The newly elected prime minister of Bangladesh, Tarique Rahman, concluded his much-awaited first foreign tour since he entered office in February 2026. His two-nation tour, first to Malaysia and then China, is seen as a major overhaul of Bangladesh’s foreign and security policy roadmap. It reflects a shift in Dhaka’s regional engagements away from India. Rahman could have made it just a trip to China, but he made Kuala Lumpur, not Beijing, his first stop. Many would say it was simply to avoid headlines in Delhi.
But why avoid Delhi and break with traditional diplomatic practice, especially when Rahman had been pushing to restore ties with India, which were strained in the wake of the ‘July Movement’ in 2024 that ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina? Was it the reported delay in India’s issuance of visas to Bangladeshis or the question of Hasina’s extradition? Is Rahman catering to domestic political sentiment by signalling intent toward India but making the final move toward China? While the answer could be all of the above, it would be a mistake to assume that India did not anticipate such a move.
Away from the political messaging in Bangladesh’s new foreign policy, Rahman’s visit to China must be analysed to understand why it matters.
Key outcomes
The Bangladeshi prime minister’s three-day tour of China was comprehensive, with key outcomes including security engagements, development cooperation, connectivity, investments, maritime affairs, medical cases, and multilateralism. A total of 13 MoUs were reportedly signed, and among Rahman’s key meetings with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership was with President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall in Beijing.
The Chinese state media called the visit an “upgrade” in ties, citing Rahman’s remarks on Beijing as the “most valued and trusted partner”.
However, the original elevation and language change in bilateral ties occurred all the way back during Xi’s visit to Bangladesh in October 2016, when the relationship was upgraded to a “Strategic Partnership”. It was the same year that Bangladesh joined China’s multibillion-dollar ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
Both key developments in the Bangladesh-China relationship occurred during the second term of Hasina, who was considered close to India. If Hasina could tilt toward China more strategically despite sharing a closer bond with India, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect an ‘India First’ approach of a regime that has been elected after her ouster (especially when Delhi continues to host Hasina as a ‘guest’).
Also read: Tarique Rahman’s visit to Malaysia indicates changing geopolitics
Deepening party ties
In addition to the diplomatic courtesy exchanges, an early development during Rahman’s visit to China was the signing of an MoU between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the CCP. This development needs some attention, as in the past decade, the CCP has been advocating stronger party-level ties in countries of the Indian subcontinent—alongside state-level ties—to enhance its political outreach.
Notably, amid the current political churn in the region, Bangladesh and Nepal have seen a rise in new political leaders and parties. For China, this presents an opportunity to forge early alliances. This political change reflects a shift away from Indian centrality and hypernationalism. The aspiring youth leadership in Bangladesh and Nepal seems to prefer not being burdened by history—which includes shared ties with the closest neighbour.
China understands that party-level exchanges become crucial during elections as well as periods of political instability in those countries. Apart from Bangladesh, China recently made a similar push with Nepal during foreign affairs minister Shishir Kahanal’s visit, advocating a “political party+ channel” to “consolidate and develop friendly” ties with the ruling Rashtriya Swatantra Party.
Maritime cooperation, connectivity, defence, trade
Apart from the emphasis on party-level ties, security and maritime cooperation between China and Bangladesh require closer inspection. In the joint statement, the subtle mention that the two sides “agreed to strengthen cooperation in maritime affairs”, without much explanation, must be read with caution. Beijing is expanding its strategic watermarks in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) through maritime infrastructure development in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, and other littoral states of BoB such as Sri Lanka.
This expansion is further reflected in the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC), a key strategic corridor near India’s east and northeast. The CMBEC was discussed and announced during Rahman’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart. While the development has captured headlines in Delhi for its strategic significance, a further action plan would help clarify its critical impact on India, given that the country shares long borders with both Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Additionally, the two sides agreed to “jointly advance the Mongla Port Facilities Modernisation and Expansion Project and the development of the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram”. Interim leader Muhammad Yunus proposed the move during his visit to China in March 2025. The recent development reflects Beijing’s intent to pursue the project, as it has strategic value. Both Bangladeshi ports are in proximity to India and have a Chinese presence, raising concerns for New Delhi.
On the foreign and security policy front, China and Bangladesh have agreed to “set up a mechanism for strategic dialogue between foreign ministers” and also explore “a 2+2” dialogue mechanism on diplomacy and defence”. While these mechanisms help maintain regular exchanges on diplomatic and defence matters, they primarily serve as key initiatives to enhance China’s defence exports. The Global Times has reported on Dhaka’s intent to buy 24 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets, the aircraft used by Pakistan against India in May 2025.
China is among Bangladesh’s largest trading partners, with annual bilateral trade estimated at $18 billion. As of 2024, China was reported to have a trade surplus of $21.7 billion with Bangladesh, while exports reached $22.8 billion and imports totalled $1.16 billion, indicating Chinese dominance.
The trade deficit remains a key challenge for Bangladesh, for which some efforts seem to have been made during this visit, beginning with tariffs.
“Bangladesh appreciated China for the zero-tariff treatment for 100 percent tariff lines, and will foster a favorable environment for Chinese enterprises to invest in Bangladesh,” the joint statement read.
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No hides on Taiwan
If one closely looks at the structure of China’s Joint Communiques with other countries, the first few paragraphs often carry the weight of Beijing’s security concerns, while the following lines clarify the objective.
The recent joint statement said that Bangladesh has reaffirmed its “strong commitment” to the One China principle.
“Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. Bangladesh resolutely opposed any form of ‘Taiwan independence’, firmly supported efforts of the Chinese government in achieving national reunification,” the statement read.
While diplomatic reiterations on such issues by other countries are important in Beijing’s strategic calculus and its position on global platforms, it is also a way of warning countries in the region and beyond not to engage with Taiwan and isolate Taipei. Interestingly, the earliest mention of Taiwan in official China-Bangladesh Communiqués occurred during former Premier Wen Jiabao’s State Visit to Bangladesh in April 2005. The wording may have changed over the past two decades, but the message remains the same.
Undoubtedly, Taiwan has become a standard ask for China, in addition to other engagements it seeks from Bangladesh on trade, connectivity, and defence. It also reveals how Beijing uses its power to advance strategic interests, especially against geographically smaller and less powerful countries, and then presents that pressure in the subtle language of diplomacy, partnership, and mutual respect.
The Chinese modus operandi in countries in India’s neighbourhood in recent years has clearly been to exploit resources, events, and political dynamics that seek to shift away from engagement with India. Be it the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, or Bangladesh, Beijing is clearly not missing out. The fact remains that for countries of the subcontinent, concessions to China come at the cost of their own peace and stability.
Way forward
The recent political upheavals in countries of the Indian subcontinent have not only changed their internal orders but also their foreign and security policies. Since India has traditionally been an all-weather friend, the new forces want to move away from Delhi in pursuit of short-term political gains. It is the belief among these countries that China will prove to be a reliable partner. For Bangladesh, the way forward should not be framed as a choice between India and China, but as a careful balancing of development needs with long-term strategic autonomy.
At the same time, New Delhi must also be clear that geography, shared history, and the legacy of the 1971 war alone cannot be the guarantors of influence and friendship. It must note that the youth-led, development-focused political apparatus in Dhaka will judge India on its proactive delivery of development, connectivity, and water cooperation, among other areas. At the same time, issues such as visas must be handled delicately, as they affect the strongest pillar of the India-Bangladesh bilateral partnership—the people.
Rishi Gupta is a commentator on global strategic affairs. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)