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In Nov last year 6 Field Regiment located at Devlali, held functions to commemorate the Diamond Jubilee of the ‘62 War with China.
It was disconcerting to observe that among the participants I was the lone representative of those who survived that war.
6 Field Regiment had been deployed in Arunachal Pradesh as part of 4 Infantry Division. It’s batteries were located at Sela, Darrand Dzong and Bomdilla. I was the Command Post Officer (now Gun Position Officer since 8 gun batteries have been replaced with six guns) of 86 Field Battery at Darang Dzong.
On that fateful day of 18 Nov 62 we lost three officers and 60 soldiers and another 27 had been taken as prisoners. Among the dead were –officers, JCOs and soldiers with whom I had developed close bonds. Bonds that only the uniformed fraternity can relate to.
That War has been extensively studied and blame appropriately apportioned. Based on the lessons learnt the Army underwent some major restructuring. Mountain Divisions were specially raised to fight in the North East. A special force was also created. However, regrettably the politico- civil structures for national security remained generally untouched.
Recalling my experience and observations there are three aspects amongst quite a few others that remain relevant and important even today.
Let us begin with logistics. Every account starting from Brig Dalvi’s has dwelt on the inadequacy of infrastructure to include roads and tracks that prevented the supply and provisioning of ammunition, clothing, equipment and rations. I believe there is enough reason to revisit this subject. We had a air/ rail head at Tezpur. There was a reasonable class 40 Road from Tezpur to Tawang. Air supply via para drops and limited helicopter support was available. And most importantly compared to the Chinese we were operating within our territory. Now compare with what the Chinese accomplished. Let us just look at the last phase. The Chinese 11 Infantry Division from its concentration area North of Se la was launched on an outflanking move to capture Bomdila and Darrang. This division covered more than 160 Kms via Tse la and Poshingla moving on a narrow mountain track. Supported by over 1000 porters this division reached all its objectives as planned. In contrast my Regiment less a battery took almost a month from Tezpur to move up to our deployment areas at Bomdila and and Darrang for want of transport and road space. What prevented us from hiring 30000 porters and assembling elephants, camels, mules, tractors and trolleys and whatever else was needed to ensure required combat capacity? Vision and synergy between the military and civilian bureaucracy were clearly lacking!!
Intelligence!! “It’s said that a pair of good eyes can equal 2000 soldiers” Much has been said about our intelligence failures. But we have it seems not drawn any lessens from what intelligence accomplished for the Chinese. Studies have vaguely alluded to the Chinese interfering with our wireless networks. There is also mention of the odd Tibetans dressed like monks who were suspected of spying.
But before proceeding further lets note that those days there were no satellites, no aerial photography, and no drones. Yes wireless intercepts were possible but such intercepts could not have given the Chinese the information/ intelligence that they finally exploited.
For a clearer understanding of this analysis we go back to the period 13 to 18 Nov 62. Our Defenses were at Sela, Darrang Dzong and Bomdila. At Sela the Chinese were in contact. But Darrang Zong and Bomdila were about 40 to 60 Kms in depth. ( See Sketch attached) Factor the problems of navigating at night over mountain tacks in unknown enemy held territory. On night 17/18 Nov I as part of the 19 Maratha patrol traversed one of these tracks. It was a nightmarish experience.
With the above as backdrop look at what the Chinese offensive accomplished. On 18 Nov by dawn all attacking columns had simultaneously struck at the chosen objectives. With uncanny precision every gap and every vulnerable space in our defenses were hit. My Battery withdrawing from Sela was ambushed on the 18th morning close to Darrang Dzong. More alarming, 4 Rajputs -while withdrawing from Darrang Dzong was ambushed South of Mandla on 19 Nov. The Commanding officer and more than half the battalion were killed. How and when did the Chinese get to these positions undetected?? It seems we have glossed over these questions.
Reflecting over that debacle I have now come to the following conclusions:
- The Chinese had detailed real time information of all our deployments. Such information was gathered by visual observation from close quarters. Likely that the Chinese were dressed as monks or civilians.
- The process of infiltration would have begun around 13/14 Nov.
- In all probability large numbers came in dressed as locals and were perhaps given sanctuaries in the surrounding villages.
- By night of 17/18 Nov the Chinese were well poised for the offensives that followed across the entire Divisional defensive sector.
The import of such intelligence requires no amplification.
Now for the third and perhaps the real game changer in our force equations.
From 59 to Sep 62 we had approximately 5-6 clashes with the Chinese. In each of them we suffered more casualties and even had some of our policemen/ soldiers taken -prisoners. Not one encounter went even vaguely in our favor, despite the fact that in almost all instances neither the numbers nor the terrain was against us. Imagine the impact of such news on those who were deployed to go into battle when war finally broke out. We may claim otherwise but the majority of us had been psyched into believing that the Chinese were seven feet tall.
Another unique feature of this War was that the battles were primarily fought -by the infantry, no Air Force nor Armor and negligible artillery.
So why did we lose so deplorably even when on quite a few occasions the numbers nor the terrain were entirely in favor of the Chinese. Our soldiers were equally fit. There were as well trained as the adversary. The only rational explanation is the weaponry of the infantry. The Chinese had superior personal arms. The contest was between our .303 bolt- action rifle- versus the 7.62 automatic rifle. And the 7.62 prevailed hands down. So here is lessen No 1 of the 62 War- The impact of CRITICAL WEAPONRY. In this case it was the basic infantry soldier’s RIFLE. We lost because the Chinese had better rifles.
If we had not had a dysfunctional National Security apparatus, a professional mentally agile proactive military leadership would have analyzed those initial battles and within a year or so of those initial clashes projected the requirement of 50-60000 automatic rifles ( Kalashnikov or equivalent). Had, those rifles been procured by Jun/ Jul 62 our military debacle may not have happened. It is hoped that the import of this lament is not lost on the current establishment.
These pieces are being published as they have been received – they have not been edited/fact-checked by ThePrint.