Over the last two years, the government of Uttar Pradesh (UP) has been discussing land in a different manner than it had earlier. Industrial land is being mapped and added to a searchable database. A draft Unified Land Policy was circulated in September 2025 to harmonise the rules for all the development authorities in the state.
The Chief Minister announced the Urban Redevelopment Policy in October 2025, which is based on what the government calls land reorganisation – redevelopment of underutilised and encroached government land for mixed housing, commercial, and recreational use in 17 districts, and municipal bond issuance to fund it. The cabinet approved the policy on 29 January 2026.
At a workshop in Greater Noida on September 2025, officials said that a survey led by Invest UP, the state’s investment agency, has covered over 33,000 industrial plots in the state’s development authorities, of which about 25% are vacant, and a mapped land bank of over 25,000 acres has been created and is to be updated every month for investors (ET Spotlight, 2025; Invest UP, 2025). However, later accounts differ. Business Standard reported that the state had assembled about 100,000 acres for industry across three authorities, and in June 2026 the Chief Minister told investors in Jewar that the state offers 75,000 acres. No published note explains how these figures relate.
All of this is normal on its own. Governments find themselves with little fiscal space and turn to their assets; land is typically the biggest asset that most state governments have and it is also the least well-accounted for. Before the policy debate becomes a script, a more fundamental question is whether public land in UP is being treated as a one-time revenue source or a long-term development tool that can influence the trajectory of the state’s growth over the coming decades? These are not the same goals, and to mix them up is precisely what other governments have done and are now attempting to back out of.
Why land is a policy issue and not only an asset
UP is facing three pressures simultaneously. The first is fiscal: a state that aspires to become a trillion-dollar economy (Business Standard, 2025), but is constrained by tax revenues and central transfers, assumes that land is the balance-sheet item that is sitting there underused and that needs to be financed. The second is administrative: decades of fragmentation in land records mean that no one in the state government can currently give a reliable and consolidated answer to the question of how much land the state actually owns and where, as the three land bank figures above show.
Even basic property tax collection is hampered by the fact that the records were not designed to reflect how urban land is subdivided and used, as the record formats used for rural parcels do not capture the partitioning and mixed-use nature of city land (Jha et al. 2023). The third pressure is political economy: land cases are among the slowest in Indian courts. About 51.9 million land- and property-related cases were pending at the end of January 2025, and a land acquisition dispute takes about 20 years on average to travel from filing to resolution in the Supreme Court (Wahi 2019) – implying that any monetisation strategy that assumes quick and clean transactions is not as solid on ground as it is on a map.
This is not an exclusively Indian problem. In fact, it is one of the oldest issues in urban economics and other governments have already tried it.
Lessons from other countries
The example most often cited is Singapore and there is a reason for this, but the explanation is often incomplete. Singapore’s land is largely State-owned, a process that was achieved over decades through systematic acquisition beginning in the 1960s. However, this land was not sold off by the State to private owners. The State sells the land to statutory boards at market value, and the proceeds go into the Past Reserves rather than being used as current revenue (Ministry of Finance Singapore, Ministry of Law Singapore, 2022). The Housing and Development Board then sells public flats on 99-year leases (Government of Singapore, 2024).
A 2024 study published in Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie traces this system’s intellectual lineage directly to the classical economic argument – from Ricardo’s theory of rent through Henry George’s writing on the unearned increment – that land value increases from public investment and community growth, not from anything the individual holder does, and should therefore be captured publicly rather than privatised (Purves 2024).
The study finds that this system gave the bottom half of households wealth close to the level economist Thomas Piketty proposed as an ideal. The same study also identifies the next point of challenge for the system: as fixed-term leases expire, owners of apartments on public land will see their values fall towards zero, and Singapore will be confronted with precisely the distributional issues that a purely revenue-driven land sale would have avoided, by simply transferring ownership.
The Netherlands offers the cautionary counterpoint. What planners refer to as active land policy is a practice with roots in the early 20th century (notably after the 1901 Housing Act, which prompted many municipalities to establish specialised land companies) and that became widespread after the Second World War: the purchase of agricultural land, the provision of infrastructure, and the sale of serviced plots to developers for a profit, with proceeds often used to support infrastructure, public facilities, and – in the post-war period – to cross-subsidise social housing.
This was good enough for decades and came to be a point of civic pride. Before the crisis, these land profits were estimated at over 600 million euros a year (van Oosten et al. 2018). Then came the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and municipalities that were left holding land they could no longer sell suffered losses estimated at around 2.6 billion euros between 2010 and 2012 alone (van Oosten et al. 2018). Medium-sized municipalities lost 50 to 100 million euros each, and Apeldoorn lost up to 200 million. The key takeaway is not that public land ownership is foolish. Rather, the lesson is that by considering land acquisition as a speculative real estate investment and not a public policy goal, one turns a governance instrument into a fiscal liability for taxpayers to bear. The authors conclude that land policy should serve spatial quality, not profit.
A third model is that of South Korea’s Land and Housing Corporation (LH), and the long history of land readjustment associations in Japan, where land assembly is primarily a planning function, with revenue being a secondary function, and is used to solve housing shortages and to coordinate infrastructure. In the Seoul area, LH is now shifting from selling the land it assembles to building homes directly. In Japan, the public authority pools many small parcels, plans roads and parks for the whole area, and returns smaller plots to the owners.
The plots are often 50% to 60% of the original size, but they are worth more because they now have services. Even so, success depended on patient persuasion: in 2015, 138 projects had been stalled for more than 10 years, over 27% of the total (Sah and Seetha Ram 2019). The method has also been studied in Germany, the Netherlands, and Israel (Hong and Needham 2007).
