Instead of hackathons, the Election Commission can look at these five ways to solve the EVM problem.
The opposition parties met the Election Commission this week and moderated their demands on EVMs. Instead of junking EVMs altogether and going back to the ballot paper, they came up with a more reasonable plea of counting the paper slips generated by the new VVPAT machines in at least half the polling booths.
This raises the prospects of a resolution to this issue, just in time for the general elections. Now the onus is on the Election Commission (EC). Here are suggestions on how the EC can respond to the demand of the opposition, and both sides can put this rather needless debate about EVM manipulation to rest.
Also read: As EVMs are debated, this is how the ballot box was made for India’s first 1952 election
A struggle with EVMs
Let us not forget that this debate began in 2009 with BJP leader and spokesperson Narasimha Rao—with blessings from veteran L.K. Advani—questioning the EVMs after their defeat.
Since 2014, a series of unexpectedly large victories for the ruling BJP, especially in UP, became the basis for allegations of EVM manipulation from opponents. The recent press conference in London was the high point of these wild conspiracy theories. Much of these allegations rested less on any evidence of actual manipulation and more on the suspicion that it must have taken place.
It emanated mostly from an apprehension that the Modi-Shah duo could resort to anything to win elections. This was not illegitimate apprehension, given the track record of this regime in violating institutional norms. But it was a fear, not a fact.
The responses of the Elections Commission
The EC could have allayed these apprehensions. Instead of challenging opponents with ‘hackathons’, the Election Commission could have offered field trials and verification of EVMs that were used in recent elections or offered to match paper slips in disputed cases. Sadly, it just argued that it was impossible to manipulate the EVMs. That was a bad argument, even for a technologically challenged person like me. Any electronic gadget can be tempered with. The question is: under what conditions is it likely to happen?
Ironically, the EC took this how-dare-you-question-us stand just when its credibility was at its lowest in the last three decades. To be fair, it is not the first time that a government has appointed officers considered close to the ruling party to the Election Commission (remember Mr Navin Chawla, a confidant of 10 Janpath, who became the CEC?). Even by those modest standards, the conduct of some of the members of the Election Commission during the last five years has left a lot to be desired.
The debate is particularly pointless now with the introduction of the VVPAT attachments to the EVM. This new machine prints a paper slip that shows the symbol of the party that the voter had just voted for. The voter can verify, but not touch the slip before it drops into a box, from where it can be retrieved for manual count, if necessary. Parties just need to instruct their voters or at least their trained cadre to verify the paper slip after they vote. Now, the EC also has a double check. All we need now is a small tweaking of the rules and procedures.
Also read: What Election Commission can do to dispel the misconception about EVMs
The way forward
First, the Election Commission must allow experts nominated by any registered party to examine any of the machines to be used in the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections. This window should be extended to a period until one week before the elections, so as to rule out any hidden software or change in the motherboard, etc.
Second, the process by which EVMs are allotted to any particular constituency should be made transparent. Since any manipulation of the EVM would depend on getting the sequence a party’s candidates right, and since the sequence changes from one constituency to another (it depends not on the party name, but on the alphabetic order of surnames of candidates), it is critical to ensure that no one should know which EVM would be deployed where. This should be done through a random lottery in the presence of party representatives.
Third, election rules should be amended to allow a voter to register an objection with the polling officials, if she suspects that the paper slip did not match the party she voted for. If a booth records, say, more than 1 per cent voters raising such objections, it should be mandatory to match the EVM count with the paper trail count for that booth. The EC should have big publicity campaigns to inform the voters about how to check paper slips and raise objections.
Fourth, in view of reports about ‘defects’ in the EVMs, the rule about the replacement of malfunctioning EVMs within 30 minutes or repolling should be strictly adhered to. Sufficient publicity and training are needed here, so that every malfunction is not assumed to be manipulation.
Also read: EVM hacking allegations: Politically malicious or should they be investigated?
My final suggestion is about altering the existing counting process. Currently, the EVMs are brought in for counting in a serial order in batches of 14 (don’t ask me where this magic number comes from!). So, polling booth number 1 to 14 are counted first on 14 separate tables. This is called ‘round 1’. I suggest that the counting should begin with one randomly chosen booth for each of the 14 counting table. So, it could be booth 3, 11, 26, 47, 53, 89, and so on. In this special first round, the paper slips should be manually counted and then checked against the display board of the EVM. If there is no mismatch (overlooking trivial discrepancies of up to 0.5 per cent), the rest of the counting should proceed as it does. If the discrepancy exceeds this limit, then all the paper slips in all the booths of that constituency should be counted. As a measure of abundant caution, the runner-up candidate should be able to call for paper trail matching in any one booth of their choice, before the result is finally declared.
This might look cumbersome. It would certainly delay the results by a couple of hours and rob the counting-day TV programmes of the 20-20 feel they have today. But it would put to rest an avoidable and harmful debate. A debate about basic procedures of voting and counting lower the trust in one of the few real achievements of our democracy. It also distracts from the real and pressing issues of electoral reforms.
The author is the National President of Swaraj India.
Hacking manipulation takes place at the counting stage towards the end.
Find out how to stop that
ECI has already implemented them.
1. Election commission already allows and even mandates political parties (before candidate names are finalised) to send their representatives who can be an expert to observe First Level Checking of EVMs (this is done under CCTV). After that, at each level candidate/or representative is asked in writing and called to observe setting up of the machine. All candidates/representatives sign at all these levels. (no one objects if they, the process will stop.
2. This point is also covered and no one knows (even ECI, RO or district magistrate) which ATM will go where. EVMs are randomised thrice to ensure that their final destination is not known even a few days before the election. Polling booth location or polling party are not known even 2 days before an election. Randomisation happened by an NIC software in front of candidates/political parties/representatives and they observe the process and then sign.
3. There already a process where a voter can challenge the machine if he/she feels that the vote did not go to the political party. After the challenge, the Presiding officer will press the button (a whole detailed procedure exists) to confirm the defect.
4. On defects, machines are replaced. Replaced or defective machine, if they have some votes, are not counted if the winning margin is less than the total number of votes in the machine.
5. Counting is done in the round of 14 based on the assessment of the rooms availability, manpower required, CCTV and other handheld camera required. On any difference (leave aside 0.5 per cent), the counting is invalid. The possibility of difference would arise only and only if the Presiding officer failed to erase the mock poll data done on election day 30 minutes before the actual election. The mock poll is done to show the accuracy of the EVM to the polling agent of all the candidates by polling an equal number of votes to each candidate. They then sign.
Sensible suggestions.Very feasible. EC should consider these seriously
How did congress win ?