The United States, China and Russia are raising the rhetorical temperature on the Arctic, but India is yet to craft a coherent strategy for engaging one of the world’s most consequential regions – economically and geopolitically.
At the Arctic Council meeting in Finland earlier this month, US secretary of state Mike Pompeo warned that with Russia and China expanding their Arctic footprint, the northern latitudes had become “an arena of global power and competition.” A recent Pentagon report highlighted China’s growing clout in the Arctic and speculated that it might, in the future, deploy ballistic missile submarines to the region.
The US also sparked anger by blocking a joint declaration that made reference to man-made climate change. China and India are among the 13 “observer” states at the Arctic Council, whose eight member states are Russia, Canada, the United States, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark. India’s participation comes at a time of dramatic developments in the high north, fuelled by climate change and the ambitions of states.
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Arctic in flux
Last September, the volume of sea ice in the Arctic was a quarter of what it was in 1979. Thawing Arctic glaciers are the primary cause of sea-level rise today and pour nearly 13,000 tonnes of fresh water into the oceans every second.
As the Arctic ice melts, Russia and Canada have revamped military facilities in the region, and China has unveiled plans for a “Polar Silk Road”. Russia wants to quadruple Arctic shipping by
2025, by building infrastructure and enlarging its fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. China has also stepped up its diplomatic and economic profile, positioning itself as a “near-Arctic” state, striking a slew of oil and gas-related deals with Russia and concluding a free trade agreement with Iceland. It is currently building a 30,000-tonne nuclear-powered icebreaker.
In 2007, two Russian mini-submarines planted a rust-proof national flag made of titanium on the seabed, more than four kilometres below the North Pole. Arctic nations have since been making aggressive claims – a trend driven by the perceived commercial gains to be made as the ice recedes due to climate change.
A much-cited US Geological Survey report in 2008 estimated the Arctic held 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 per cent of its undiscovered natural gas. Arctic shipping routes could also cut the sailing distance between northwest Europe and northeast Asia by more than a third.
Arctic states are keenly aware that military tensions will drive away investments, which is why most have remained committed to resolve their territorial disputes through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Despite this focus on commercial activity, the Arctic will remain a difficult place to do business. Ambitious drilling and mining projects will struggle with delays and cost overruns in the harsh environment of the region. Hydrocarbon wells will only be viable when global prices shoot up.
Shipping routes will also not be easy to navigate. Even in the summers, drift ice will pose a problem for shipping, until at least 2040. Specially designed vessels with strengthened hulls will be needed to ply the frigid waters, and they’ll be frequently assisted by icebreakers.
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India’s options
India’s Arctic connection dates back to 1923 when, as part of the British Empire, it joined the Svalbard Treaty. The Treaty allowed signatories to carry out commercial activities on Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago. After Independence, India’s attention turned south to the Antarctic. It joined the treaty that demilitarised the Antarctic and, currently operates two research stations there.
The gradual turn towards the Arctic began little over a decade ago. In 2008, India inaugurated its first Arctic research station, Himadri, in Svalbard, just 1,200 kilometres from the North Pole. In 2013, India was granted observer status in the Arctic Council.
The next year, state-run ONGC’s overseas arm OVL finalised a deal with Russia’s Rosneft to explore for oil and gas in the polar region.
India has described its interests in the Arctic as being “scientific, environmental, commercial as well as strategic”. While this expansive definition of India’s interests is accurate, it does not clarify what is most important. India lies far too south for the Arctic shipping routes to be attractive. And for all the hype about Arctic mineral resources, India has better options closer to home.
Arctic shipping might re-route some of China’s trade away from the Strait of Malacca, thereby reducing its vulnerability to this chokepoint and denying Indian ports commercial opportunities. However, there is little India can do about this.
That leaves us with scientific and environmental interests. Melting Arctic glacial ice is currently the chief contributor to rising sea levels, which could devastate coastal communities in India and across the Indian Ocean Region with all the attendant humanitarian, economic, and strategic consequences. This must remain India’s primary focus in the Arctic.
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The Madrid Protocol, which came into force in 1998, keeps the Antarctic’s natural resources off-limits until 2048. But in the Arctic, mining and other destructive commercial activities are set to grow, accelerating the ecological destruction wrought by climate change.
India’s Arctic focus should, first, strengthen its scientific capabilities in the region and maintain a robust diplomatic presence in the Arctic Council and its working groups. Second, India ought to nurture broad-based relationships with Arctic countries.
Scientific work would help India better understand the impact of a changing Arctic on its own monsoon. Diplomatic efforts would counsel restraint in the pursuit of natural resources without openly criticising specific projects. India will also have to abandon its earlier rhetoric about the Arctic being the “common heritage of mankind,” since the nations of the region consider this formulation an infringement on their sovereignty.
To strengthen its scientific capacity, India should set up more research stations in the region. It should also procure its long-overdue polar research vessel and build or buy more such ships. Finally, it must formalise collaboration with top polar research institutions in Europe and offer Indian students scholarships to study in them.
To coordinate its international efforts, India can appoint a senior diplomat for polar affairs. This person would not only work with Arctic states, but also build a coalition of like-minded developing countries concerned about developments in the Arctic region. India could also back public diplomacy initiatives, such as organising meetings between indigenous communities of the Arctic (which are represented in the Arctic Council) and Indian Ocean communities.
The possibilities are many, but India needs to quickly get its act together before opportunities melt away with the polar ice.
The author is a policy researcher at the Takshashila Institution.