The 2022 Global Compendium of Land Value Capture Policies, produced by the OECD and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, includes 60 countries (all 38 OECD members and 22 others) and finds that nearly every country surveyed uses some form of value capture – whether through developer obligations, betterment charges, negotiated infrastructure levies, or strategic public land management – and that European countries rely more heavily on developer obligations and strategic public land management in particular.
The compendium sorts the tools into five groups: infrastructure levies, developer obligations, charges for development rights, land readjustment and strategic land management (OECD and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2022). The instruments are not rare. What is different and what determines success is the institutional discipline in governing the use of the proceeds and the management of the underlying land inventory over time.
Four different concepts that keep getting collapsed into one conversation
One reason why this policy area is confusing is that four different concepts are often talked about as if they were synonymous.
Land monetisation refers to a one-time or front-loaded sale or long-term lease of a specific parcel of public land for its value, usually in the form of monetary return. The National Land Monetisation Corporation (NLMC), the company set up to monetise surplus land owned by central public sector enterprises, is expressly designed on this model. In September 2026 an NLMC panel cleared proposals for consideration as the Centre eyed Rs. 5,000 crore from asset monetisation.
Land governance is wider and precedes monetisation: it is the whole system of records, rights, institutional power, and dispute settlement that establishes whether or not people can transact on a piece of land with legal certainty in the first place.
Land value capture is a particular fiscal method to capture some of the value added to a land asset as a result of the public investment – through betterment levies, transferable development rights, or other means – without necessarily selling the land (OECD and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2022).
The broadest frame is public asset management: managing the entire portfolio of public land as a long-term balance-sheet asset – rather than a collection of parcels awaiting individual decision-making – for a variety of fiscal, social and developmental goals.
The current initiatives in UP involve all four, but do not seem to differentiate between them – at least as discernible from the available public documentation. That is not to say anything against intent. It is a structural risk because a monetisation decision without a governance framework underpinning it is a transaction built on legal quicksand, and a land bank measured in acres without a value capture strategy attached leaves money on the table that could have been used to finance the infrastructure the land required anyway.
The institutional problem underneath the policy problem
None of the four concepts above can work well in UP without addressing a first-order problem: no one has a single, reliable, continually updated inventory of what public land the state has, in what legal condition, under whose administrative control.
Namita Wahi (2019) of the Centre for Policy Research traced much of India’s land conflict to a similar pattern: surveys that are outdated or missing, records that are inaccurate, revenue and forest departments that dispute which land belongs to whom, and more than a thousand central and state land laws that pull in different directions. She warned that digitising records will not help unless they are updated on the ground.
Superimposing a monetisation strategy, a redevelopment policy, and an industrial land bank on top of that fragmentation without first addressing it risks repeating a familiar pattern: announcements that stimulate investor interest but not the legal and administrative underpinning to support delivery.
Digital tools can assist with this to some extent. GIS-based land mapping and satellite monitoring can inform a government where its land is and if it is encroached. However, they cannot by themselves determine who has legal authority over a parcel of land that is in dispute, or correct an incentive structure in which multiple agencies have partial and sometimes conflicting claims to the same land. Technology does not replace the institutional and legal reform that a problem requires – it just increases the visibility of the problem.
Why this should matter beyond the fiscal case
What makes this debate worth more than just a revenue argument is that public land serves two purposes, unlike most other state resources. When a hectare of government land is redeveloped for affordable housing, a transit-connected public space, or green infrastructure for climate resilience, the value is never monetised, but it does impact how equitably and sustainably a city grows for generations. A hectare sold outright to the highest bidder yields a revenue only once and the state cannot use the same parcel for any future public purpose. Both can be a valid option based on the parcel and context.
The challenge is to stop making that decision by default, transaction by transaction, and to put in place a state-level framework that asks, “What is the best use of this specific piece of land to meet which objective?”
There is a need for evidence, not enthusiasm, in that framework. It involves understanding, parcel by parcel, what is there, what it is worth, what it is needed for, and what other governments have tried and what they actually achieved with similar instruments – rather than importing the headline version of Singapore’s model without its lease discipline, or the ambition of the Dutch active land policy without the fiscal caution that decades of losses eventually imposed on it.
Also read: India sells pluralism abroad but struggles to practise it at home
What Uttar Pradesh should do, and in what order
First, publish one count within six months (or any feasible date): acres allotted, in use, empty, and in court, under one agreed meaning of “land bank”. Make the April 2025 database public.
Second, write down the purpose of each parcel before selling or leasing it. Auction only land that is free of court cases and not needed for public use.
Third, lease before selling on important sites, with rising rent and a plan for the day the lease ends. Do not sell land near new expressways and metro lines outright until the state decides how to recover the gain from public spending.
Fourth, keep land money out of daily spending. Put it in a fund for roads and water, and show in the budget how much income depends on land.
Fifth, build a land company only after the count exists. Built first, it would simply sell whatever the authorities hand it.
Sixth, ask the Comptroller and Auditor General to audit how plots are allotted and how many stand empty.
Public land can be a one-time revenue source or a development tool. UP has not yet chosen between these alternatives, and it cannot choose well until it has counted what it holds. The count comes first.
Ajay Gautam is an Assistant Professor at the Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad. He holds a Ph.D. in Law and Governance from Jawaharlal Nehru University and has held postdoctoral fellowships at the London School of Economics and the Indian Institute for Human Settlements. His research focuses on land, law, governance, and social inequality.
The views expressed in this post are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their organisation or of the I4I Editorial Board.
This article was originally published on the Ideas for India website.
