff, Pierre Schill, visited India in February. Last November, India’s Army Chief had visited Paris as well.
The two sides remain committed to actualising the ambitious plans set during the subsequent exchanges of the two leaders in 2023, when the partnership celebrated 25 years, and in 2024, when President Emmanuel Macron graced India’s Republic Day as the Chief Guest.
With such trust and strategic significance, it is logical that India and France should take their wide-spectrum cooperation to the next level, especially in the realm of defence cooperation, which remains the bedrock of the partnership. The recent flurry of high-profile visits suggests that much is in the offing before 2026, which can be formally declared as the year of Indo-French innovation.
There are two specific documents that guide the evolving strategic bonhomie between India and France — Horizon 2047, signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to France on Bastille Day in July 2023, and the defence industrial roadmap signed during Macron’s visit to India in January 2024.
These two documents cover the breadth of how various convergences are envisioned by the two sides.
Horizon 2047 is a strategic roadmap guiding the partnership until 2047, coinciding with India’s independence centenary and the golden jubilee of India-France ties. It focuses on three pillars. One, enhancing India’s defence, industrial, and technological independence with France’s support. Two, strengthening bilateral, trilateral, and triangular cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Three, advancing collaborative efforts in the space sector. The document also outlines a comprehensive matrix for bilateral cooperation across several areas, drawing from their mutual commitment to strategic autonomy and multipolarity.
When the defence industrial partnership roadmap was mentioned in the 20th point of the detailed joint statement released during Macron’s visit in January, it took the Indian commentariat by storm, and for good reason.
The joint statement spanned across 41 points that spoke of the exceptional nature of the relationship. It talked of evolving ties and convergence of interest in the Indo-Pacific, joint exercises, trilateral overtures, and surveillance missions in the Indian Ocean Region through frameworks such as the Maritime Cooperation Dialogue.
Important in their own regard and crucial for ensuring dynamism in bilateral ties, it was still the defence industry roadmap that caught everyone’s attention with its pithy articulation. Even though the detailed roadmap remains classified for now, the stress on co-designing, co-development, and co-production of defence equipment not only for India but also for other countries etched in stone the ambitious joint vision of how the two sides have committed to taking the bedrock of their bilateral ties ahead.
This roadmap is in accordance with India’s ideal of Atmnirbhart Bharat and will cover both air and space technologies, maritime technology including underwater domain awareness.
France’s rise as second-largest defence exporter
According to SIPRI’s five-yearly data of global arms flows between 2019-2023, France emerged as India’s second-largest defence exporter, with 33 per cent of total Indian imports coming from France. Notably, Russia with 36 per cent still remains the topmost exporter. However, tracked over the five-year period, SIPRI data shows a steady decline in India’s imports from Russia, from 76 per cent for 2009-2013 to 36 per cent for 2019-2023. India has reportedly not placed a fresh order with Russia after the war in Ukraine. The deliveries received lately of equipment such as Igla S manpads have been for orders placed around 2018. The remaining contingents of S 400s are still awaited, most likely to arrive by the third quarter of 2026.
With no significant orders placed since 2021, and the Ukraine war going unabated, the impact of sanctions on Russia’s capacity to manufacture defence equipment and their subsidiaries for export remains unclear. Then there are technical difficulties in the rupee-ruble payment mechanism, which is likely to impede the purchase of bigger equipment. Except for licensed production of equipment such as the stellar BrahMos missiles that are being produced in India, and AK-203 (Kalashnikov) rifles at Amethi, the share of Russian exports is likely to fall even further.
Co-designing, co-development, co-production
The sheer number and expanse of ventures between India and France has been increasing by the day. In 2023, India’s DRDO opened an office in Paris for navigating cooperation in defence technology by harnessing the compatibilities and competencies of the two economies. DRDO has also entered into an agreement with France’s Naval Group to enhance the capabilities of the Kalvari Class submarines. Alongside the initial procurement of six Kalvari attack submarines, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has cleared the acquisition of three more submarines in 2023. The 2024 joint statement also lauds the developments on an MoU between DRDO and the French Directorate General of Armament.
The confidence shown by France for 100 per cent transfer of technology by Safran, the world’s largest aircraft equipment manufacturer, for the proposed Safran-India Shakti jet engine deal, is unprecedented by a Western power. These jet engines are for the fifth-gen Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) designed for stealth. The Modi government has confirmed plans to develop seven squadrons of the AMCA, including two squadrons of the AMCA Mk1-A, to be equipped with GE-414 from the United States. The remaining five squadrons will be powered by new indigenous engines, with contenders including Safran of France, General Electric from the US, and Rolls Royce from the UK. It is here that France’s involvement stands out by offering a 100 per cent transfer of technology.
Additionally, Safran has entered into a shareholder’s agreement with India’s HAL for industrial collaboration concerning the motorisation of the heavy-lift helicopters program (IMRH).
The other example can certainly be given from the aerospace giant Thales, which has announced plans to establish an avionics Maintenance, Repair and Operations (MRO) facility in Delhi. This indeed bears testimony to Thales support to modernisation and indigenisation efforts in India’s aerospace and defence sector. It needs to be underscored that Thales is a pivotal member of the Rafale team of Dassault Aviation. Currently, the Indian Air Force (IAF) operates two squadrons of Rafale jets and is close to inking a deal for acquiring its marine version for India’s aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.
Dassault also remains an important contender for India’s Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) whenever it materialises. Just like Safran’s pitch for AMCA and IMRH operates on the logic of economies of scale, the same is applicable to Dassault for its deliveries of Rafales (air and marine version), Thales MRO facilities, and a potential deal for MRFAs. Although, the logic of economies of scale has to be reconciled with India’s pitch for diversification as well.
Co-production for third parties
Stated as one of the goals of the defence industry roadmap, one of the likely theatres for India-France joint production export is the Caucases. India has been a steady supplier of weapons to the region after the war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, as has France, especially after 2023. Disgruntled by Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia has virtually suspended its membership and is siding with the West, despite keeping Russia’s military base in the country. The geopolitical space for France has increased after Russia recently announced the withdrawal of its peacekeepers—which was seen as a major tool of Moscow’s influence in the region.
Paris has been supplying Armenia with air defences, GM 200 radars, assault rifles and Mistral short-range air defence systems. France also trains Armenian troops.
India, for its part, has been siding with Armenia for a different geopolitical calculus, for instance, against Turkey and Pakistan, but lands up on the same side as France when it comes to weapons deliveries.
Armenia is expected to spend about $1.5 billion on defence in 2024. A steady weapons supplier, in the backdrop of a geopolitical shift of power in the region, India could be inching closer to a strategic partnership with Armenia alongside France. This direction could logically culminate into joint production and export of weapons, in line with the MoD’s stated objective of enhancing defence exports.
The convergence on the array of ambitious defence industrial plans must also translate into robust geopolitical roles, reflecting a more holistic approach to bolstering the fractured security of our epoch. That calls on the two sides to develop and deliver on reducing the prevalent uncertainties of an ambivalent world. Beyond semantics, such deliverables must be based on a realistic assessment of capabilities and convergences while respecting the divergent national interests of the other.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)