Beyond Kashmir’s security paradigm is a lived reality that most people won’t get to know. Kashmir’s youth migration is not a flight from militancy. It’s a simmering exodus that happens in two stages. Students first leave for degrees, then for jobs, and never return because those who migrate for specialised fields tend to settle wherever they land, while local university seats sit vacant behind them.
Educational vacancy is one part of it, another is the lack of big companies and expert fields. Even those who make it out often aren’t escaping, with many ending up underemployed outside the Valley — a lawyer outside law, an engineer in sales — trading local joblessness for outstation instability with no family safety net.
Though the same migration exists in other parts of India as well, Kashmir has built no remittance channel. It’s a measurable, worsening pattern, and it deserves to be read as an economic story, not just an emotional one.
Jammu and Kashmir’s unemployment rate stood at 6.7 per cent as of early 2026, nearly double the national average of 3.5 per cent, according to figures the J&K government itself placed before the Assembly.
Among the 15-29 age group specifically, the picture is starker: 17.4 per cent unemployment against a national figure of 10.2 per cent for 2023-24, and in one quarter that year, nearly a third of young people in Kashmir’s urban areas were without work, the highest such figure recorded anywhere in the country.
More than 3.49 lakh youth are currently registered as unemployed with the Union Territory’s District Employment and Counselling Centres.
Over a lakh of them have postgraduate or graduate degrees. According to Kashmir’s own Economic Survey, the unemployment rate among educated youth is close to 46 per cent. This is probably an underestimate because registering with a government employment centre necessitates the kind of patience and paperwork that many young people, especially those who are already looking to move overseas, choose to forego.
Leaving the Valley often doesn’t guarantee a stable life for these young Kashmiris, with many struggling to make ends meet or ending up in jobs that don’t align with their skills and degrees. The situation looks more like that big American dream many cosmopolitan kids had in the 2000s.
Meanwhile, the outbound flow keeps growing, and local institutions are visibly emptying out because of it. By one widely cited estimate, about 30,000 students leave Jammu and Kashmir every year to study abroad, pursuing degrees in artificial intelligence, aerospace engineering, robotics, biomedical engineering, and other specialised fields that Kashmir’s own universities, for the most part, simply don’t offer. The trend has been going on for many years. And even today, if the universities in Kashmir have started offering such courses, they are not relevant to Kashmir’s job market.
At the University of Kashmir alone, hundreds of postgraduate seats have gone vacant in recent years. In 2023, about 124 postgraduate seats were left unfilled at the main Hazratbal campus alone, even as households in the Valley privately funded the same degrees in Delhi, Bengaluru, or abroad.
Two-staged migration
What makes Kashmir’s version of migration distinct is that it happens in two stages, and each stage bleeds value out of the local economy in a different way.
The initial departure occurs at the point of higher education. In addition to taking their tuition costs with them, students who relocate to major cities in India or the UK also take with them the complete secondary economy that a student body produces, including rent, local expenditures, internships, and small businesses that are close to the college. In essence, Kashmir finances an education sector that it does not own, and the economic multiplier of that expenditure ends up in another city.
After graduation, the second exodus occurs, when these same students are unable to find employment in the area upon their return. The private sector in Kashmir is quite small. Historically, tourism, horticulture, and handicrafts have been the main drivers of the economy; these industries were designed for a different type of labour than what the area is currently providing. They don’t produce the white-collar, tech-related jobs that graduates in computer science or artificial intelligence are prepared for. Thus, graduates depart once more, initially to the cities of India and then gradually to the United States, the United Kingdom, and, primarily, the Gulf.
Here is where the comparison with other Indian states becomes genuinely instructive, and where Kashmir’s situation looks structurally different.
States like Kerala and Punjab have spent decades building formal channels for diaspora money to flow back through remittance corridors, NRI investment schemes, land and property markets explicitly built around returning or absentee earners, and even state government departments dedicated to diaspora affairs. Kerala’s economy, in particular, is substantially propped up by Gulf remittances that get counted, tracked, and reinvested locally through fairly mature financial infrastructure.
