New Delhi: The tensions between India and Bangladesh have heightened over the past week over accusations of attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, and global media has taken notice of it.
The Guardian reports that the “monsoon revolution”, which led to the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, was “widely regarded as a diplomatic disaster for India”. Bangladesh used to be India’s closest ally in the region, the report says, and the “Delhi government had used its considerable sway over Hasina to orchestrate economically and strategically beneficial deals”.
Hasina fled to India in August, and has been in exile in Delhi since. Since then, the anger towards India has continued in Bangladesh—and India has been accused of undermining the caretaker government with Nobel winner Muhammad Yunus at the helm. A major flashpoint has been fear over the safety of Hindus in Bangladesh.
While Yunus reassured reporters that rumours of violence have been exaggerated, fresh concerns emerged when ISKCON monk Chinmoy Krishna Das was arrested for sedition. His supporters in Bangladesh held protests, and a Muslim prosecutor was hacked to death in the days that followed. Mass protests also erupted in India over Das’s arrest.
“The Hindu minority in Bangladesh has historically faced persecution, particularly from more extremist Islamist elements which Hasina largely kept under control,” The Guardian reports.
“Analysts in Dhaka said the reports of violence against Hindus were being overblown by India but also blamed the interim government—which is seen by many as inexperienced and out of its depth—for mishandling the situation and failing to establish law and order,” it continues.
The Washington Post also adds its two cents: a special tribunal in Bangladesh has banned the publication of any speeches made by Sheikh Hasina—a day after she made a virtual address to supporters of her Awami League party in New York.
The decision was made by the Dhaka-based International Crimes Tribunal, which Hasina herself established and used to try people accused of war crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 war for independence with Pakistan. The politicians who were found guilty and executed mainly belonged to her rival party, Jamaat-e-Islami.
“Yunus has been meeting with political and religious leaders urging them to stay united. On Wednesday, he held a dialogue with most political parties except Hasina’s Awami League party and the Jatiya Party which are facing severe challenges under the Yunus-led administration,” the Post reports, before continuing to say Bangladesh has been facing “crucial challenges” since August.
“The security situation remains a major concern. About 700 inmates, including many criminals and radical Islamists, still remain at large after jailbreaks during the political chaos in August,” it reports.
Meanwhile, Bloomberg worries that India’s growth slump spells larger economic doom. In its latest India Edition newsletter, Bloomberg writes that “from a ‘world-beating 8.2%’ last fiscal year to a ‘5.4% growth shocker’ last quarter, India’s slowing GDP growth has prompted economists to slash full-year estimates to as low as 6% for this fiscal and next.”
This “hard landing has surprised both cheerleaders and cynics,” it says. Some slowdown was expected due to the Modi government’s ongoing fiscal consolidation and the fact that the RBI is trying to curb inflation. But this number points to “stagflation” and “tough times ahead”.
The piece offers three key things to remember. The first is that the slowdown might not be temporary—there might be a longer cyclical slowdown, as industrial growth has been dented and Trump’s tariff threats might limit an increase in private investment in India.
The second is that there is “no significant fiscal or monetary policy relief in sight”. The central government is committed to reducing the budget deficit, while the RBI is focused on lowering inflation and hasn’t yet acknowledged that high interest rates might be hurting growth and putting India behind the curve. It’s unlikely that the RBI will cut interest rates.
The last lesson it offers is that policymakers will have to either take new risks, or investors in India will have to lower their expectations.
“India will still be the fastest-growing large economy in the world but that label will not make up for lost growth in a nation racing to become rich before it gets old. Worse still, slowing growth will raise clamor for more welfare schemes, setting off a vicious policy circle,” Bloomberg says. “In short, no guts, no glory. That will get tested next year.”
This seems to be the theme for India-watchers. Tanvi Madan writes in Foreign Affairs that despite India’s differences with the US—mainly accusations over involvement in plotting to kill American citizens, New Delhi’s relationship with Moscow, and American support for a Yunus-led Bangladesh—New Delhi sees the US as an “indispensable partner in every sector of India’s forward march,” to quote Modi. The exhaustive piece examines every angle of the Indo-US partnership—from global positioning to bilateral ties.
“And particularly given the looming China challenge, Indians across most of the political spectrum seem to feel that New Delhi must work closely with Washington regardless of who is in the White House. It should therefore come as no surprise that Modi was very quick to congratulate Trump on his 2024 victory—as was Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the Indian opposition,” writes Madan.
Delhi isn’t nervous about a Trump presidency, Madan writes, because the Indo-US relationship has only strengthened over time. Delhi is confident when it comes to dealing with Trump and his team. One of the things India will be watching is whether Trump will take a more assertive stance towards China.
“A White House that looks at the world through a lens of competition with China is helpful to New Delhi in a few ways: it will likely seek to ensure a favorable regional balance of power, collaborate with like-minded allies and partners and urge them to take the China threat seriously, deepen cooperation with India, and be more willing to manage differences with New Delhi,” she writes.
On the other hand, an administration that is softer on China could reduce India’s importance on the global stage. This scenario is not yet out of the question for New Delhi, which will be keeping a close eye on what Beijing puts on the table once Trump is in office.
“To ensure that the United States and India converge more than they diverge, India will likely return to its original Trump playbook, with some updates and amendments,” writes Madan. “Understanding Trump’s skepticism of alliances and desire for good deals, New Delhi will highlight that it neither has nor expects a security commitment and indeed is willing to burden share and contribute to regional security. It will more explicitly underscore—including in dollar terms—the ways in which India is strategically and economically useful to the United States.”
But India also needs to protect itself from potential volatility, and will most likely do so by doubling down on its investment diversification in partnerships across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This will include both Russia and China, Madan predicts.
“Broadly speaking, Trump’s reelection will also underscore New Delhi’s quest for self-reliance,” she writes. “But even as New Delhi seeks to make its own choices, given its deep strategic and economic links with Washington, India will have no choice but to grapple with those decisions made in the United States—a country that, with its skepticism of alliances, free trade, and immigrants, resembles India more than ever before.”
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