The ongoing Iran War has settled an important question about modern conflict. An air campaign by a superior power ensures its dominance in the opening phase—but not a decisive victory. The stronger side will endeavour to seize the initiative, strike first and degrade visible military capability with an air, missile and drone campaign, backed by all the supporting force multipliers to bring about defeat through psychological collapse. A resilient weaker side will absorb the initial onslaught and adopt an asymmetric strategy to prolong the war and impose costs. This model becomes more relevant for nuclear-weapon-armed states, which must fight wars below the nuclear threshold of the adversary. This generally includes major territorial, economic or military combat potential losses.
For India, this is not just a theory. In a future conflict, China will aim for a short, high-technology, decisive war. Pakistan will seek to turn it into a prolonged asymmetric contest. Both will operate under a nuclear shadow that constrains escalation but encourages risk-taking below the threshold. In an India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese support is likely to be restricted to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), including space resources and electronic/cyber warfare. But in an India-China conflict, Pakistan will certainly open a second asymmetric front.
This article is a sequel to my previous article on ThePrint—Iran war has given India a blueprint for the next conflict.
Pakistan’s asymmetric strategy
Pakistan has little incentive to fight India symmetrically. Its approach will mirror the logic demonstrated by Iran—avoid decisive engagements, impose persistent costs, and exploit escalation limits.
It gave a glimpse into its thought process during Operation Sindoor. After imposing costs on the Indian Air Force through counter-air operations in the first hour of the conflict, the Pakistan Air Force remained cocooned in hardened shelters for the next 87 hours. Pakistan switched to drone swarms launching approximately 600 attacks over the next 72 hours, but only focused on military targets saturated with India’s integrated air defence. In the same period, the IAF focused on the destruction of Pakistan’s air defence, electronic warfare and deception—enabling air strikes on the night of 9 May 2025, going into 10 May 2025, with impunity across the length and breadth of Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategy was correct, but execution was poor. Moreover, Pakistan lacked missile power and quality drones.
But here’s what my experience tells me Pakistan will do in the next round. It will upgrade its fighter aircraft with long-range air-to-air missiles, thicken its air defence, acquire better missiles and drones, harden its defence infrastructure and adopt subterranean warfare to the extent possible. Its asymmetric strategy will manifest in target selection, proxies/agents in the Indian hinterland and maritime operations.
Pakistan will use air, missile and drone attacks not only on military targets, but will deliberately target major cities for psychological and political impact. It would dare India to lose its moral high ground by replicating the same, creating a dilemma for decision makers.
Pakistan will also target critical infrastructure, like power grids, oil refineries, petroleum depots, transport hubs, and communications networks, to disrupt daily life.
In conjunction with China, it could launch cyber attacks on the economic and financial networks of banks, digital payment systems and stock exchanges. The aim is not destruction, but temporary paralysis with disproportionate effect.
Pakistan has been waging a terrorism driven proxy war in J&K and in major cities of India since 1990. This war was symbolised by an AK-47-wielding and grenade-throwing terrorist who could also plant improvised explosive devices. These terrorists/agents are now likely to be armed with the most democratised high-end military technology—drones—in the hinterland of India. With drones cheaper than an AK-47, all military, civilian, economic, infrastructure and leadership targets will face attacks from the rear.
The maritime domain is another arena for asymmetric warfare. Of course, rival navies will fight for sea control/denial, but in the asymmetric domain, it may extend to targeting of commercial ships and tankers using drones and missiles. Harbours used by commercial ships can be mined. Up to 500-600 km, “mosquito navy” will play a big role in sea denial for commercial shipping. Its range can be extended by refuelling.
Also read: India needs to learn from US-Iran conflict, just like Tehran took lessons from Iraq war
India’s asymmetric strategy against China
Empirically, great powers seek a quick victory based on their military prowess. In my view, due to the uncertainty of the outcome, the probability of a limited war with China is low. However, keeping in view India’s rise and assertion on the borders, China may use force to embarrass India and reassert its hegemony.
Like the US, it would seek a quick victory in a conflict, limited in time and space, without hard-slogging conventional operations in the mountains. India’s political aim would be to impose a strategic defeat by sustaining China’s technology-driven attack and neutralising any gains with an asymmetrical operational strategy.
During the crisis in Eastern Ladakh, we responded passively to China’s preemptive offensive to secure control of approximately 1000 square km with a massive counter deployment. It achieved a strategic stalemate but failed to restore the status quo ante during negotiations due to a lack of leverage. Geography allows China a first-mover advantage, so India has to go beyond passive confrontation.
I highlighted in my last article that the best defence against the air campaign of a superior adversary is the adoption of subterranean warfare. It must be adopted in letter and spirit. In addition, we must create an optimum air defence capability. Our conventional response, in the form of a counter-air campaign and ground operations, must escalate to other sectors of the vast border where we have a terrain advantage.
The Strait of Malacca is China’s economic lifeline. The Andaman and Nicobar islands are strategically located west of the strait. The Indian Navy can blockade the strait or impose “denial” on China-related commercial shipping. A similar action in the Arabian Sea to deny access to Gwadar, Pasni, and Karachi ports will have a cascading impact on the Chinese economy. The advantages of creating a “mosquito fleet” for interfering with commercial shipping are obvious.
The Dalai Lama, the religious and political head of the Tibetan nation, and a government in exile are based in India. In the public domain, there are reports of 10,000 to 12,000 Tibetan troops trained as Special Forces who, so far, have been used conventionally in our conflicts. In relation to our borders, Tibet is China’s Achilles Heel. If China does not respect our sovereignty, I find no reason why the war must not be taken to Tibet. Consequently, our asymmetrical targets must be carefully chosen and focus primarily on the PLA. The Tibetan Special Forces can be infiltrated to target the PLA’s rear areas and coordinate the Tibetan freedom struggle.
Also read: No country is ever fully sovereign. Cold War era taught India its real meaning
A word of caution
Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the adversary or capitalise on limited preparation against the
threat. They rely primarily on concepts of operations fundamentally different from those of the adversary and from those of recent history. This is not new. Military history is replete with examples from the Trojan War to the Strait of Hormuz.
There is no compartmentalisation between conventional and asymmetric strategies. It is just that nations and militaries get conditioned to fighting wars in a particular way. And anything done differently produces asymmetry, for which little or no preparation has been done. Of course, asymmetric strategies can be countered, but a reaction as opposed to preemption has obvious disadvantages.
China, India, and Pakistan are modern armies that have to wage conflict below the nuclear threshold. Keeping in view the nuclear threshold, there are obvious constraints in the way conflict will manifest. Asymmetric strategies enable the weaker military to stalemate the adversary and impose a strategic defeat. The military challenge is to preempt or neutralise the asymmetric strategy of the weaker adversary and exploit it against a superior adversary.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)