The seven-day encounter in the forests near Gadool Ahlan village on the slopes of the Pir Panjal range has once again put the spotlight on the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. By all counts, the brave officers, including 19th Rashtriya Rifles Commanding Officer Colonel Manpreet Singh, his Company Commander Major Ashish Dhonchak, J&K Police DSP Humayun Bhat, and Sepoy Pradeep Singh who were killed in action, were go-getters and leading from the front. Two terrorists, including Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Uzair Khan, were killed. However, I would be failing as a defence analyst if I do not point out the serious lapses in the operations in the J&K over the past two years in which more soldiers have been killed in action than the number of terrorists eliminated.
It is evident that Army has misread Pakistan’s proxy war strategy and the changed tactics of the terrorists. In the four years since the revocation of Article 370, the political narrative, which the Army has supported too, has been that the backbone of the insurgency has been broken and the runt must be dealt with expeditiously to wipe it out for good. The truth is that violence in J&K had plateaued since 2010 as is evident from the data maintained by South Asia Terrorism Portal. In the five-year period from 2018 to 2023, there has been a slight rise in the number of violent incidents and terrorists killed as compared to the 2012-2017 timeframe. Indeed, there has been a crackdown on the financiers and overt supporters of terrorists, but a political strategy that seeks a lasting solution is still absent.
Pakistan’s strategy and terrorist tactics
Despite its economic and political travails, Pakistan’s proxy war strategy has remained unchanged. It has not taken its eye off its aim of wearing India down to usurp the Kashmir Valley and other Muslim-dominated areas. The degree of violence is calibrated in keeping with the international environment, pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the prevailing situation both at home and in India, and the success of counter-insurgency operations.
There is no dearth of recruits from either Pakistan’s Punjab or J&K. Currently, the leadership seems to be provided by Pakistani terrorists and foot soldiers are local Kashmiris. Training of indigenous terrorists is done in-house in J&K and arms/ammunition are brought in by couriers or delivered by drones. No matter how effective the counter-infiltration grid is, the terrain allows 150 to 200 terrorists to be sustained and maintained — enough to keep the insurgency going on.
The terrorists have shifted their bases from the villages to the forests. In the villages, intelligence agencies easily located them and the Army has perfected its drills of outer and inner cordons and a strike group that went for the kill. Terrorists were invariably forced to take shelter in a house that was brought down, rarely requiring classic room clearance.
In the forests, terrorists are relying on ambush — a surprise attack from a concealed position on an unsuspecting moving or temporarily halted enemy. More often than not, a trap is laid. The primary source of intelligence for the Army is the J&K Police which has a good intelligence network and leverage over the population due to the nature of its work. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and military intelligence rely on money. Due to religious motivations, most sources also work for the terrorists.
In a prolonged insurgency, most people know who is doing what. Forewarned, the terrorists spring an ambush. One of the acid tests of a potential terrorist is to act as a source and lure the security forces into a trap before they can join the ranks. If forced to accompany the Army, they either slip away during the ambush or become a martyr if killed.
As per my assessment, the above pattern was followed in the ambush of five soldiers, including four from Special Forces, in Rajouri’s Kandi forest area on 5 May 2023. The same seems to be the case with respect to the Gadool Ahlan encounter. In other cases, from forest hideouts, the terrorists observe the pattern of movement or any lapses by security forces and launch a planned or an opportunity ambush. This was the case when a lone unescorted vehicle was ambushed and five soldiers were killed on 20 April this year. A similar case was the killing of 10 soldiers in Bhatta Dhurriyan between 11 and 14 October 2021.
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Security forces must succeed at all times
There is a time-proven adage that the terrorists only have to succeed once but the Army at all times. Indian Army has had 34 years of experience fighting counter-insurgency in J&K, 67 years in the Northeast, and 10 years in Punjab. There is nothing about such operations that it does not know. It is also well-known that counter-insurgency places extreme physical demands on the soldiers. During the peak years of insurgency in J&K there were two to three encounters every 24 hours and the terrorists aggressively engaged the troops. This kept the troops in a state of high alert. With insurgency at a low ebb and large gaps between encounters, complacency sets in and short shrift is given to the strenuous time-proven tactics. And when information is received, there is undue haste in launching an operation, and caution is thrown to the winds.
Ambushes in the counter-infiltration grid tend to follow a pattern that facilitates infiltration and, at times, leads to ambushers getting ambushed. Area domination patrols also get ambushed for the same reason. Tired soldiers resting without precaution fall prey to the ever-watchful terrorists. There is a cardinal rule for reconnaissance ahead of a moving column. Even at section (10 soldiers) level, two scouts tactically move 50 to 60 yards ahead to prevent the entire body from being caught in an ambush or coming under fire at the same time. If there are gaps between columns moving in the same direction, then each column must have its own reconnaissance.
“A leader has the right to be beaten, but never the right to be surprised,” Napoleon said. Of course, the ambush itself has many variations, but all these can be countered by detailed planning. The forested mountainous areas favour the ambusher and lapses with respect to tactical movement are catastrophic. Failure to follow these time-proven tactics is the only explanation for the entire party of the Commanding Officer getting caught in an ambush in the Gadool Ahlan encounter.
The first fundamental of any planned counter-terrorist operation is to tactically move and establish an outer and an inner cordon and prevent the terrorists from escaping. This rule also applies in the toughest of terrain. It is only after this is done that the strike force or even the inner cordon tactically closes in to establish contact and eliminate the terrorists. The second cardinal rule is that when using sources, it must be assumed that a trap will be laid.
Close combat is a two-way street. Casualties do take place, but these must not occur due to violations of fundamental tactics. Leon Uris in his famous book Battle Cry quotes his Marine sergeant, “We want you alive! Let the other son of a b…. die for his country, we want you alive!” Substitute ‘his country’ for ‘his cause’ and the quote is relevant for counter-terrorist operations.
‘Leading from the front’ is the hallmark of the Army’s leaders. All sub-units from a section of 10 soldiers upwards have leaders who are supposed to lead. So is every individual soldier imbibed with leadership qualities. Relatively higher leadership intervenes when chips are down to set an example. They must not take over the mission of their subordinate leaders and be at the forefront from the word ‘go’. However, in counter-terrorist operations, it is also imperative for the commanding officers to be well forward to make critical decisions. A balance has to be struck. The loss of a commanding officer adversely affects the morale of troops. Till the 1950s, a protection section used to be authorised for the commanding officer, which always tactically operated ahead of him. This practice needs to be revived in counter-insurgency operations.
The way forward
Let there be no doubt that Pakistan will never give up its strategy to annex J&K through a thousand cuts, no matter how economically poor it becomes. Its nuclear weapons and well-equipped army safeguard it from a decisive defeat. It has adequate capability to counter surgical strikes through quid pro quo operations.
There is an urgent requirement to restore the status of statehood for J&K and hold elections. The Kashmiris are closely following the developments in Manipur and taking notice of the contrast with which they are treated. If the current drift continues, the gains of the past four years will be lost and the situation in J&K will regress in time.
The Army needs to dominate the forested areas. To make this happen, the counter-insurgency grid will have to be restructured. Fifty per cent of the company operating bases of Rashtriya Rifles must be moved into the forests, particularly the Pir Panjal range. Vacated bases in the Valley must be handed over to the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).
A concerted effort must be made to avoid complacency and get back to the basics to ensure that there is no deviation from the time-tested tactics, procedures, and drills. Patience is the key, and any haste in the conduct of operations will only lead to avoidable casualties.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)