More honesty, less grandstanding can prevent Ukraine war from ballooning into a world war

The West must recognise that Russia is a declining power, but if pushed hard, it will react – just like Germany did after a humiliating peace at Versailles.

Illustration by Soham Sen | ThePrint

As an extremely dangerous war in Ukraine gets even more edgy, there is talk of mediation, of a ceasefire, or anything that will end what could become a conflagration that could make the World War look like a pale comparison. That’s at one level. At another, this war need not have happened at all, and can be speedily brought to a conclusion if certain conditions are met. For that, a little more honesty is required and a little less grandstanding.

The political geography of the invasion

First, it seems that Russian forces are close to reaching their objective of completely encircling Ukrainian troops in the east, and thereby eventually dominating this part of the country. Look carefully at the map, which shows that the River Dneiper cuts Ukraine virtually into two. An ethnolinguistic map will show similar division, explaining why Russians are struggling where Ukrainian speakers are in a majority. Then, consider a graphic of voting patterns in the Presidential elections of 2010 where the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovitch’s vote share also follows the same divisons.

Then came the annexation of the entirely Russian-speaking area of Crimea by Moscow, and separatist rebellions in the Donbass region. The result? A landslide victory for Volodymyr Zelenskyy as President and later for his party Servant of the People. Though the pro-Russian opposition did better than expected.

Following this, the President, a media mogul, began his crackdown on opposition, particularly Ukraine’s television channels, and attacked separatists, which earned him serious human rights charges. In January this year, Zelenskyy’s government even arrested a former President.  When the war broke out, it was a political opportunity for a President badly eroded. Today, Zelenskyy is the face of bravery and defiance.

In sum, while there is a clear division within Ukraine, it’s still not enough to entirely erode Ukrainian identity in either half of the country. A Russian occupation of the East is possible, though tricky. Russian occupation of the whole of Ukraine? It can’t be done. Moscow will find popular opposition far more difficult to handle than the whole of Ukrainian army.

The NATO thing

The war did not just benefit Zelensky. It also did a lot to strengthen the once-formidable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fraying at the edges in the throes of peace. Germany’s historic shift will see an increase its defence budget by $100 billion while the rest of Europe is already following suit. This comes after years of the US pressing the Europeans to ‘do more’ for their own defence.

Now here’s the thing. Apart from a one-time offer of sorts by George W Bush in 2008 to Kyiv, no one has since offered Ukraine a NATO membership. Even that offer was violently opposed by Europeans. President Zelensky has since tried every trick in the book to push such a decision, but to no avail. Note also that on 16 February, President Biden said clearly he would not send troops to defend Ukraine. Russia attacked a week later. Thereafter, the US President said that the US nuclear alert levels had not changed, despite Moscow’s nuclear grandstanding. The message? Ukraine is not an issue of national security interest to the US. It is, however, to the Russians. Just about everybody knows that.

It’s all about the money, almost

War has and always will be about money. During World War II, the US spent nearly 40 per cent of its GDP on defence. In 2017, research identified 20 companies as profiting the most from wars, most primarily from the US but also from France, Italy and Russia.

Now consider the stock market. As the bourses slumped on the shock of war, shares of major defence manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin shot up, as did Raytheon Technologies to name just a few. As NATO budgets increase, so will their share prices. It’s worth flipping this argument in examining Russian interests. Ukraine has the world’s 7th largest and Europe’s 2^nd largest coal reserves at about 34 billion tonnes. Other sources have estimated the reserves to be approximately 115 billion tonnes located primarily in the Donbas Basin; and huge reserves of gas primarily in Crimea. And Ukraine ranks 6^th in global iron ore production with some 27 billion tonnes of reserves. India’s ArcelorMittal is in Kryviy-Rih, making steel.

