With a fragile ceasefire in Middle East and shifting geopolitical currents worldwide, a difficult question has surfaced in strategic circles: has India done enough—or has it chosen to do too little?
The issue is not about diplomatic theatrics. It is about India’s evolving global stature. If New Delhi seeks to move beyond being a voice of the Global South to becoming a consequential global actor, then moments of crisis are not interruptions; they are tests. And in this test, India’s conspicuous absence from the diplomatic choreography has raised uncomfortable questions.
Today, India maintains working relationships with all principal actors—Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv. Yet, as negotiations unfolded and backchannels activated, it was Pakistan, and not India, that found itself in the room. This inversion of expectations has triggered a deeper debate: has India’s self-imposed caution ceded strategic space?
The case for caution
There is, to be fair, a strong defence of India’s approach. India’s interests in Middle East are complex and deeply material. Energy security remains paramount. The region supplies a substantial share of India’s oil and gas, underpins fertiliser availability, and hosts a vast diaspora whose remittances are critical to the economy. Maritime stability in the Gulf is not an abstraction; it is to some extent an economic lifeline.
In such a context, risk aversion is not weakness; it is prudence. India has, over the past decade, invested heavily in bilateral relationships across the region, carefully de-hyphenating ties—engaging Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states on parallel tracks without allowing one relationship to derail another. This calibrated multi-alignment has delivered tangible gains.
Moreover, not every strategy requires overt activism. Quiet diplomacy, restraint, and a consistent emphasis on dialogue and de-escalation have long been India’s preferred tools. Given the volatility of the current crisis, marked by high-stakes miscalculations, leadership targeting, and the ever-present risk of escalation, there is logic in avoiding entanglement.
Yet, caution carries costs, especially when it begins to look like passivity. India’s response to recent developments appeared measured to the point of invisibility. The reluctance to call out violations, whether on sovereignty, targeted assassinations, or disruptions to maritime security, sits uneasily with India’s traditional commitment to international law. Even when India invoked its familiar “4 Ds”—dialogue, diplomacy, de-escalation, and de-hyphenation—the messaging seemed routine rather than purposeful.
This matters because norms erode not only through action, but through silence. If pre-emptive strikes, targeted killings, or blockades become normalised, the consequences will extend far beyond Middle East. For a country like India, which has consistently argued for a rules-based international order, selective quietude risks undermining its own long-term interests.
There were, arguably, low-cost ways to do more. India did not need to mediate or insert itself into negotiations. But it could have articulated clearer red lines—without naming actors—on what constitutes unacceptable behaviour. It could have leveraged plurilateral platforms such as BRICS to shape a broader call for restraint. Even symbolic actions, like timely statements and calibrated outreach, might have signalled intent.
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The Pakistan factor
Pakistan’s visible role in recent diplomatic exchanges has added a layer of strategic discomfort for India. Its emergence as a facilitator, however limited, has prompted concerns about a shift in regional relevance.
But this requires perspective. Pakistan’s involvement reflects tactical convergence rather than structural transformation. It was enabled by a specific alignment of interests, particularly with the US, and by its utility at a given moment. Such roles are often transient and rarely translate into sustained trust or influence.
Indeed, history suggests that Pakistan’s ability to leverage geopolitical openings tends to be episodic. Its internal contradictions, economic fragility, and long-standing credibility deficits impose clear limits. As some seasoned practitioners note, mediation is as much about acceptability as it is about capability, and both are in short supply over the long term in Pakistan.
The more consequential issue, therefore, is not Pakistan’s moment in the sun, but India’s own strategic posture.
Has India become overly risk-averse in its external engagement? Has the imperative of balancing multiple relationships, particularly the growing weight of ties with the US, constrained its willingness to act independently? And in seeking to avoid friction, is India inadvertently diminishing its own voice?
There is also a domestic dimension. The narrative of India’s global rise has, at times, outpaced the realities of its diplomatic choices. Great powers are not judged only by their economic weight or military capability, but by their willingness to shape outcomes, especially in moments of crisis.
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Recalibrating without overreaching
None of this implies that India should abandon prudence or lurch into adventurism. The region’s complexities, and India’s stakes in that complexity, demand careful calibration. But calibration is not the same as reticence.
India must find ways to be present without being intrusive; to be principled without being partisan; and to be proactive without being reckless. This requires a more agile diplomatic toolkit; one that combines quiet engagement with selective assertion.
It also requires clarity of purpose. If India seeks a larger role in the global order, it cannot remain a bystander in crises that directly affect its interests. Nor can it rely solely on bilateralism when regional dynamics demand broader engagement.
Middle East is not a peripheral theatre for India—it is central to its economic security and strategic future. The current crisis, therefore, is not just another episode to be managed; it is a signal moment.
India’s restraint may have been justified. But its absence has been noted. The challenge now is not to rewrite the past, but to recalibrate the future. Because in geopolitics, space once ceded is rarely returned without effort.
Shishir Priyadarshi is President, Chintan Research Foundation. Views are personal.
(Edited by Saptak Datta)