The recently concluded G20 summit in Delhi demonstrated India’s rising global stature. The keenness of the US, its allies, and partners to woo India was visible in the galaxy of global leaders who attended the summit. The desire to ensure India’s ‘win’ during the G20 presidency, even though Presidents XI Jinping and Vladimir Putin skipped the event, was apparent in the diluted final communique.
Similarly, the signal to China was clear—both from the deepening India-US partnership, symbolised by a bilateral between PM Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden within three months, and through the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.
There are those in India who may see all these developments as the fulfilment of the country’s long-held desire for a multipolar world order. However, it is more likely that realpolitik played a role—the US and its allies’ desire to court countries in the Global South in an era of US-China peer competition.
2023 is India’s year—from holding the presidency of the UN Security Council in December 2022 to the Global South summit in January, participation in the G7 and Quad summits in Japan in May, and hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in July.
India’s goal was to burnish its strategic autonomy credentials through these summits—balancing close ties with its Western partners with its historical claim to leadership among the world’s have-nots. In this regard, India has succeeded.
For the United States, its decades-old alliance system was long the backbone of its grand strategy. However, in an era when countries seek to avoid choosing sides, ensuring that American partners and allies are part of minilaterals and regional groupings is key.
President Biden’s decision not only to attend the G20 summit but also to hold a bilateral meeting with PM Modi reflects this policy. The absence of both Putin and Xi provided the US and its partners with a unique opportunity to show their support for India and its goals.
Many American allies share this view. At the G7 held in May 2023, Japan invited six countries as observers. A close American ally, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is part of the I2U2—a grouping of India, Israel, UAE, and the US—and now the new economic corridor.
India also used the G20 forum to bolster ties with partners in the Global South, including ensuring the African Union’s membership in the G20. India’s G20 priorities also encompassed global public goods that resonate with fellow Global South countries. These include climate financing, debt sustainability and financing, digital public infrastructure, and disaster risk reduction.
Finally, even though it is not a G20 agenda item, India ensured that the final statement included a reference to terrorism. For India, this is important, especially in the context of Indian domestic politics, to demonstrate international support for its concerns about terrorism and extremism.
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Taking India-US ties to a new level
President Biden attended the G20 summit and, prior to the summit, held a bilateral meeting with PM Modi. Meeting three months after Modi’s official state visit to the US in June, the aim was clearly to reaffirm the “close and enduring” strategic partnership. The joint statement released by the White House spoke of a transformational, multi-faceted relationship covering all areas of mutual interest.
There was the now predictable reiteration of American support for India’s membership in the UN Security Council. While the symbolism was important, any additions to the UNSC’s permanent veto-holding membership appear highly unlikely, as India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany—the G-4—understand.
The Quad was also referenced, including the January 2024 summit in India, along with the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy and US entry into the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative. While India has played it down, a key hard security deliverable from the June 2023 state visit is India’s emergence as a hub for repairing and maintaining the US Navy’s ships and other assets.
India is not an American security ally and is not providing bases to the US, but agreements like these – in addition to the four foundational agreements that both countries signed over the last two decades – demonstrate India’s potential to support the US and its allies in any future conflict in the South China Sea and beyond.
Indians have long prided themselves on their achievements in science and technology, even during the Cold War when facing sanctions and restrictions imposed by the Western countries. Today, India is a country that has landed on the moon and launched a solar mission. In 2023, after decades of protecting its state-of-the-art technology in civilian and defence sectors, the US has shown a willingness to cooperate and collaborate with India in space, cyber, semiconductors, Open RAN, and Quantum. During the September bilateral in Delhi, Modi and Biden also discussed multi-institutional educational partnerships in critical and emerging technologies.
There were also developments in the defence realm, with the US Congress approving the agreement between GE Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) to manufacture GE F-414 jet engines in India. The Indian government has also approved procurement of 31 General Atomics MQ-9B drones. Additionally, there was a reference to the potential for the two countries to work in the realm of nuclear energy, particularly in developing next generation small modular reactor technologies. For India, it is important that the US is finally willing to share its technology ‘crown jewels’ with a non-security ally; for the US, sharing such high-end technology is a small price to pay for building the defining partnership of the 21st century.
In the commercial and trade realm, all disputes at the WTO level have been resolved, and the two countries have announced an “Innovation Handshake” agenda as part of the India-US Commercial Dialogue. This agenda aims to bring together start-ups, private equity and venture capital firms, corporate investment departments, and government officials to “forge connections between the two countries’ innovation ecosystems.”
However, the economic partnership between the two countries remains the weakest leg of the relationship. India has become more protectionist, remains sceptical of the benefits of free trade, and is reluctant to provide a level-playing field for foreign and domestic actors. The two countries are far from achieving the goal of $500 billion in bilateral trade promised during the Obama administration.
Also read: Simple G20 truth is—India gained in last Cold War by playing both sides. No longer a choice
The new corridors of power
President Biden also participated in the launch of the new India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which seeks to use regional connectivity and economic integration to boost economic growth. Although China was not mentioned, the corridor is being positioned as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Since the start of the Biden administration, the US has emphasised the need to offer countries around the world an alternative to the ‘China model’—high-interest loans for infrastructure projects. Over the past two years, various alternatives have been proposed, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Quality Infrastructure Partnership. However, none of these initiatives has garnered the large-scale ‘buy-in’ of as many countries and continents as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the Trans-African Corridor.
Now that nine months of summit diplomacy have concluded, India’s leaders should build on the partnerships and relationships that have been forged over decades. India’s geo-strategic location is critical, and these economic corridors can reinforce India’s historical ties in development, economics, and security with countries in the Gulf, Europe, and Africa.
India’s leaders should focus less on past issues and social matters and concentrate on bolstering partnerships with Asia, Europe, Africa, and the United States. It is these partnerships that will go a long way in helping India achieve its economic and security goals.
Aparna Pande is Director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Washington-based Hudson Institute. She tweets @Aparna_Pande. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)