A Bharatiya Janata Pity

Perhaps such is the bitterness at losing power, so powerful the need to live in denial, that BJP has begun to lose its balance at all levels, and, obviously in case of the Naqvi/Naidu types.

File image of a BJP rally | Flickr

If there is one area of governance history would give the NDA good marks for, it is foreign policy. The idea of coercive diplomacy was daring and novel. It also worked even if the NDA messed it up a little bit in the end by sometimes speaking in differing voices and then leaving that 180-degree turn for too late a stage.

Besides original thinking, there were two other reasons Team Vajpayee was able to pull if off. The first was that Vajpayee succeeded in wresting policymaking away from the foreign office bureaucracy and brought it firmly where it belongs, in the political domain. The second, and equally important, was the fact that, at least since the phase of coercive diplomacy and then a renewed engagement in Pakistan began, he never allowed the Venkaiah Naidus and Mukhtar Abbas Naqvis to hold forth on intricacies of high strategy.

At the best of times you would describe these gents and their ilk, the Modis and the Mahajans, as megaphones with no volume control. They all did plenty of damage to the BJP’s own election prospects by making uncivilised personal remarks against Sonia Gandhi and her children. But one area they steered clear of was foreign policy. But now, out of power, they have decided to cross that Lakshman Rekha as well. The victim, unfortunately, is an officer known not just for his integrity, patriotism and intellect but also for displaying courage under fire, in the line of duty in Kashmir.

The object of the megaphones’ ire is Wajahat Habibullah, IAS officer of the 1968 batch from the J&K cadre. Different governments have trusted him, in his long career, with crucial jobs in Kashmir, New Delhi, and overseas. Nobody has ever raised a doubt on whether he has his heart in the right place. His friends would describe him as salt of the earth. His bosses have talked glowingly of his commitment even after he suffered a near-fatal accident in the Valley. Since he also happens to be a Muslim, governments have found him particularly valuable to present India’s viewpoint on the Valley abroad. But maybe that is why the two loudmouth Ns find him such a natural target. His name fits in with their prejudices, so why should they let facts confuse them? Or, do you really expect Venkaiah Naidu, who is a worthy successor to Madan

Lal Khurana’s “never-keep-your-mouth-shut” tradition, and Naqvi, the No. 2 in the BJP’s two-man Muslim team, to understand any of this? They want Habibullah suspended and hauled over the coals for anti-national conduct.

His crime is a perfectly well argued and intelligent paper for the US Institute for Peace which analyses the American position, and likely role, in the Kashmir conflict and related issues in a manner so subtly nuanced a Brajesh Mishra or a Jaswant Singh could have crafted it. His conclusion, as reported by Manini Chatterjee in this newspaper earlier this week, does not vary one bit from the no-mediation/no-intervention/purely lateral Holy National Line: “The US may feel it can best serve its own and the region’s interests by continuing to encourage dialogue between India and Pakistan.” Why should somebody face suspension from service for merely re-stating an old sarkari position?

Now, either they do not know what they are complaining about because they never understood the foreign policy issues anyway, or they are merely joining the game of competitive cynicism along with their seniors who surprised us all the other day with a stunning rollback of their old position on FDI. Perhaps such is their bitterness at losing power, so overwhelming the anger and so powerful the need to live in denial, that the party has begun to lose its balance at all levels, senior, junior and, obviously in case of the Naqvi/Naidu types, juvenile.

It would be a good idea for the two of them to seek out Brajesh Mishra or Jaswant Singh if not Vajpayee for a tutorial on the way they managed India’s interests in those crucial years. Starting with Pokharan II and then through Kargil, Parliament attack, the two near-war situations following the mobilisation, if there is one thing the NDA government can take credit for, it was the way they played the America card. They engaged with the US, drew its attention and energies to the subcontinent in such a way that it felt compelled to lean on Pakistan, to prevent war while at the same time being unable to expand its role into intervention of any kind. In the process, the gains for India were significant and far-reaching.

The Kargil infiltration first brought the US in as a key player. It may still be some time before we can hear our side of the story from Jaswant Singh or Brajesh Mishra but both Clinton and Strobe Talbott in their recent books have given us a pretty good idea of how the game was played. While India continued to build up for war, the pressure was all on Pakistan to withdraw. At another level, the US shadow also ensured that the situation did not spin out of control, into an all-out war. But the really solid gain of that crisis was the acceptance of the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) more or less as a border first by the US and then, as usually happens, by the rest of the international community. More than the loss of face or occupied territory, this was Pakistan’s loss from that misadventure. In spite of the loss of lives and the trauma this was India’s net gain.

Since then the Vajpayee government followed the same strategy of engaging with the US, drawing it into the subcontinental conflict in an audacious, but calculated, manner whereby it was at hand to nudge Pakistan into improving its conduct while, at the same time, providing both sides a hedge as well as a face-saver so they could pull back in case events seemed to be hurtling them into an all-out war.

What Habibullah is suggesting is no different from that. Yes, he talks about the Kashmiris being distrustful and alienated. But so, at various points of time, have most key members of the previous government. Even Vajpayee has said that the reason he made his peace overture in Srinagar in April 2003 was precisely that he saw a new hope and yearning for peace in the eyes of the people assembled to welcome him. He saw in their eyes an opportunity to break away from old alienation, mainly as a result of the 2002 elections. So what is Habibullah saying now that should make the BJP so angry as if Robin Raphel had again questioned the instrument of accession?

Probably the fault lies not with the loudmouths but the top leadership of the BJP. In terms of talent and experience they now constitute a formidable opposition in Parliament and, sure enough, this government will make enough mistakes in the course of time for them to put it on the mat. But, from insurance to America, must they continue to sound so bitter, angry and in denial, as if unable to accept the loss of power and incapable of even savouring the good they may have done, from economic reform to foreign policy?