Viksit Bharat is the buzzword these days. Achieving this by 2047 seems possible, given the rapid pace of infrastructure development and the slew of people-centric programmes. What is less clear, however, are the threats a Viksit Bharat would face on the battlefield in 2047.
At the NDTV Defence Summit held earlier this month, General Manoj Pande, Chief of the Army Staff, highlighted that warfare has diversified into new domains. To remain competitive in keeping with the changing character of war, a paradigm shift in capability development is required to become a future-ready force that can safeguard national interests.
Wars will continue to be fought despite efforts for peaceful resolution of disputes. These could be on account of ideological differences, competition over resources and living space ‘lebensraum’, or even purely domestic considerations like wanting to stay in or usurp power. However, the ways in which these wars will be fought will undergo a profound change due to rapid advances in a range of complementary technologies.
The enmeshing of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning with existing weapons systems will lead to the fielding of more destructive weapons systems. They will have longer ranges, more destructive power and improved accuracy, all operating in a networked environment that will also be transformed. These new technologies – some of which may be low-cost – could easily proliferate to smaller countries and even non-state actors, greatly adding to the diversity of threats and challenges.
Hardware and TTPs
Two major domains must be considered in this context. First, the development of new weapons systems, the ‘hardware’. Second, the impact of these developments on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) or ‘doctrines’ for their employment. A case in point is how the weaponisation of low-cost $500 drones has materially changed the character of warfare. The relatively low cost and ease of operability make them ideal for use by even non-state actors as evidenced by attacks on Red Sea shipping by Houthi rebels and elsewhere by various pirates. If a 30,000-tonne ship can be sunk or disabled by rebels, it does not bode well for surface combatants, especially if operating in littoral waters.
The first major domain, the hardware or the new technology that will drive future wars, will fall under different categories too. The first category here would be the increased lethality of next-generation weapons systems aided by precision guidance.
Combined with the low probability of collateral damage, the threshold for the use of such weapons will only decrease. This will conversely increase the likelihood of their use, particularly for kinetic operations other than war (OOTW), such as punitive strikes a-la Balakot.
The second category would be unmanned and autonomous weapons systems, including Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) would also be the norm, as would Optionally Manned Systems (OMS). OMS would allow weapons systems to be employed in unmanned kamikaze mode if recovery were not essential. An aircraft with a turnaround of 500 km could then be used in one-way mode for 1,000 km, thereby achieving surprise.
On land, AI-enabled robotic humanoids could alter the dynamics of combat by changing who does the fighting and makes critical life-and-death decisions.
The third would include logistical aspects of sustaining the forces on the field under such diverse circumstances. Robotic mules, already in service as technology demonstrators, or aerial delivery of supplies, could materially shorten long and vulnerable re-supply chains. A robotic mule or logistics drone pre-programmed and tethered to its parent unit would automatically reach the correct place at the correct time. The possibilities are endless.
The fourth and perhaps the most important factor, as it is the basis of the earlier three categories, would be Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Advanced networked and AI-enabled C4ISR capabilities would provide an advantage through enhanced situational awareness, knowledge of the adversary and environment, and shortening the sensor-shooter loop.
Also read: Don’t fight wars of tomorrow with weapons of yesterday. Armies must prepare for future battles
The importance of TTPs
The second major domain that would have to be addressed is that of doctrine and the formulation of suitable TTPs to optimally utilise these new-fangled systems, many of which may still be on the drawing board. Novel and unexpected methods to use these new weapons will determine whether these result in radical changes in doctrines or merely adaptations to meet changing conditions. In this domain, too, there are four areas where developments could manifest.
The first aspect here would be the continued relevance of the principle of war regarding the concentration of force, deemed essential to gain numerical superiority over the adversary at the point of decision. With the advancements in C4ISR, large concentrations of forces would be sitting ducks. New doctrines and methods of warfighting would have to be formulated to be able to concentrate forces at the desired place and time from widely dispersed concentration areas. Similarly, at sea, Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) that cover hundreds of square nautical miles would be easier to detect and target even though they are mobile. Smaller task forces might be a better option.
The second would be first-salvo effectiveness. Because of their enhanced range and accuracy, missiles and rockets would rain down simultaneously with little to no warning on pre-selected civilian or military targets. This would leave the defender with no reaction time yet remaining below the nuclear threshold.
The third aspect concerns hybrid warfare and grey zone operations from both state and non-state actors, and the strategies to tackle them. These activities may be ongoing even when nations are seemingly at peace, and effective countermeasures to detect and nullify these threats must be formulated. Some of these threats might even have to be dealt with using the OOTW route.
This timely concentration of forces in a dynamic battlespace would require a robust communications system. This, therefore, would become the main target for cyber-attacks, which is the fourth aspect to be kept in mind. Cyber-attacks would also seek to jam or spoof sensor-shooter links, degrading the overall effectiveness of the weapons system. These attacks might not cause much physical damage but will be an integral part of any offensive or defensive plan, much as artillery support is today.
Given the complexities of the challenge, it is not the Armed Forces alone but all organs of the government that must dwell on these issues. Technologies and doctrines must develop concurrently. Policymakers, academia, industry as well as think tanks must bring their heads together and put into place a long-term plan of action so that we are ready to meet the challenges of 2047.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)