For the last month, a strategic stalemate has prevailed in the US-Israel war on Iran. It’s been defined by mutual threats, coercive blockades, and inconclusive talks held on 11-12 April. A formal ceasefire with Iran declared on 8 April has been extended in the early hours of 22 April until Iran’s “proposal is submitted, and discussions are concluded, one way or the other”. The world economy continues to be held to ransom as no oil and gas flows out of the Persian Gulf due to the twin blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Both sides seek a grand bargain and believe that they have the upper hand and the necessary leverage to achieve their political aims during negotiations.
The US desires the absolute end of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its proxy wars through the Axis of Resistance, and restoration of the Strait of Hormuz as an uncontrolled international waterway. Iran seeks a long term peace agreement, retention of strategic autonomy with respect to nuclear power including right to enrichment, sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, lifting of sanctions, release of frozen financial assets, and peace in Lebanon.
The US-Israel’s leverage lies in the threat of resumption of a no-holds-barred air campaign—one that targets residual missile/drone capability and oil, energy, water and communications infrastructure. They can also target Iran’s economy by continuing the blockade of the Gulf of Oman.
Iran’s leverage is the continuous blockade of Hormuz, which impacts the world oil economy, adequate residual missile and drone capability to replicate the US-Israel air campaign on GCC countries, and brinkmanship to drag the US into a “forever war”.
The irony is obvious. Iran, a much weaker state with a defence budget nearly 90 times lower than the US’ and sanctioned for 47 years, is negotiating on par after eight weeks of war by adopting an asymmetrical strategy. It has weathered the most intensive air campaign since World War 2, decapitation of its top-rung political and military leadership and degradation of its military capacity and capability.
What lessons can be learnt by India from the war?
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Strategic level
India, China, and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states and are safe from the existential threat posed by a decisive defeat and major loss of territory in full-scale conventional wars. Hence, conflict has to be fought below the nuclear threshold in pursuit of national interests. India, with relative conventional superiority, maintains an offensive deterrence against Pakistan. Keeping in view China’s superiority, it maintains a defensive or dissuasive deterrence. Pakistan, since 1990, has also pursued an asymmetrical strategy based on terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and in major cities of India.
China’s military capabilities are only a shade below those of the US. India and Pakistan maintain a mix of medium- and high-technology armies, with India at an advantage. Iran’s experience will tempt China (against India) and India (against Pakistan) to conduct US-style air/missile/drone campaigns to impose their will on relatively weaker adversaries.
Pakistan will adopt an asymmetrical operational strategy to absorb the air campaign, safeguard adequate residual capability to retaliate, and resort to escalation by targeting economic targets, blocking sea lanes, and using proxies for a drone campaign in the hinterland. Limited ground operations may also be undertaken. The advantage of an asymmetrical response is that it can prolong the conflict, while keeping it well below the nuclear threshold. Keeping in view the military differential, India should adopt a similar asymmetrical strategy against China.
This duality—decisive early dominance by a superior power, followed by resilient asymmetric resistance by a weaker one—will be the pattern of future wars in the subcontinent. The military challenge for India would be to defeat the rival’s operational conventional/asymmetrical strategy to reimpose deterrence. India must learn from both the hunter and the hunted. How it would be done is a subject in itself, which I will cover in the next article.
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Mix of high and asymmetrical technology
The problem of modern state-of-the-art weapon systems is that, in an endeavour to cater for everything, they become cost-prohibitive, not only in respect of the main weapon system but also in terms of the cost of the expendable missile/projectile. The cost of India’s very effective BrahMos missile system is nearly twice that of the Tomahawk missile, the mainstay of the US Army. The numbers of the missile remain at a premium, despite an almost trillion-dollar defence budget.
There is a need for parallel, relatively cheaper, less sophisticated missiles, which can be used en masse in swarms to overwhelm enemy air defence. While 90 per cent of Iran’s missiles were intercepted at a phenomenal cost, the 10 per cent that got through caused disproportionate destruction of very expensive air defence communications and command-and-control systems.