Then there’s the defence industry. When the Soviet Union dissolved, some 30 per cent of its defence units were in Ukraine. Since then, Russia is one of the largest buyers of Ukrainian equipment, and continues to depend heavily on defence manufacturers such as Motor Sich in the east for aircraft engines; on Antonov, in Kiev, for aircraft; and on Yuzhmash that designs, manufactures, and services rockets and missiles. And don’t forget China has been poaching these industries. Russia has everything to gain in grabbing its old defence units back, and once again making Russia a competitor in defence manufacturing.

The power motif

War is after all an extension of politics. President Biden’s muscular approach to Russia in his  State of the Union address won him a rare bipartisan standing ovation. That’s something for a President lagging badly in the polls. Approval ratings jumped by eight points, which is extremely unusual for such an event. Whether Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was also motivated by the need to strengthen himself is unclear. But in 2015, Professor John Mearsheimer was arguing that Putin was much too smart to invade Ukraine. Yet he’s done just that. Perhaps after his most recent stint of nine years in power, he too needs a boost. But what is clear is that no President, Putin or anyone else, would sanction a Ukraine that was part of NATO.

Putin’s demands and the surprising agreement 

Putin’s reported demands  are clearly a maximalist position for negotiation. That includes an absolute ‘no’ to Ukraine joining NATO; a reduction/removal of western troops in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and others who joined after 1997, and interestingly, a pullback of short and medium range missiles, which essentially means a revival of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) that the US abandoned — due to fears of such Chinese missiles and not Russian — in 2018. And here’s the surprise. Documents accessed by El Pais of Spain show US’ willingness to negotiate. It does, however, carp at stopping NATO’s ‘Open door Policy’. Consider each of these. The events of the past few weeks have shown clearly that NATO is not coming to Ukraine’s defence. The red line starts at NATO’s border. There is, as of now, no indication at all that Moscow intends to drive into any of these countries. All it wants is a little less of NATO and a little more of talking to the West. The question is where the border lies?

Despite the one-sided coverage of the war — entirely from western capitals — it is clear that Russia did not start by storming its way into Ukraine. The advance has been cautious, and curiously, no offensive air power has been used. But they did make sure no one else did either, by destroying every military airfield in the country. They didn’t really attack civilian areas, and encouraged them to leave where they proposed to advance. None of this showed a blitzkrieg mentality, till in the last few days when it has seemed necessary to push hard to prevent a stalling. Talks have also begun between the two countries. Russia’s latest position is that it does not want to divide Ukraine, wants a ‘non-Nazi’ government in Kyiv (read a friendly government), its complete demilitarisation, and neutrality written into its constitution. The ‘separatist’ republics of Donetsk and Luhansk are, of course, already ‘recognised’ and Moscow wants its Crimea’s annexation also recognised by the world. That’s it.

The way out 

These are the facts.

To make them work on the ground is to first recognise that Russia is a declining power, but if pushed hard on its core interests, it will react – just like Germany did after a humiliating peace at Versailles. What is clear is that its core interest lies in a degree of neutrality in Ukraine and its entry into the Black Sea. As can be seen, this is  not of vital interest to the US or its allies. Step one is therefore to negotiate a standstill agreement, with some (underlying) recognition of the fact that Russian forces are likely to remain in situ till Ukraine agrees to be a solidly neutral country, with this guaranteed by both sides. Moscow also needs to recognise that any prolonged stay will be expensive in the extreme.

Second, once a ceasefire is negotiated, it would need supervision by a UN force, ideally with a ‘ceasefire line’ that can be monitored to prevent movement of mercenary forces like the Wagner Group or those sent by the West, and create mayhem.

Third, it’s as well to accept that a new Ukraine will not include the new ‘Republics’ or Crimea. That’s the price of ensuring that the rest of Ukraine at least stays in one piece.

Fourth, the US and Russia need to put through a treaty for eliminating an entire class of missiles; that would contribute hugely to European security. It would also lead to a degree of understanding that relies on mutual ties rather than sanctions. It will be welcomed by Europe, and contribute hugely to the personal standing of both Presidents. That does require President Biden to stand up to his military industrial giants. They should be more than satisfied with the increase across Europe of defence budgets. Something that’s going to continue, as another power rises.

The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views are personal.

(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)