The onus of supporting Ukraine in its long-standing war against Russia is evidently going to fall on Europe. The bloc’s dependence on the United States for security is forever wrapped in melancholic uncertainty until it doesn’t stand up to the occasion.
The response emanating from Europe hinges on the catchphrase ‘Trump-proofing’ and has two complementary vectors. One, Europe militarising itself, and two, providing military support to Ukraine.
There has been enhanced involvement of individual European actors and the European Union in the Russia-Ukraine war since the delay in the United States aid package to Kyiv. In this regard, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, recently proposed creating a €100 billion military fund for Ukraine and offered coordinating military aid to it as well.
These are pathbreaking departures from NATO’s role in the Ukraine war that, till now, was restricted to providing non-lethal aid for fear of escalation. It will also make NATO more directly involved with taking over operational responsibilities of coordinating military assistance provided by member states, which, until now, was spearheaded by the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein, a coalition with more than 50 countries responsible for providing 99 per cent of all military aid to Kyiv.
This proposal comes months before NATO’s summit in Washington in July where key priorities for the alliance will be discussed as it celebrates its 75th anniversary.
All these developments suggest that finally, NATO is also Trump-proofing the European theatre lest the US presidential elections perpetuate the uncertainty in the air into tangible hindrances. So far, the alliance has steered clear of directly supporting Ukraine. Money to Ukraine doesn’t go from NATO’s budget but from individual member states. With this new proposal on board, the member states would have to discuss various mechanisms and also dwell on the question of whether or not individual bilateral assistance should be included in the overall amount.
Also read: EU’s real problem isn’t war fatigue. It lacks a grand strategy
7 verticals of Trump-proofing
The latest trump-proofing efforts made by NATO complement at least six other endeavours happening at different verticals across the European theatre.
One is the finalisation of individual security agreements with Ukraine. After the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Finland has become the eighth NATO country to have concluded almost identical and long-term (at least 10 years) security treaties with Ukraine, pledging financial support, military aid, and defence industry cooperation. Although bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine were finalised at NATO’s Vilnius Summit in 2023, Ukraine’s NATO dream isn’t around the corner at all.
Two, in 2023, the EU pledged to produce 1 million 155 mm shells by spring this year. Behind schedule and facing real-time problems in coordinating its defence industries, the EU now seems confident to deliver 1.5 million shells by the end of 2024. Giant defence industries across the continent are expanding and returning to artillery production.
The lack of ammunition is bringing major changes in Kyiv’s war tactics. With less ammo to fire on the battlefront, Ukraine is attacking deeper into Russian territories, targeting their logistics and hydrocarbon reserves.
Ukraine’s strikes on Russia’s naval capabilities in the Black Sea region have also been increasing in scale and frequency. However, the delay in ammunition reinforcement has been detrimental to Ukraine’s defence of its front where a slow retreat has been underway as the risk of front line collapsing grows by the day.
Three, the introduction of the Czech-led initiative for the purchase of ammunition from outside the EU. More than 15 countries have raised approximately €1.8 billion as part of this initiative, which was proposed by Czech President Petr Pavel at the Munich Security Conference in February 2024. He had found 5,00,000 155 mm and 3,00,000 Soviet-era 122 mm shells outside of Europe. With the purchase complete, the shipment will reportedly be delivered to Ukraine this month.
Four, the release of the EU’s first defence industry strategy (EDIS) in March 2024. This strategy states a clear, long-term vision to achieve defence industrial readiness in the EU by coordinating member states’ investments, boosting research, and building better resilience in defence supply chains. Under this initiative, the EU has decided to open an Office for Defence Innovation in Kyiv. Broadly, the targets set out by 2030 include joint purchases of 40 per cent of the defence equipment, prioritising products made in Europe, and trading at least 35 per cent of defence equipment at an intra-EU level.