The same is the case with the most democratised asymmetrical technology of Unmanned Aerial Systems. It causes disproportionate damage relative to their cost. This has been demonstrated by Ukraine and Iran, which are without an effective air force. Ukraine’s drones sent the Russian naval fleet out of the Black Sea. Iran’s $20,000-50,000 Shahed drones not only destroyed targets but also created an interceptor missile crisis due to the huge differential in cost. These drones are capable of ranges of 2,000 km and may soon become intercontinental.
At the end of eight weeks of war, Iran’s cheaper missile and drone capability, enmeshed with satellite-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), to target GCC countries’ oil, water and other economic targets, is its deterrence against the US doing the same with the most advanced aircraft, missiles and drones. Of course, Iran suffers from a relative disadvantage of not having a modern air force. Similarly, there are a host of other niche asymmetric weapons and support system technologies in the field of electromagnetic and cyber warfare which can be exploited.
India requires high-end technology-based weapon systems to achieve military aims in a short time with “shock and awe” and a relatively cheaper mass of asymmetrical technology-based systems to fight a prolonged war to defeat a superior enemy. Thus, the answer is a judicious mix, and it must be indigenous.
Subterranean warfare
Empirical wisdom, and experience in the last five years, from Iran, Gaza, and to some extent Ukraine, have demonstrated that the most effective defence against the air, missile and drone campaign of a superior adversary is the adoption of subterranean warfare. Command and control, defences and logistics have to go underground. Tunnel defences offer a pragmatic solution. Even the defence industry, producing critical systems, must go underground. Iran’s ability to maintain residual missile and drone capability as a deterrence is due to tunnel defences created over the years.
The physical protection of India’s Armed Forces belongs to a bygone era and does not cater to the transparent battlefield and precision-guided munitions. Even hardened aircraft shelters/bunkers are above ground. Our defences and logistics installations stand out like sore thumbs, incapable of withstanding a high-end air, missile and drone campaign. It is pertinent to mention that even the US military had to vacate their unprotected bases in the face of a modest Iran missile and drone campaign. There can never be enough air defence to defeat an air campaign.
India needs to develop a subterranean warfare doctrine and adopt it forthwith. Mountains are tailor-made for this warfare. India has the necessary expertise, all it requires is the will.
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Missile and drone forces
There is a strong case for creating a separate force for the employment of missiles and drones at the strategic and operational level. There is no question of missiles or drones replacing the versatile modern fighter aircraft, which today is a multi-functional platform for locating, guiding, and striking air and ground targets and conducting electronic/cyber warfare. Iran has displayed effective employment of drones and missiles at long ranges up to 2,000 km. It is only a matter of time before this technology is transferred to Pakistan. Even Russia bought Shahed drone technology from Iran.
However, the effectiveness of missiles and drones for strategic- and operational-level targets at much lower cost, enmeshed with space-based ISR and guidance, requires a separate organisation. Tactical-level employment can continue with existing organisations.
Multi-domain operations
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) involve the synchronised application of military capabilities across land, air, sea, space, cyber, and information domains to create converging effects against adversaries.
Command and control and weapon platforms at all levels of command must be able to access the same information in real time for follow-up action. Without this capability, 21st-century warfare cannot be fought.
India still has a long way to go.
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Transformation
It is ironic that ‘Defence Forces Vision 2047: A Roadmap for Future-Ready Indian Military’ has been formalised by the Integrated Defence Staff without a formalised National Security Vision, National Security Strategy, National Defence Policy, and an estimate of likely financial commitment. Thus, the transformation of the Armed Forces will continue to be incremental at a lethargic pace.
The Ukraine and Iran wars have given us the blueprints for the pattern of 21st-century conflict. There is no time to be lost. The government must declare a ‘military transformation emergency’. Pakistan would be itching to do an Iran on us, and China would be planning to execute an air campaign without allowing us asymmetrical escalation. India has no choice but to transform.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)