Five reasons why Modi-Shah’s ‘politics of fear’ is not a good strategy for 2019

File photo of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Home Minister Amit Shah | Atul Yadav/PTI

The politics of fear may alienate voters who flocked to the BJP in 2014, on its promise of fulfilling aspirations.

Narendra Modi’s prime ministerial bid in 2014 was marked by the ‘politics of hope’, with the then Gujarat chief minister promising everything under the sun to an electorate exasperated with the weak, corrupt and paralytic UPA regime.

The BJP has changed its strategy to secure Modi a second term in 2019. The party seems to have zeroed in on the ‘politics of fear’ as its central theme — fear of Hindus being victimised by Bangladeshi “termites” and Myanmarese Rohingyas; fear of the judiciary denying Hindus the right to a Ram temple in Ayodhya; fear of ‘urban naxals’ who the Prime Minister identifies with the Congress; fear of an international conspiracy hatched by Rahul Gandhi to derail the Rafale fighter jet deal; and, fear of a domestic conspiracy by a bunch of politicians to replace Modi and thus take India into an era of darkness.

All these fears would be too overwhelming for people to recall the dreams they bought from Modi five years ago. It may appear to be a sound strategy for a ruling party facing so many questions on the economy, foreign policy, and internal security. But here are five reasons that expose the holes in this strategy:

First, a return to the Ram temple agenda is unlikely to add any new voters to the BJP’s kitty. Look at the party’s vote-share in the Lok Sabha polls when it used to contest on the core issue Ram temple.

In the 1989 elections when the Ram temple movement was picking up steam, the BJP increased its tally in the Lok Sabha to 85 — from 2 in the previous election— at a vote-share of 11.36 per cent. The vote share went up to 20.11 per cent and the seat tally to 120 in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections, held barely months after the arrest of L.K. Advani in the middle of his Somnath-Ayodhya Rath Yatra led to the fall of the VP Singh government.

The Ram temple issue was at the centre of a national political discourse, which got further polarised after the demolition of the controversial structure in Ayodhya in December 1992. It didn’t result in any spike in the BJP’s vote-share in 1996 elections although the party did secure more seats — 160 seats with 20.29 per cent voteshare.

The party milked the issue in the next two elections and even came to power but registered only a marginal increase in its support base—25.59 per cent in 1998 and  23.75 per cent in 1999.

These data show that barely a quarter or one-fifth of the voters opted for the BJP when it made construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya its raison d’etre.

The first time the BJP’s vote-share registered a significant jump—from 18.80 per cent in 2009 to 31.34 per cent in 2014— was when the party’s prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, didn’t utter the words, Ram Temple, all through his campaign.

It may be safe to assume that the BJP’s core voters — those who voted for its Hindutva credentials —stayed with the party in 2014 as Modi was the new Hindu Hridaya Samrat, replacing Advani from the pedestal, post the Godhra riots in 2002. But he was also able to draw substantial additions from across castes and communities. Moditva, as it was, was a blend of Hindutva in the background and aspirational politics at the forefront. And people, including many who either loathed or were indifferent to Hindutva, fell for it. The BJP’s strategy for 2019 runs the risk of losing these ‘Hindutva plus’ voters.

Second, the ‘politics of fear’ works more effectively for an opposition party, which can play on insecurities to paint the party in power as weak, indecisive and not in control; it was a ploy Modi used to demolish the Manmohan Singh government. When a ruling party decides to play such politics out of desperation, it doesn’t just sound hollow and expose its vulnerability but also ends up running down its USP—that is Modi.

Third, India has changed since Advani’s Rath Yatra days three decades ago. Gone are the days (1987-88) when people would do an aarti of the TV set when Ramanand Sagar’s Ramayana series was telecast. Many people can now be seen whistling when they see Paresh Rawal suing God and cursing the so-called godmen in Akshay Kumar-starrer Oh My God.

Modi often speaks of India’s demographic dividend and of how 65 per cent of the population below 35 years is impatient. Most of them voted for Modi in 2014 as they were fascinated by the Gujarat model of development and trusted him to replicate the same at the national level. Already uneasy about the state of affairs, they may not take kindly to the saffron party’s new priorities and convictions, which are far removed from their dreams.

Fourth, the upper and privileged castes have been the most vocal supporters of the Ram temple. The BJP may be able to galvanise them by directly or indirectly sponsoring a renewed temple movement, but it would alienate sections of OBCs and Scheduled Castes who were swayed by Modi’s persona and promises to opt for the BJP for the first time in 2014.

There would be a similar reaction from a section of the liberal intelligentsia and the middle class whose disillusionment with the Manmohan Singh government had driven them to give Modi a try.

Fifth, Modi kept a tight leash on potentially disruptive elements — the Bajrang Dal, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and other organisations affiliated to the Sangh Parivar, hardcore elements within the BJP, and all kinds of lone wolves— which helped him to control the narrative and focus on governance to a certain degree. Once he lets the genie out of the bottle by re-igniting the polarising debate on Ram temple and undertaking the task of throwing out 40 lakh “illegal” Bangladeshis from Assam and soon-to-be counted “termites” and “infiltrators” from across the country, there would be no going back. The politics of fear would haunt Modi and his government even if it propels him to power again. Is he ready to secure a second term at this cost?