Subianto govt can help India-Indonesia ties in 4 ways. But some anxieties can’t be ruled out

What would be Subianto’s priority in Indonesia’s foreign policy? His 'good neighbour approach is likely to remain in line with Indonesia's traditional non-alignment doctrine.

File photo of Indonesian defence minister Prabowo Subianto | Reuters

The recent presidential and parliamentary elections in Indonesia were conducted in a relatively secure and peaceful manner, but there are concerns about widespread vote buying and systemic vote rigging during the vote recapitulation process. Many have also spoken about democratic backsliding with the return of dynastic politics in Indonesia.

While official results could take several weeks to arrive, historically accurate quick counts show Prabowo Subianto, current defence minister and former Indonesian army lieutenant general, has won the election by a significant margin. His opponents, former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan and former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo, though, have not conceded defeat. Baswedan had contested the election promising “change” as an alternative to the status quo, while Pranowo spoke about the vision to make Indonesia an “advanced nation”.

But Subianto and his vice-presidential candidate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of current President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, managed to convince the general public by offering several promises, which included the continuation of Jokowi’s plan to focus on resource-based industrialisation and free lunch programmes for all students.

Prabowo’s unofficial election victory has been widely welcomed by many leaders across the world. Among those who have directly conveyed the congratulatory message is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In a post on X, Modi expressed hope to advance the goals of strategic partnership between India and Indonesia. Leaders of countries with close relations with Indonesia, such as Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have also congratulated Prabowo.

But all these congratulatory messages, especially from Western countries, seem to have eclipsed an important reality: Prabowo’s record of human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor, which isn’t seen as a significant issue anymore in the international community. With Prabowo presenting himself as someone who will continue Jokowi’s legacy, the world community is ready to welcome him as the new leader to represent Indonesia on the regional and global stage.

But what would Prabowo’s priorities be in Indonesia’s foreign policy? How will his vision affect Indonesia’s outlook in the Asia-Pacific region, and how will his government view Indonesia-India relations?

Becoming a good neighbour

Prabowo first spoke about his foreign policy vision at an event conducted by the Indonesian think-tank, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta (not to be confused with the America-based CSIS). He summarised his vision as “good neighbour” policy, which calls for maintaining Indonesia’s traditional non-alignment doctrine and building a strong web of friendship with the neighbours, both immediate and distant.

Talking about the importance of Indonesia’s non-alignment doctrine, Prabowo argued that it is becoming increasingly necessary for Jakarta not to take part in any kind of alliance that would otherwise endanger the country’s national interests. Noting the need to accelerate Indonesia’s economic growth, Prabowo argued that Indonesia will build its relationship with partner countries based on common interests, especially ones that benefit the country economically.

Such statements show that Prabowo is closely following Jokowi’s strategy, which prioritises strong bilateralism and economic diplomacy as hallmarks of contemporary Indonesian foreign policy.

Like Jokowi, Prabowo is quite pragmatic and perhaps even more cautious about playing a greater role in regional organisations such as ASEAN. Considering his heavy realist rhetoric, Prabowo is likely to see Indonesia’s participation in regional organisations more as ‘formality’ rather than an ‘engaged and proactive leadership’, which other presidential candidates espoused during the campaign.

While mentioning his future strategic partners, Prabowo made a clear declaration that he is going to pursue a more comprehensive partnership with China, India, and Russia. Interestingly, when Prabowo mentioned China and India, he described both nations as ‘great and old civilisations (of the East)’.

He called Russia as ‘Indonesia’s good friend’ for a long time, and would thus wish to foster such a relationship again in the future. This statement comes as no surprise. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2023, Prabowo called for an Indonesia-mediated peace plan in Ukraine, which was criticised by the Ukrainian defence minister who said that it “sounded more like a Russian (peace) plan”.

About the possibility of Indonesia becoming a new member of the BRICS alliance, Prabowo responded rather frankly: “If this alliance benefits Indonesia economically, why not?” He was also asked about AUKUS, a trilateral security alliance between Australia, the UK, and the US, which has raised concerns in the Asia-Pacific region about a potential nuclear arms race. Prabowo said that Indonesia respects the existence of AUKUS and regards the participation of the three countries in the alliance as a sovereign matter.

“The emphasis of every country is to protect their national interest. If they feel threatened… they will do whatever they can to protect themselves,” he had said in 2021. The comment shows that his government would pursue a cautious and calibrated policy in the future. The Jokowi government maintained a strong relationship with China, but now, it seems that Prabowo wouldn’t want to risk its relations with Western countries.

Over the years, Jakarta has sought the West’s help in several strategic sectors such as defence, trying to acquire second-hand military hardware to fulfil MEF (minimum essential force) requirement. Even today, Indonesia needs funding and technical assistance from Western countries in the environment sector to help the country in its energy transition process.

For Prabowo, defence diplomacy is necessary to strengthen the Indonesian military, which would, in the long run, boost deterrence in the turbulent region. As defence minister under Jokowi, Prabowo pursued an agenda to acquire military hardware from countries like France and Qatar.

India-Indonesia relations

Prabowo’s foreign policy vision and political promises hint at positive future relations between India and Indonesia. His emphasis on strong bilateralism might not help India’s effort to consolidate a joint multilateral vision of establishing an ‘open and free Indo-Pacific region’, but such a stance could establish a strong foundation for advancing Delhi-Jakarta ties.

Prabowo’s core diplomacy team is likely to include Indonesia’s veteran diplomats and experts from think-tanks such as the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), which is helmed by former deputy foreign minister Dino Patti Djalal. Rosan Roeslani, former ambassador to the US and chief of Prabowo’s presidential campaigning team, is speculated to be the foreign minister.

There are at least four possible areas where the India-Indonesia relationship could advance under the Prabowo government.

First, there would be greater communication between the two countries regarding the implementation of social welfare programmes such as the Pradhan Mantri Poshan Shakti Nirman (PM POSHAN) scheme, which inspired Prabowo’s promise to provide free lunch for students across the country. However, the rollout of this scheme would prove to be a challenge considering the requirement of wide coverage, the possibility of mismanagement, and budgetary constraints.

Second, Prabowo would probably pursue an agenda of deepening defence diplomacy with India. The two countries have successfully conducted several joint military training, which is likely to intensify in the future. In particular, it is expected that the Indonesian navy will work closely with its Indian counterpart to conduct more exercises on naval defence and warfare, considering the threats coming from the Chinese Coast Guard in the Natuna Sea.

Third, there would be greater collaboration between Indian and Indonesian start-ups and tech companies, especially considering Jakarta’s ambitions to foster a digital and green economy. This cooperation would not only help the country’s start-up industry thrive but also ensure that companies develop more sustainable and greener plans for their business. For now, Indonesia has established close cooperation on scholarship programmes with IITs to nurture digital talents. It is expected that this programme would be widened to other fields of cooperation as well.

Despite the likely areas of convergence between the two countries, some anxieties can’t be ruled out. Indonesia aspires to build the largest solar power plant in Southeast Asia, a project mainly assisted by China. That should worry India, a leading country in solar energy.

Fourth, it is also important for India to engage more with Indonesia to ensure a common vision in the Indo-Pacific. While Indonesia remains extremely cautious in its multilateral engagement, Indian policymakers and foreign policy experts could engage their Indonesian counterparts through various platforms to formulate strategies for realising a stable, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific for all.

The author is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia. Views are personal.

(Edited by Humra Laeeq)