Throughout 2023, China navigated a difficult landscape characterised by strained ties with the United States, persistent calls from the European Union for de-risking, India’s unwavering stance on the border issue, and the Philippines’ emergence as a credible contender in the South China Sea. These circumstances presented considerable challenges for China.
However, the latter half of the year marked a discernible moderation in China’s approach towards the West, suggesting a softening of ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ and a potential easing of tensions. This period provided valuable insights, shedding light on the areas where China faces formidable challenges and where it remains steadfast in its policy positions.
What was China focused on?
At the outset of 2023, a setback occurred when a Chinese spy balloon disrupted the potential for US-China reconciliation. The incident prompted US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to cancel his scheduled visit in February.
During the initial months of the year, China focussed on cultivating relationships with countries leaning toward anti-Western sentiments. A noteworthy accomplishment was brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia, a significant US defence partner in the Middle East, and Iran, known for its adversarial stance towards the US. However, the limitations of China’s influence were highlighted by the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas conflict.
While much of China’s current focus is on stabilising relations with the US and the West, its approach towards several Asian countries has been less conciliatory.
China welcomed European leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and hosted a somewhat lacklustre EU-China summit. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US and the Xi-Biden summit, Chinese media and foreign ministry channels projected an optimistic view of bilateral relations. Additionally, Xi visited Russia, often perceived as a junior partner, and Vietnam, which reaffirmed its acknowledgment of Taiwan as an inseparable part of China’s territory.
However, during this period, China took a more assertive stance on territorial disputes. Tensions increased in the South China Sea with the Philippines, while with India, China continued to downplay concerns, urging New Delhi to prioritise economic prospects over resolving the border dispute.
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A year of select multilateralism
China advocated for inclusive multilateralism, aspiring to lead the so-called Global South. However, its practical approach leaned more towards selective multilateralism, indicating its words do not match its actions. While Xi was absent from important summits like the G20 in New Delhi and COP28 in Dubai, he attended the BRICS summit in Johannesburg and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco. China tended to favour summits where competition and opposition were minimal, prioritising venues that aligned with its interests and imposed no conditions.
In the last two years, China has introduced initiatives, including the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Civilizational Initiative, aiming to present an alternative to the Western-led rules-based world order and take a leading role among emerging economies. Seemingly, the intention is not to reform or contribute to the current world order, but rather to disrupt it and carve out its own central space in the global landscape, distinct from the Western-dominated paradigm.
The Belt and Road Forum saw a resurgence, but the guest list this year was notably shorter and comprised predominantly of friendly nations. While the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains active, it has garnered support primarily from countries either in dire need of quick infrastructure or those favourably disposed towards China. Italy, a G7 country, made an official exit from the BRI.
China often prioritises its self-interests in multilateral groupings rather than solely promoting the proclaimed objective of ‘true multilateralism’. The latter, according to China, revolves around principles like dialogue on equal footing and consensus-building through consultation.
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What’s in store for China in 2024?
As the year nears its end, China grapples with a multitude of domestic challenges amid a complex international backdrop. The mysterious disappearances of former foreign and defence ministers, coupled with the purge of key rocket force commanders, add to the array of concerns facing the country. This has led to an impression of erratic foreign policy and a lack of long-term strategic foresight.
China’s approach has generated friction with countries that have historically considered it a significant economic partner, particularly India and the Philippines, over the past two decades. Simultaneously, the handling of the South China Sea dispute has allowed tensions to persist, becoming an enduring issue. Moreover, seeking reconciliation with the US at a time when widespread consensus views China as a threat to both economic and security interests reflects a somewhat disjointed diplomatic approach.
Mere temporary reconciliation does not inherently ensure lasting peace unless grounded in shared interests and a mutual comprehension of each other’s positions. China’s objectives frequently collide with those upheld by the Western liberal order. And, reciprocally, China does not entirely align with Western ideals. Chinese social media discourse provides a glimpse into this. For instance, various Weibo accounts with huge followings continue to express pessimism and distrust towards the US, framing it as a formidable adversary to China. These accounts also often exhibit a disdainful attitude towards the US. Some Weibo posts draw comparisons, portraying China as a more desirable place to live. A viral post on Weibo even suggested that an increasing number of Chinese and Chinese-Americans are contemplating a move to China. Similarly, in the US, 83 per cent of Americans hold unfavourable views of China, according to a Pew survey.
When it comes to regional dynamics, China’s assertive stance has prompted many countries to reevaluate their strategies. China retains its status as a pivotal and primary economic partner for the majority of them, but there is a rising inclination among countries to resist its aggression. There’s also a growing concern about avoiding vulnerability to China’s leveraging and weaponising of over-dependence. This concern is propelling many in the ‘Global South’ to explore diversification of their economic partnerships and actively seek alternative avenues for collaboration, aiming to reduce reliance on any single market.
While China seeks to stabilise ties with the West, a more effective approach might involve de-escalating tensions with neighbouring countries and regional counterparts—a path that Beijing seems to have disregarded.
In the ever-evolving global landscape, 2024 is poised to pose significant challenges for China in terms of its foreign policy. The increasing trend of firms divesting from the country will create a rocky path ahead. As the US and India gear up for elections, there is a possibility that China may capitalise on this distraction to consolidate its position. Nevertheless, in the long run, it appears improbable that China will be able to operate in an unchallenged environment. Several persistent issues, including the absence of signs indicating normalisation of New Delhi-Beijing ties, the tech rivalry with the US, and the South China Sea issue, will continue to plague China’s diplomatic efforts in the foreseeable future.
Sana Hashmi, PhD, is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)