Around 228 BCE, during the Warring States period in China, the House of Zhao was at war with the House of Qin. Li Mu, a brilliant strategist and fearless general, was Commander of the Zhao army, and the Qin realised that unless General Li Mu was removed, they couldn’t defeat the Zhao. So, they bribed a court official of the Zhao to spread the word that General Li Mu had ambition to usurp the throne of Zhao, once he defeated the Qin. When this rumour gained currency, King Qian had Li Mu killed. Three months later, the weaker Qin won a decisive victory over the stronger but leaderless Zhao.
It seems like the Chinese Premier Xi Jinping hasn’t read ancient Chinese history. General Zhao Zongqi, the former Western Theatre Commander, became the 102nd Senior Commander to be purged by Xi last week.
That’s not all. Communism in China was born of Leninist -Marxist thought, diffused across the border from Russia, which attracted Mao Zedong and his cohort to set up the foundations of the Communist Party of China in 1921. Russian influence was all-pervasive in China, and as recently as 2015, it was an established criterion for every officer in the People’s Liberation Army to have been schooled in warfare in Russia to become a General in the PLA.
Stalin purged the Red Army in 1937-38, driven by paranoia and determination to remove all competition, executing or imprisoning three out of five Soviet marshals, including the brilliant Mikhail Tukhachevsky ( he is the author of ‘Deep Battle’ maneuver), thirteen out of fifteen Army commanders and as many as 30,000-40,000 officers. This actually convinced Hitler to view the Soviet Army as a weak “headless Colossus,” as he unleashed Operation Barbarossa to capture the oil-rich Caucasus and Stalingrad in 1941.
Hitler famously said, “We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down”. Ultimately, Stalin had to release a few of his generals, reinstate them, give them wartime commands, and fight the German Army. The Russian Army stymied and finally routed the Germans almost three years later in 1944.
What are the ‘never-ending’ purges of PLA about?
When Xi Jinping became political, party and military head of China as President, Chairman of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he began his ambitious Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to transform the PLA into a ‘world-class ‘ army. Aside from the military aspects, it was the deep-rooted culture of corruption, nepotism and factionalism that needed weeding. Xi went after the PLA leadership with a vengeance, promising to take on “flies” as well as “tigers”, implying he would spare none, irrespective of status. He thundered that “If we don’t redress unhealthy tendencies to develop and allow them to develop, it will be like putting up a wall between the party and our people, and we will lose our roots, our life-blood and our strength”. He unleashed a campaign against the four evils of “formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance” issuing an “Eight Point Regulation” in 2012 to erase these four evils.
Lofty ideals that found favour with the people then. Over a million party members were purged, and that continues to this day. But 2026 is not 2012.
It is next to impossible for any system to continue to be “corrupt” and for its generals to “seriously violate discipline and law” over 14 long years, with no fear of the consequences. Therefore, the problem lies elsewhere.
Is the purge a widespread phenomenon, or is it focused against a particular region, group or faction?
A detailed study by the China Power Project at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), corroborated by other sources and covering the period from January 2022 to February 2026, offers some interesting and revealing data points.
The maximum purges have been in the Southern Theater Command, followed by Central, Eastern and Northern Theatres in that order. The top three Commands are responsible for the annexation of Taiwan to achieve Xi Jinping’s dream of “Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”. Nothing could be more disconcerting to a political leader than to find the very Commanders entrusted with this sacred duty to be fallible and corrupt.
The Western Theatre Command, Xinjiang, and Tibet Military Command are at the very bottom of the purge list. These are the commands facing India. Indian strategists should take note: by and large, commanders responsible for the LAC with India appear to be less corrupt and perhaps more loyal and committed than their counterparts elsewhere. Even in interactions with junior officers, it was evident that those serving in the more prosperous provinces along China’s eastern seaboard had stronger aspirations and ambitions than those deployed in the harsh, remote regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.
Those Generals who were closer to the power centre in Beijing were purged in much larger numbers than those in lesser important billets elsewhere. For example, out of 90 Generals and Lieutenant Generals purged in the last four years, as many as 21 were from the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and its Functional Departments in Beijing alone. Clearly, Xi has put the lens of scrutiny on these Generals rather than on operational Commanders located in other regions around China (25 out of 90).
The largest numbers purged are from the Rocket Force, Army and Navy in that order, with the Air Force and erstwhile Strategic Support Force (now trifurcated into Aerospace, Cyber and Information Support Force) at the bottom of the ladder. The Cyber and Information Support Force is the eyes and ears of Xi Jinping, and it should come as no surprise that a lot of information on the purged Generals would have been collected by these two forces. The stories of fuel in the missile silos being replaced with water and silo doors that wouldn’t open are rife, as are the huge kickbacks to the military-industrial complex that built these missiles and rocket systems.
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What does this portend for the PLA?
First, Higher Direction of War (HDW). With a non-operational Commander like Zhang Shengmin (he is from the Political Commissar stream) and Xi Jinping himself at the apex command of the PLA in the CMC, it is clear that HDW is directly under the command of Xi himself. Theatre Commanders would be reporting directly to Xi, a dangerous precedent of a non-military leader holding absolute command and control over the PLA. With it also comes the responsibility and accountability for the outcomes of war, notably Taiwan. It is therefore abundantly clear that the impending war across the straits is still away, till Xi builds up a professional leadership that gives him the confidence that they will deliver Taiwan to him.
Second, when any Commander reports directly to the Supreme Commander in an authoritarian regime, it comes with two pressures – the pressure to show loyalty and the pressure to deliver. Dictators don’t want to hear bad news. When the repercussions of fear of failure are known, Commanders tend to overstep their remit, lose the sense of reason and display idolatry toward their leaders. Remember when Henry VIII beheaded three of his queens; the most despised and dangerous job in all of England was to become his Queen. To be a General in the PLA today is, possibly, a similar predicament.
Third, the professionalism of the PLA. Much has been written about the risk aversion of Commanders, the obvious ‘looking over the shoulders’ mentality and the impact of poor leadership on morale in the rank and file. Some thinkers have indicated a lack of experience in the new crop of military Commanders that would be promoted to these billets, and reflect on their ability to successfully prosecute military operations, in particular, complex amphibious operations across the Taiwan Straits.
Inarguably, these observations are true. However, it would be wise to limit that to a period in time only. Remember, officers in most professional armies, like the US, India or Pakistan, serve in flag ranks (Major General and above) for five to six years only and in command of armies for barely two to three years. But officers in the PLA have experience in general ranks of over 10-13 years, with most becoming Major Generals at the age of 53-54 and retiring in the CMC at 67 years of age.
Thus, the so-called ‘new crop’ are not rookies to command and carry sufficient experience with them to hold responsibility and accountability. Ultimately, it is the test of loyalty to the CCP and the leader that matters and nothing else is of consequence.
Finally, Xi Jinping himself. Having amassed more power than even Mao Zedong and having enshrined ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ into the Party Constitution, like Mao, Xi cannot have a successor. Mao strongly believed that the ‘Party must control the gun’ and that ‘power flows from the barrel of the gun’. Mao had, at various periods in his long years as Chairman, purged Marshal Peng Dehuai in the 1950s, General Luo Ruiqing, the PLA Chief of General Staff in the 1960s, and his nominated successor and Defence Minister Lin Biao was killed in a mysterious air crash. Xi is following suit, and may go even further.
But if history is to be believed, then this famous quote portends ominous signs.
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.
Major General Mandip Singh, SM, VSM, is a retired artillery officer and a keen China watcher. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)