There is no similar channel in Kashmir. Money goes out for living expenses, tuition, application fees, and the years it takes to establish a life overseas, but nothing structured comes back. Institutions can carefully assess the increased security risks associated with these channels in order to provide room for innovation, or what we now refer to as the orange economy.
Data on money sent home by the Kashmiri diaspora remains poorly tracked, and that absence of data is itself a part of the story. It means that Kashmir loses its people for free, while other migrant-sending states in India at least get paid for theirs. The earnings that do return tend to arrive informally, through family transfers rather than structured investments, and rarely translate into local business formation the way they do in Kerala’s or Punjab’s diaspora economies.
This isn’t a static picture. Jammu and Kashmir’s Start-up Policy 2024-27, incubators at NIT Srinagar, IIT Jammu, IIM Jammu, and IUST Awantipora, and a Software Technology Parks of India centre in Srinagar all represent a genuine, recent attempt to build local absorption capacity. Kashmir now counts over a thousand registered startups, and some Valley-based ventures have also pitched successfully on national platforms. Local delivery and logistics startups have created real, visible local jobs.
But registration numbers overstate the underlying reality. Few of these startups have scaled to the point where they can absorb the kind of specialised, foreign-trained talent that is leaving the Valley every year. A thousand registered startups is not the same as a thousand functioning employers, and the harder question here is: how many of these ventures actually pay salaries and survive past their second year?
And this is not only about fields like AI or tech, this applies to fields like social sciences as well, particularly research, where we are yet to establish independent research expertise or institutions who work on real world problems or policy issues.
Also read: Srinagar’s cinemas may have gone dark. Kashmir’s love for films never did
What this actually costs
The deeper cost of Kashmir’s youth migration isn’t simply the absence of a few thousand skilled workers. It’s the absence of the institutions, capital, and mentorship networks that returning skilled professionals typically build once critical mass is reached elsewhere; the kind of quiet compounding effect that turned Bengaluru into a tech hub or Kerala’s Gulf corridor into a functioning economic pillar.
Until Kashmir builds organisations capable of employing the graduates it produces and, equally, until it builds the financial and institutional channels to bring diaspora capital and expertise back in a trackable, reinvestable way, every departing flight from Srinagar will keep representing not just one student’s ambition, but a small, repeated transfer of the Valley’s future economic capacity to another city.
Tehmeena Rizvi, PhD, specialises in Women, Peace and Security studies in South Asia with a particular focus on Afghan Migration and the Kashmir region. She tweets @TehmeenaRizvi. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)

Comparing the Indian state of Jammu Kashmir , currently managed as Union territories, to Kerala or Punjab makes zero sense once you look at the basic facts.
Kerala and Punjab built overseas money pipelines because decades of peace allowed local businesses and banking to grow. Kashmir’s financial channels face strict tracking for one obvious reason: stopping cross-border terror funding. That isn’t ‘state neglect’…it’s basic security.
As for the claim that New Delhi has abandoned the Valley, the numbers tell the exact opposite story. The Central Government funds nearly 65% of J&K’s entire annual budget, pouring in over ₹43,000 crore every year. That comes out to roughly ₹31,000 per person in direct central funds—nearly triple what Kerala (~₹11,000) or Punjab (~₹10,500) get per person.
New Delhi is writing massive checks every single year to bridge the gap. If university seats sit empty and local businesses refuse to create jobs, blame local leaders and regional management. It is not an ‘oppressive’ central policy.
I have come across quite a few Kashmiris in the USA.
They identify themselves only as Kashmiri and Muslims. Neither do they identify as Indian nor as Pakistani. You have to pointedly ask them which passport they are on to actually know their nationality.
It’ quite obvious that they have no interest or commitment to their respective nationalities. Maybe that’s why they are not really bothered about ensuring any kind of development back home.