It was an extraordinary speech on a subject once momentous, but given events happening all around, the bait was not bitten into. News, after all, is too dynamic to fret long over a doomsday subject that had been relegated to discredited speculation. Even refusing to be revived from its topic-induced stupor by scaremongering that Russia may use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Nuclear weapons and the threat of a radioactive conflict has long been downgraded for being simply sensationalist. So, when the current Advisor to the Nuclear Command Authority in Pakistan speaks, it should’ve garnered more attention than it did.
Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Kidwai spoke on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, at the Arms Control and Disarmament Centre in Islamabad’s Institute of Strategic Studies. The occasion was the 25th anniversary of the South Asian tests, but the content of the speech was of greater importance, regionally as well as globally. For, unlike North Korea, the speech wasn’t a missile launched sabre-rattling exercise, but simply cold cuts spread on a table, sans preservatives. The technical aspects of the speech were largely on expected lines, gung-ho, flag waving stuff. But what warrants greater attention is the psychology behind the policy enunciated.
Engage differently
Getting to know that psychology involves making changes to hitherto routine talks, since decades of Indo-Pakistani talks haven’t progressed beyond the routine politico-diplomatic utterances. Even the feet-touching gesture of Prime Minister Modi didn’t make much of a difference to the relationship. So now given the policy expounded by Pakistan’s nuclear principal, it is worth taking a different route, finally initiating a regular dialogue between the Indian and Pakistani militaries. There have been enough welcoming signs from the Pakistani army leadership, including those when in harness. Going by their professionalism, it is certain that the Indian military hierarchy will reciprocate.
The two militaries have never been engaged in a dialogue that didn’t involve trading lead, so it was time they learnt to speak with each other. The genesis of Pakistan’s skewed policies stem from its military insecurities. Since no politicians or diplomats, and neither war, has been able to find a solution to those insecurities, it is worth trying the route of a military-military dialogue. The structured dialogue can begin with the former appointments, Chiefs or DGs of Military Operations, or any such platform that gives it a better framework than a round of golf, undoubtedly a great bonding exercise.
Over time, it can be institutionalised to include serving officers occupying key appointments. Institutional insecurities clearly need to be addressed and there is no shame in doing so. Only then will Indians begin to understand the psychology behind the policy.
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It is a journey that Lt Gen Kidwai traced in his recent speech, and it began over half a century ago, ‘humiliation of the 1971 War followed by India’s testing of a nuclear device at Pokhran in May 1974’. To now where, ‘Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a “target-rich India”.’ The former two milestones reverberate in Pakistani security conversations. His subsequent line is of greater importance though, ‘Its political will and intention to employ that capability in the ruthless pursuit of its political objectives were made quite clear to Pakistan on both occasions’.
The crafty Indian caricature persists well into this century.
Then other gems follow, ‘Allah was clearly on our side when he provided breathing space to Pakistan’s nuclear programme for nearly a decade when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the international focus on Pakistan’s nuclear project was pushed into the background.’ So now Pakistan has a Full Spectrum Deterrence that covers horizontal, tri-service assets, as well as the vertical, with ‘range coverage from 0 meters to 2,750 km, as well as nuclear weapons destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical.’ The greater worry is the zero range, not the capability to strike at thousands of kilometres.
Who is Gen Kidwai
Before analysing the zero it is important to know more about the theorist. Artillery officer Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Kidwai took over as Director General Strategic Plans Division in 2000 and through extensions stayed there. In fact Michael Krepon, the Washington disarmament specialist likened him to a US legend. ‘The “father” of the US nuclear navy, Admiral Hyman Rickover, had such a high profile and was deemed to be so essential by his supporters on Capitol Hill that his retirement from active duty was postponed until the ripe old age of 81. Pakistan’s closest approximation to Admiral Rickover is…Kidwai’.
Lt Gen Kidwai must undoubtedly have done an excellent job in keeping Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal safe from snooping eyes as varied as American, Indian, Al Qaeda and the occasional fortune seeker like AQ Khan. Another western analyst described him succinctly but thoroughly, ‘he has spent much of his life trying to create pockets of order in a nation to which order does not come naturally. In 1971, Kidwai was captured during a war with India and held as a prisoner of war for two years in the north Indian city of Allahabad — an experience he is still reluctant to discuss.
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Psychology of a Pakistani in Indian captivity, would undoubtedly have been impacted. Therefore, the lines about ‘humiliation’ and India’s ‘political will and intention to employ that capability’ from the 1970s speaks volumes about the mind that directs Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Which in essence is:
- there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide.
- Pakistan’s ‘counter-massive retaliation’ can therefore be as severe if not more.
- That Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a “target-rich India”, notwithstanding the indigenous Indian BMD or the Russian S-400, to include counter-value, counter-force and battlefield targets.
It is well nigh time, therefore, for India and Pakistan to allow their militaries to engage with each other in a civilised manner, across the table, on a regular basis. This getting to know each other exercise will clear many a doubts, remove misgivings and open the minds to the current realities. The politico-diplomatic practices of the past haven’t gotten anywhere, so it’s worth trying anew. Otherwise that zero metre capability touted by Lt Gen Kidwai will become a technology trap of tyrannical proportions. Military logistics will go for a toss, as will command and control at the section level.
Manvendra Singh is a Congress leader, Editor-in-Chief of Defence & Security Alert and Chairman, Soldier Welfare Advisory Committee, Rajasthan. He tweets @ManvendraJasol. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)