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HomeOpinionIndia sells pluralism abroad but struggles to practise it at home

India sells pluralism abroad but struggles to practise it at home

An India that essentialises its own citizens at home is quietly undermining the pluralism it sells abroad. No G20 presidency or bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council can paper over that contradiction.

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There is a particular kind of confidence India has been projecting abroad lately. It hosted the G20 summit under the banner ‘One Earth, One Family, One Future’, convened the first Voice of the Global South Summit, with 125 countries in the room, and now speaks of itself, perhaps half-jokingly and half-seriously, as a Vishwaguru—a teacher of the world. Diplomats have started using the word Vishwamitra, a friend to all. It is a heady vocabulary for a country that spent decades being told where it stood in the global pecking order.

There is another story, though, running quietly underneath all that diplomatic language, and almost nobody outside India pays it much attention. It has to do with how the country talks about itself when it is not performing for an international audience. That conversation sounds different. 

There is something a little absurd about marketing pluralism to the world as a civilized export while treating it as negotiable at home. 

Essentialism, in plain terms, is the idea that a group of people defined by religion, caste or language carries some fixed core that every member is stuck with whether they want it or not. You are not a Hindu who happens to hold this view or that; you are a Hindu, full stop, and the script comes with the label. You are not a Muslim who happens to vote a certain way; you are a Muslim, and the script writes itself. It is a tidy way of thinking about a genuinely untidy country, which is probably why it is so seductive. Most historians would tell you that this idea is newer than it looks, dressed up as something ancient.

India has never actually been simple, or so Amartya Sen argued in an entire book built around the point. The Argumentative Indian goes back to Ashoka’s edicts on tolerance, to Akbar’s religious debates at Fatehpur Sikri, and centuries of argument in Sanskrit and vernacular languages. Though I suspect Sen’s real point was smaller than the history sweep suggests: India’s real inheritance is disagreement, not doctrine. People here have always picked which parts of their identity to lead with, depending on the room they are in. Whether that is still quite as true as Sen made it sound is a separate question. But it is a different country from the one essentialist politics describes, where a name tells the state everything it needs to know about you.

You can see the essentialist project most clearly in the Hindutva framework that VD Savarkar laid out in the 1920s, which tied Indian-ness to a specific ancestry and a particular relationship with the land. This idea has moved from the margins to the mainstream over the past decade. It is not confined to one movement, though. Caste identity is essentialised on both sides of the reservation debate. Language politics has its own version, deciding what a “real” Bengali or a “real” Tamilian is supposed to sound like. The habit of reducing a person to their group shows up all over Indian politics once you start looking for it, and it is not the property of any one party.

Here is the part that does not resolve cleanly. The Pew Research Center’s 2021 survey of nearly 30,000 Indians found that huge majorities across every religion—85 per cent of Hindus, 78 per cent of Muslims—say they support religious tolerance, and 84 per cent say respecting all religions is central to being “truly Indian”. At the same time, most of those same respondents said they would rather live and marry strictly within their own community. 

Put those two findings next to each other and the picture gets stranger, not clearer. This is not a country full of bigots, at least not by its own telling. It is a country where people say they believe in tolerance and then quietly go back to marrying, praying and living within their own communities, seemingly without noticing the contradiction, or perhaps without being particularly bothered by it. Essentialist politics did not invent that contradiction. It just found it lying around, unclaimed, and gave it a flag to salute and someone to blame.


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The Vishwaguru contradiction

Maybe this is where India’s global pitch gets uncomfortable. A Eurasia Review analysis published in 2025 argued that India’s religious politics are starting to cloud its diplomatic ambitions. Foreign policy commentators have made similar arguments over the years, pointing to a Prime Minister who cultivates the image of a global statesman while presiding over rising polarisation at home. None of this stays within India’s borders. It shows up in the US State Department reports, in the questions foreign correspondents ask before they get to GDP, and reportedly in why the RSS started organising its own outreach trips to the West to manage a story that keeps getting told without it.

The numbers, when you actually look at them, are not much kinder. India Hate Lab’s 2025 report counted 1,318 verified hate speech events targeting religious minorities that year, a 13 per cent rise over 2024 and nearly double the 2023 figure. Of these, 98 per cent targeted Muslims, and anti-Christian hate speech alone rose 41 per cent. Human Rights Watch’s 2026 World Report documents the government using an amended criminal code to go after journalists and activists for peaceful speech. The older pattern of revoking OCI status from diaspora critics, with well over a hundred cases since 2014, has not stopped either. A Reuters journalist is currently suing the Indian government over the cancellation of his OCI status.

This matters because India’s actual pitch to the world was never “we’re the most powerful”. China already has that lane, and more raw capacity to make the case. India’s pitch, the one behind its seat at the head of the Global South table, behind its case for a permanent UN Security Council seat, alongside its economy (now the world’s sixth-largest economy, after a rough year for the rupee), has always leaned on being different. A billion-plus people, staggeringly diverse, who mostly manage to govern themselves without the country falling apart. Pluralism is not a side detail in that story. It is the story.

An India that essentialises its own citizens at home is quietly undercutting the credential it is selling abroad. If the Vishwaguru title is to mean more than just a hashtag, the argument that will determine its meaning is probably not happening in Beijing or Washington. It is the argument that Sen described, the one India has always had with itself. I don’t know that it is an argument anyone can win outright. Maybe the country just needs to keep having it, out loud, without flinching from what the data actually says about it.

Kaushiki Singh Shrinet is an international relations and public policy professional whose research lies at the intersection of foreign policy, security, diplomacy, global governance, and gender and politics. Views are personal.

(Edited by Ratan Priya)

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