Can decades of reformation override the ‘heinousness’ of crime? Delhi High Court says yes

HC comes down heavily on what it called 'mechanical' bureaucratic processes in prison system, while highlighting shift in judicial focus from retributive justice to rehabilitative potential.

Illustration: ThePrint Team

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has ordered the immediate premature release of two life convicts, criticising the Sentence Review Board (SRB) for what it described as its “dogmatic adherence” to the gravity of the original offences while overlooking decades of reformation.

In a judgement delivered Monday, Justice A. J. Bhambhani came down heavily on what it called “mechanical” bureaucratic processes in the prison system, while highlighting a shift in judicial focus from retributive justice to rehabilitative potential of the individual.

While ordering the immediate premature release of two men, Ramesh and Tasleem—the former convicted of culpable homicide and the latter of gangrape—Justice Bhambhani quoted Anton Chekhov: “Capital punishment kills a man at once, but lifelong imprisonment kills (a man) slowly.”

The two cases were part of a batch of over 22 petitions by various life convicts challenging SRB decisions rejecting their premature release. In most of these cases, the Board had rejected applications citing what it described as the “perversity” or “heinousness” of the crime.

Ramesh’s case served as a primary example of procedural unfairness, the court said. As of early 2026, the culpable homicide convict had spent more than 31 years in actual imprisonment, and over 40 years with remissions or earned reductions for good behaviour. Despite satisfying all eligibility criteria, the SRB rejected his plea for release on 18 separate occasions.

The court’s rationale for granting his release focused on several key findings.

Ramesh had not received a single jail warning or adverse report in over three decades, showing his model conduct. He remained gainfully employed in Tihar’s printing unit for 25 years and earned multiple skill-development certifications.

With this judgement, the court has reaffirmed that the rehabilitative concept of penology must have meaning. By directing that both Ramesh and Tasleem be released, it signalled that “retributive death by incarceration” has no place in a system committed to reformation and human dignity.

 

‘Forward-looking inquiry’

The Delhi High Court said SRB repeatedly “mischaracterised” Ramesh’s conviction as murder even though the Supreme Court altered it to culpable homicide under Section 304-II of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which has a lower threshold for release. He had been released on parole or furlough 32 times, without a single instance of misuse.

Similarly, the court addressed the case of Tasleem, represented by advocate Sarthak Maggon, who had served over 15 years in jail and was convicted of gangrape. The SRB had rejected his release, saying that such a “desperate crime shakes the confidence of society” and would send a “wrong message”.

Justice Bhambhani dismissed this rationale, stating that societal reactions and the notion of a “negative message are factors de hors(outside) the statutory criteria”.

Emphasising that the reports from the Social Welfare Department and prison authorities were positive and that there was “not even police opposition” in Tasleem’s case, the court noted that the death of Tasleem’s mother and sister, along with property disputes, created a vulnerable familial situation that necessitated his reintegration into society.

The core of the court’s reasoning rests on a rejection of the idea that the nature of a past crime should act as a permanent bar to freedom.

Justice Bhambhani said that the gravity of the original offence and the length of the sentence are “static, historical facts” that neither the convict nor the passage of time can ever alter.

The judge reasoned that if these factors were treated as “dispositive” or the final word on the matter, no life convict would ever qualify for premature release, effectively rendering the state’s reformative machinery redundant.

Instead, the court held that the inquiry must be “forward-looking”, focusing on objective parameters such as the convict’s current propensity for crime, demonstrable reformation, and the socio-economic impact of continued incarceration on their family.

A ‘bureaucratic miasma’

Justice Bhambani did not mince words regarding the conduct of the SRB.

While analysing the cases, the court found that the SRB had fallen into what it called a “bureaucratic miasma”, characterised by “copy-paste” rejection orders and a failure to meaningfully engage with institutional reports.

The court criticised the SRB’s recurring conclusion that convicts had “not lost the propensity to commit crime” despite having “zero punishment” records.

Justice Bhambhani called the SRB’s assertion that jail conduct is not a barometer for conduct outside a “patently erroneous” approach that nullifies the “very purpose” of reformation policies and efforts.

The court found that such “mechanical refusals” violated the principles of natural justice and the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

A mandate for liberty

The most significant procedural aspect of the judgment is the court’s decision to order immediate release rather than sending the cases back to the SRB for another review.

The court reasoned that because the SRB had demonstrated an “entrenched arbitrariness” and had ignored prior judicial directions, remanding the matters would be “futile”.

Justice Bhambhani concluded that when an executive decision is found to be “patently illegal or fraught with constitutional violation”, the high court must exercise its powers under Article 226 to prevent a “gross miscarriage of justice”.

(Edited by Sugita Katyal)