Congress, BRS knew their MLAs were unpopular—how incumbents are the new electoral paradox

The 2023 elections raise three questions: how elected MLAs become unpopular while the state leadership doesn't; why parties don't replace them; and is replacement good for democratic politics?

Congress Telangana President A Revanth Reddy greets party workers and supporters celebrating the party's lead during the counting of votes for Telangana Assembly elections, in Hyderabad (PTI)

An emerging consensus on the recently concluded assembly elections is that serious anti-incumbency sentiments against party MLAs led to the defeat of the Congress in three Hindi-belt states and the Bharat Rashtra Samithi in Telangana. This consensus is bolstered by Lokniti-CSDS post-poll surveys, which indicated that the incumbent chief ministers of the Congress and the BRS were extremely popular in these states. By some accounts, more than 50 per cent of the sitting MLAs lost in this election cycle.

Could the Congress and the BRS have avoided defeats by dropping unpopular MLAs, following the lead of the BJP, which dropped 44 sitting MLAs in the 2022 Gujarat assembly election? Naresh Arora, a political strategist for the Congress party in Rajasthan, answered in the affirmative. “Around 50 Congress MLAs faced very high MLA-level anti-incumbency. Far too many voters liked Ashok Gehlot but did not like the MLAs. Again, this has been reflected in our data for months. Unfortunately, the party was unwilling to change too many sitting MLAs,” he wrote.

If party replacement of MLAs (and even MPs) is an effective strategy to win elections, it raises three important questions about the emerging nature of democratic politics in India.

Sources of local-level anti-incumbency?

First, why do incumbent MLAs become so unpopular, even when the state leadership of the ruling party continues to retain its popularity?

A common explanation is that incumbent MPs and MLAs become too complacent after victory, are rarely available to voters to hear their grievances, and engage in exploiting the privileges of power. ‘Chunaav jeetne ke baad vidhyak ji kahan dikhte hai’ [MLA is nowhere to be seen after winning the election] is a common refrain on the ground. Some MLAs often become kingpins of local-level corruption, engage in extortion of prime property, and amass huge wealth. Given that a candidate in assembly elections spends anywhere between Rs 5-10 crore in the Hindi belt to become competitive, they are likely to focus on activities to recover some of the cost and create resources to finance the next election campaign, if nominated. Unsurprisingly, the assets reported by incumbents in their election affidavits, while being greatly under-valued, show a huge spike. Since political office yields such significant returns, wouldn’t MLAs do whatever they can to remain popular in their constituency?

There is, however, a more complex and structural phenomenon at play here. The number of voters per assembly constituency has increased three-fold in the last forty years. For example, there were less than one lakh electors per assembly constituency in the 1980s in Rajasthan, which has increased to 2.6 lakh electors in the recently concluded election. Ordinary citizens expect the MLAs to represent them by addressing all their needs. MLAs are expected to attend marriages, last rites, and be available for almost everything, including transfers and positions in government jobs. This has become an extremely difficult proposition because the power of MLAs has been increasingly circumscribed by growing centralisation within parties and chief ministers’ reliance on bureaucratic machinery to run the state. It has become now common for even ruling party MLAs to complain that the local SHO or the SDM doesn’t heed their demands. Meanwhile, party leaders have become ever more popular by announcing one populist scheme after the other, continuing to offer different kinds of perks and patronage to their core social base, and effectively using mass media techniques to build a larger-than-life image.

The fear of rebellion in the ranks?

Second, why don’t political parties replace unpopular incumbents? After all, dropping these incumbents can help the party beat anti-incumbency sentiments.

It is possible that political parties and leadership may not have access to information regarding the anti-incumbency sentiments against these MLAs. However, as the Rajasthan example suggests, most political parties nowadays engage survey firms that could provide them with valuable feedback regarding the popularity ratings of their MLAs (and alternative names who could prove effective contenders). Nonetheless, political parties fear that many of the incumbents may rebel and contest against the party’s official nominee if they are not renominated.

There are some unknowns at play, and this has given rise to a mythical idea that rebels alone can damage the prospect of a party in an election. We do not have a good estimate of the proportions of incumbents who rebel if they do not get renominated, and the damage they can cause to the party’s electoral prospects. Additionally, we also do not know the correlation between local-level anti-incumbency sentiments and the chance of an incumbent winning the election. What we know is that voting decisions are rarely based on a candidate’s popularity alone. Lokniti-CSDS surveys have often asked voters what matters to them while deciding their vote— local candidate, party, or leadership. Approximately one-fourth of voters choose each of these options, with the remaining opting for no opinion. These data suggest that voters who are dissatisfied with the MLA’s performance could influence the election by voting for the rival party, but the effect is likely to be felt only in closely contested seats.

MLAs also have the near-impossible task of placating local-level factions within a party. MLAs have limited independent resources or access to state largesse that they can allocate to build support locally within the various party factions. Those who cannot face the real possibility of losing an election. Parties, however, have to balance state-level factional considerations and caste-community representations while nominating and renominating candidates. Many MLAs, even if unpopular, are likely to be renominated if aligned to one faction leader. By replacing an incumbent, parties may face internal sabotage by one factional leader to get the better of another faction within the party. This situation can quickly spiral out of control, especially since nominations take place very close to the date when elections are announced. So, only those incumbents who have lost the faith of their faction leadership are not renominated. This, of course, varies from party to party. Alexander Lee, in his research on incumbency advantage among Lok Sabha MPs between 1977 and 2004, finds that incumbents from highly centralised and less organised parties are more likely to lose than incumbents from less centralised parties.

Renominating incumbents also have financial implications for the party. As the election expenditures have gone up, incumbents are likely to have access to more financial resources to fund their campaigns, and other candidates who may not have the means to fund their entire campaign on their own (but they are important for the party from ideological or representational perspective). For a party, the candidates it nominates (especially incumbents) should raise resources for themselves and the party.

Why do we even need MLAs & MPs?

Finally, there is tension between party-building strategies through continuous replacement of local-level incumbents and democratic politics through territorial representation.

The strength of democratic politics depends on stable patterns of competition. In developed countries, incumbents are much more likely to get re-elected because of their ability to provide constituency services, and push for policy platforms desired by constituents. The rate of incumbents getting re-elected in some instances, such as the US House of Congress, is over 90 percent. MLAs who successfully represent their constituency should be renominated even though it can lead to the entrenchment of power at the local level in the hands of few, especially in countries where state institutions are weak.

It is also expected that effective party building must weed out the unpopular or tainted incumbents regularly, infusing the party with fresh blood. This helps parties create strongholds that rely on party brands, and are not dependent on individual politicians. However, this policy carries a danger. If parties keep replacing their incumbents, then the state and national leadership of the party become more powerful, creating conditions for greater centralisation within parties and weakening local-level representation, which is the hallmark of territorially based representative systems that elect candidates locally. If MLAs and even MPs cannot represent their local constituents successfully, if they do not see themselves as lawmakers, what role are they playing in India’s democratic politics? Electing the executive?

The authors are with Center for Policy Research, New Delhi. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prashant)