For a bloc with state-of-the-art defence industries with a global focus, this could mean an overhaul of sorts. Where the EDIS gets it right is simultaneously creating a regulation, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), to start implementing the concrete measures identified in the EDIS. The success of the EU’s long-term plan to support Ukraine by revitalising its defence industry base is going to rely on how well the EDIS and the EDIP work in tandem.
Five, the EU is mulling to bypass the treaty ban to buy military equipment for Ukraine. The EU treaty clause Article 41 (2) stops the EU common budget from funding military purchases. Until now, the process by which the bloc was securing military aid for Ukraine was quite historic itself, but it was an off-budget instrument called the European Peace Facility (EPF), which bypassed Article 41 (2). Moreover, the EPF remains a cumbersome process as it requires negotiating 27 member states afresh every time a replenishment is needed.
What is underway today in Brussels is a debate on the legal interpretation of Article 41 (2) between the EU’s legal service that is bullish on the proposal and the European Commission’s lawyers who are conservative on it. The commission has proposed a joint legal task force to examine this issue.
Six, the setting up of the Ukraine Facility. In February 2024, the EU Council and Parliament agreed on a new support mechanism called the Ukraine Facility (UF), committing $50 billion under the new single dedicated instrument to support Ukraine’s reconstruction and modernisation while also supporting its accession path to the EU. The UF operates on three pillars that include plans for reconstruction and modernisation, investment framework in the form of budgetary guarantees through grants and loans, and accession assistance measures.
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Trump-proofing is a bumpy road
At the level of optics, this is the West signalling to Russia that it is not letting Moscow outlast Kyiv’s allies. While the reality is clouded with oodles of rhetoric, Europe’s support for Ukraine today stands on these seven interrelated verticals. Not all could be equally effective or successful, but taken together, they do make a compelling case for the European endeavour to fend for its security.
However, back home, these efforts and their execution need to be agreed upon by all the member states in the EU and NATO. A modus vivendi therein is easier said than done, as all member states do not have the same opinion on Russia or on supporting Ukraine. There is an undeniable factor of Hungary and its own relationship with both Moscow and Beijing, though not at the cost of losing either NATO or EU membership but enough to delay the process of making speedy decisions for Ukraine.
There are upcoming elections in the EU and Budapest holding the rotating presidency of the EU Council from June to December 2024, which might adversely impact the execution of these plans. The lack of coordination between major European powers like Germany and France that are still not able to fulfil their basic NATO commitments also remains anything but encouraging.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)
Russia never should’ve received Lend-lease from the U.S. in WWII and the West never should’ve given eastern Europe to Stalin. Instead they should’ve listened to U.S. Gen. Patton and destroyed the Russian military.
If Europe cannot take the United States for granted, after 75 years of NATO, new friends in the Asia – Pacific should take note. Some believe the Ukraine conflict is attributable to the eastward expansion of NATO. The policy of containment of China, which now includes a large economic component, to the extent of undoing globalisation, could also create an unpleasant outcome. Taiwan to provide the spark.
What is lost in all the Ukraine reporting is the basic ‘why’s of the conflict. Russia doesn’t pose a threat to continental europe. They simply can’t prevail against the combined might of NATO so the spectre of a Russian conquest east of Ukraine is a myth. Russia is interested in keeping its border states outside of any US led military alliance, just as the US was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The EU, especially France, was at the beginning of the war, sensitive to these concerns. According to Dr. John Mearsehmier, the US and UK essentially forced EU into this long war by scuttling the Nafthali Benett led negotiations in Istanbul. Now however the EU, and particularly Macron, has made a volte face, declaring that their ‘credibility’ is at stake. The reluctant EU has now morphed into the spearhead of the support mission. Why? Dr. Arta Moeni thinks that it is a project for greater ‘nationhood’ for the EU in which Ukraine is an unfortunate pawn. I’d like to see other opinions on the why. While the number of shells Ukraine gets and the various political instruments of supplying it are important, the whys of the affair are far more interesting to read.