Hua Chunying, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lauded President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam as ‘extraordinarily successful.’ However, this characterisation starkly contrasts with the evident challenges China is facing in Southeast Asia. The visit, rather than showcasing seamless relations, brought to the forefront the simmering tensions in the South China Sea. Both the Philippines’ firm stance and Vietnam’s cautious approach towards China’s Belt and Road Initiative underscored the complexities at play.
Nevertheless, Xi’s visit to Vietnam carried significant weight, offering insights into China’s diplomatic manoeuvres. Post-pandemic, his visits have primarily targeted countries viewed as friendly or holding favourable opinions of China. Yet, the Vietnam visit failed to solidify the Chinese narrative that all is smooth sailing in its relations with Southeast Asia.
A divided ASEAN on South China Sea
Over the past two decades, China has strategically exploited divisions among countries within the bloc, particularly in impeding a unified position on the South China Sea. However, these divisions are increasingly challenging Beijing’s regional position.
In 2012, Cambodia’s alignment with China’s interests led to an unprecedented failure to issue a joint statement within ASEAN. Recent times have witnessed transformations, both in China under Xi’s leadership and in countries’ resilience and approaches in dealing with Beijing. Currently, the Philippines is exploring alternative avenues to address the issue outside the bloc. Its president, Ferdinand R Marcos Jr, recently stated that the Philippines is eyeing a “paradigm shift” because the traditional methods of diplomacy are being continuously disregarded by China amid its recent aggression and harassment in the West Philippine Sea.” China’s dismissive approach is compelling the Philippines to seek support from major powers such as the US and India.
India has also taken a principled stance on the South China Sea issue, especially considering its deteriorating relations with China. During Filipino foreign secretary Enrique Manalo’s visit to India in June, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar emphasised the shared interest in a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. Both officials stressed the importance of peaceful dispute settlement and adherence to international law, notably UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea.
In a show of solidarity, INS Kadmatt, India’s second stealth anti-submarine warfare ship, made a goodwill visit to Manila in December. On the occasion, India’s Ambassador to the Philippines reiterated New Delhi’s support, emphasising a mutual interest in the region’s peace and stability while ensuring adherence to maritime law.
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China in Southeast Asia
Is China’s influence in Southeast Asia really waning? It seems not, at least according to prevalent Chinese social media discussions. During Xi’s Vietnam visit, the two countries agreed to forge ‘a community with a shared future’. A Weibo post suggested that Vietnam had drifted away from a pro-Western stance and opted for deeper cooperation with China. However, the discourse concerning the Philippines and the South China Sea paints a less optimistic picture.
As the geopolitical landscape evolves, the dynamics within ASEAN are crucial. The divisions among ASEAN countries regarding their stance towards China highlight the complexities of regional politics and the influence of external powers.
Hu Xijin, former Global Times’ editor-in-chief, claimed that the Philippines has been emboldened by the US. He wrote on Weibo, “Dealing with these bewildered Filipino hawkish officials, the most important thing for the Chinese is to keep playing, without getting irritated or angry, becoming more adept at water fights and bumper boats with practice. Simultaneously, we need to be fully prepared for the meddling of the United States and its allies and construct a new way to play”.
Another Weibo account praised the Chinese Coast Guard for taking control measures against three official ships of Philippines’ Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, allegedly intruding into waters near Huangyan Island in the contested sea. It appears that the Chinese social media discourse on ASEAN is also divided, contingent upon which country within ASEAN displays a friendly attitude towards China.
However, undoubtedly, Southeast Asia has held considerable importance for China for over three decades, with Beijing actively striving to garner favour. While several countries centred their Indo-Pacific policies around ASEAN, China made a pivotal move in 2013 by selecting Indonesia to unveil the maritime arm of the BRI. China has had a firm foothold in the region, but the dynamics are now shifting.
China’s approach towards Southeast Asia is flawed on at least two counts: First, Beijing’s assertive stance in the South China Sea stands out prominently. While welcoming Southeast Asian countries to the BRI, Beijing simultaneously pursued an aggressive policy in the South China Sea, particularly through the construction of artificial islands and militarisation of the South China Sea islands.
Second, China’s engagement with Southeast Asia demands a departure from its discourse regarding smaller countries. In 2010, then-foreign minister Yang Jiechi underscored the power imbalance between China and the Southeast Asian countries. At the ASEAN regional forum, he bluntly stated, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact.” Furthermore, a recent statement from an MFA spokesperson reiterated China’s stance, warning against attempts by smaller countries to align with powerful countries to coerce China. This rhetoric dismisses the legitimate concerns of Southeast Asian countries, portraying them as mere pawns manipulated by external forces (read the US0, and accentuates China’s self-imposed redlines.
The persistent division remains a significant impediment to achieving a breakthrough in the dispute, as individual countries have limited capacity to exert pressure on China. Moreover, China remains a crucial economic partner for the ASEAN member states, and several countries’ use of hedging strategies aligns with China’s interests. Nevertheless, the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea could intensify current divisions, potentially furthering great power rivalry with ASEAN at the centre—an outcome that the bloc has actively strived to prevent and one that wouldn’t entirely serve China’s interests either.
Sana Hashmi, PhD, is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)