Just the other day, I watched the recently released Hindi film Fighter, which tells an imaginary tale of repeated incursions of Indian Air Force jets into Pakistan, destroying extremist-jihadi hideouts and sending a stern message regarding Delhi’s capability to intrude into Pakistan in hot pursuit. Despite its misrepresented fictionalisation of a real event, the film does highlight the commercialisation of Delhi’s hawkish willingness to deal with both internal and external threats. This was evidenced by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s comments last week after The Guardian reported the Indian government had targeted and killed 20 people in Pakistan since 2020 in a bid to eliminate terrorists. In an interview, Singh said that if terrorists try to disturb India’s peace, then “ghus ke maarenge (We will enter Pakistan and attack them).”
Certainly, Singh was not competing with Hrithik Roshan, but rather publicising India’s intent to use intelligence resources for covert action more extensively than in the past. Reading the late former intelligence official B Raman’s book, The Kaoboys of R&AW, one understands that India has used covert actions even in the past. However, New Delhi is now interested in not just using its capacity to target but also in being more vocal about its imagined geo-political strength, especially to impress the domestic audience. This is particularly important now as it is election season.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s reaction to both The Guardian story and Singh’s statement has been subdued. Islamabad sees strategic value in maintaining silence and doesn’t actually believe India has the capacity to strike inside its territory at will.
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Silence is golden?
Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a stern statement calling Singh’s claims “provocative and myopic”, followed by a promise of giving a “befitting reply” in case of a real threat to the country’s security. But, overall, both the Pakistan government and the mainstream media have been cautious in their reactions.
One reason is that the Indian defence minister’s statement has built a case for Pakistan’s continued investment in its national security, which can be conveyed to the United States, multilateral aid donors, and other states world over. The statement, in fact, is sufficient for Islamabad to show the world, without providing further evidence, that India has killed 20 people inside Pakistan.
Not many questions need to be asked about the veracity of such claims or to prove whether indeed this was the number of people killed. It is also unnecessary to argue that none of the people claimed to have been targeted were of high value. For India, killing figures such as Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Hafiz Saeed, Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Masood Azhar, or Dawood Ibrahim, or even executing a massive air strike, remains a pipe dream.
Pakistan’s relative silence also helps in building Islamabad’s image as being more invested in peace compared to India. Just a day after Rajnath Singh’s statement, Dawn published an op-ed by former foreign secretary Aizaz Chaudhry arguing for trade with India. It’s worth noting, however, that Pakistan has not taken any substantive steps to indicate that it is open to improving relations and starting trade with India. Contrary to Delhi’s perception that trade is Pakistan’s existential need, Islamabad was never in a hurry to restart economic ties for both domestic and ideological reasons.
Neither the post-2022 caretaker government nor the current coalition dispensation could afford to start trade for fear of giving another stick to Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party to beat them with. Moreover, starting trade with India as an initial step towards economic reforms rather than a final one would likely embolden the hawks within the military to push back.
Instead, it seems Pakistan considers it a better strategy to piggyback on India’s alleged targeting of Sikhs in the West, which is how the Guardian presented the story, rather than make a separate case.
It’s worth noting that the PDM government’s accusation that India orchestrated the 2021 Lahore bombing to target LeT’s Hafiz Seed, resulting in civilian casualties, did not draw international sympathy. Presently, the more appropriate strategy is apparently to frame covert operations and Singh’s statement as evidence of Delhi’s growing aggression that ought to be checked by India’s Western allies.
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Deeper reasons
There are three more points worth raising to explain Pakistan’s reaction.
First, the country’s current circumstances differ significantly from 1998, when Islamabad reacted to then Deputy Prime Minister LK Advani’s thinly veiled statement on the significance of India’s new nuclear capability by conducting its own tests. That was a time to send a stern message across the border.
Now, Islamabad’s lack of economic options requires messaging to multiple actors—old friends like the US, who are re-engaging with Pakistan; new patrons like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would like a peaceful environment for their investments; and strategic allies like China, which prefers to avoid conflicts not of its own making.
Islamabad doesn’t want to get distracted by statements coming from Delhi, especially when diplomacy is the only viable path forward. Maintaining equanimity is especially important when it comes to the US, which has huge stakes in the Indo-Pacific region, and with whom Pakistan is investing its time and attention to improve relations. The US will not want to see either of its South Asian allies get into a fistfight. Pakistan’s government and its establishment want to send a signal to its allies and patrons that it is serious about focusing on its economy.
Second, Pakistan would like to guard its defensive options, especially as past offensive choices are no longer viable. The conditionalities imposed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have achieved far more in silencing jihadi guns than covert operations. Notwithstanding former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s statement regarding Pakistan’s lack of resources to fight a war with India, Islamabad is comfortable with its ability to protect itself in a limited conflict, although that is not likely to happen. There is no point in encouraging a needless escalation.
Third, playing up Rajnath Singh’s statement could brew further tension at home, especially with Imran Khan continuing to breathe down the government’s neck. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) has a reputation of favouring normalisation, especially trade—a wish that was recently expressed by its Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar. Reacting strongly to Rajnath Singh’s statement could draw greater attention to the PMLN and result in more finger-pointing at the government. Importantly, the PMLN government wants friendly media to highlight India’s interests in projects that could be mutually beneficial, such as the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Such an argument may not hold water, but it’s meant to cool down domestic temperatures post the statement from Delhi.
None of this is to argue that India’s open admission of covert operations in Pakistan will not have an impact. Anyone now making a case for peace will have to be more thoughtful and think through their red lines carefully. But what is important is that no one in Pakistan is advocating for reversing a mutually beneficial agreement for maintaining peace and quiet at the Line of Control.
Neither side is in a hurry to restart peace initiatives until the governments on both sides don’t settle down and get comfortable in their own skins. This means political confidence in Delhi post-elections and relative economic and political security in Islamabad. If or when that happens, Singh’s statement will not stand in the way. Until then, the defence minister has only Hrithik Roshan to compete with.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)