Strategic depth — the prevalence or absence of it — is a key determinant of a country’s National Security Strategy. It refers to the distance between the front lines, also called the Tactical Battle Area or TBA, and the base, from which the Army draws its strength, in terms of men, material and resources. The space in between, through which pass the roads and railroads connecting the two, the lines of communications, is known as the Communications Zone or Comn Z. This zone has the intermediate logistical and administrative elements to support the troops in the TBA, including population centres. The depth of this zone, and the value objectives that lie within it, will determine if a country can adopt a strategy of ‘trading space for time’, when confronted with an adverse situation.
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Strategic depth or its absence
During World War II, when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 against the Soviet Union, the Russians made full use of their strategic depth in the face of rapid German advances. The Russians who were forced to retreat, followed a ‘scorched earth’ policy, destroying or burning everything of military value, including crops and livestock; plant and machinery; denying any source of sustenance to the Germans within the Comn Z. As a result, the German lines of communication, rearwards towards their base in the German heartland, kept getting longer and longer, eventually becoming unviable, and ultimately succumbing to the severe Russian winter. This ‘trading space for time’ allowed the Russians to regroup, kick-start their industrial production and then go on the counter-offensive when fully ready.
However, what does a country do when it is not big enough to have strategic depth? Then, it has to look over its shoulder to artificially create that depth, within the neighbouring country or kingdom. The great Maratha warrior, Chhatrapati Shivaji, was among the first to employ this strategy, possibly even before it was ever enunciated. When faced with the overwhelming strength of the Mughal armies, rather than give battle against unfavourable odds, he would fall back to the territory of neighbouring Bijapur, while continuing to harass them using guerilla tactics.
From the early 1980s, Pakistan started looking toward Afghanistan to provide this strategic depth vis-à-vis India, a thought first articulated in their National Defence University, Islamabad. This is the main reason for their interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, namely, securing a sympathetic regime in Kabul. However, their plan does not seem to have worked, with their Western front with Afghanistan as volatile as ever and the Taliban showing that they are not puppets. Nevertheless, this contingency remains part of Pakistan’s strategic calculus.
What happens when a country has neither the luxury of strategic depth, nor a friendly neighbour? Faced with such a situation, this depth has to be created by occupying territories beyond one’s own boundaries. Israel is a case in point. Following the six-day war of 1967, Israel continued with its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, as it afforded them the depth against any surprise offensive by Egypt from the South. This occupation was to pay handsome dividends during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Israeli forces could hold off the Egyptians at the Mitla and Gidi passes that lie within Sinai. This occupation continued even after the war until 1982, when Israel relinquished control of the Sinai, as part of the conditions of the Egypt-Israel Peace Accord of 1979. Similarly, Israel continues to occupy the Golan heights to the North, which it had captured from Syria in the six-day war. Additionally, Israel is in occupation of the West bank of the Jordan river, an area of about 5,800 sq kms, which gives it the much-needed depth at its shortest point which is barely 15 km wide East-West.
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India’s problem
India is blessed to have the advantage of a large land-mass, with its core areas comprising industrial centres, major cities, road and rail networks spread all over the country. Yet, many of these lucrative targets also lie within or close to the TBA where they could be over-run in the initial stages of an enemy offensive. Therefore, it has to carefully calibrate its strategy with respect to its potential adversaries, China to the North and Pakistan to the West. Against each of these too, the strategy at the operational level would be different in various sectors of the border, depending on varied factors such as the terrain, the strategic importance of the area, and the political ramifications of what such losses might entail.
On the Western Front, we may afford to trade space for time in the desert sector, allowing the enemy offensive to run out of steam due to the lack of any inherent natural resources, especially water. However, the same would not be true further North. Major population centres having political and religious significance, Amritsar for example, which is just about 30 plus kms from the international border, and well within the range of enemy long-range artillery, would have to be defended at all costs. Its fall would do irreparable damage to India’s reputation, both domestically and internationally. The military strategies for the two sectors, deserts and plains would therefore, differ radically.
To the North, India shares a border of over 3,000 km with Tibet, illegally occupied by China in the 1950s. Here too, the strategies for defending these borders in the different sectors, Northern, Central and Eastern, would vary. Post the Galwan clash of 2020, both the People’s Liberation Army and the Indian Army have fortified their positions and are forward deployed, with neither side inclined to cede any space to the other. In the Central Sector, bordering Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand lie places of religious importance, which once again have to be defended strongly right from the outset. The same is true for the Sikkim and Tawang areas of the Eastern sector. If at all the option of trading space for time can be exercised, it would be in the other valleys of Eastern Arunachal Pradesh. But this option has to be exercised with care since China claims this area as part of South Tibet, a claim reinforced by their official map published as late as 28 August 2023.
The bottom line is that while India might have the luxury of a large landmass, its strategic depth is of little value due to overriding domestic compulsions. India will therefore have to be forward deployed almost everywhere to thwart any pre-emptive surprise attacks, which in spite of technological advances, can only be done by having adequate boots on ground.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)