Since 9 June 2024, terrorist activity has intensified in Jammu and Kashmir. There have been seven incidents resulting in the fatal casualties of 10 civilians, eight security force personnel, and the killing of 12 terrorists Surprisingly, many of these incidents have occurred in the Jammu region, which has seen relatively fewer incidents in the last few years.
The most recent attack in Badnota near Machedi in Kathua District is intriguing. Machedi lies about 90 km East of NH 44, on the southern route into Doda-Kishtwar from Jammu. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Pakistan would infiltrate terrorists into the Jammu Sector across the International Boundary. These terrorists would then make their way east along the Degh-Basantar rivers, cross the NH 44, the Dhar-Udhampur road almost parallel to the national highway, and trek to the Bani-Machedi area. From here, they moved through the mountain valleys northwards toward Bhaderwah, in Doda District. The moot point here is that this was an infiltration route and the terrorists would rarely seek contact with the security forces.
The recent attacks demonstrate that Pakistan retains the ability and intent to orchestrate terrorist violence in India. While terrorist activity has been ring fenced to J&K, there is no reason to believe that Pakistan would not be able to carry out a terrorist attack in the hinterlands of India.
Scale, timing and intensity
The calibration of terrorist activities by Pakistan is based on three parameters: targeting, scale and timing.
Terrorists have mostly targeted security forces in the last few months. This was evident in the 2023 Rajouri attacks and Machedi this year. There have also been some incidents of targeted killings of non-Kashmiri labourers and an isolated killing of Hindu pilgrims in Reasi. The intent behind this seems to be to regain the support of the local population—many of whom are fence sitters—by playing on the narrative of ethnicity and portraying Indian forces as an occupation Army. The other benefit of successfully targeting isolated detachments of security forces without incurring any casualties is the positive effect it has on the terrorist cadre. These successes have emboldened the terrorists, leading to situations like the one in Machedi, where terrorists likely going toward Doda-Kishtwar saw an opportunity and attacked with impunity.
The scale of violence has been controlled. Terrorists have ambushed security forces in isolated patrols or vehicles, killing four to five personnel each time, or have cold-bloodedly killed local labourers and unarmed pilgrims. These actions have been likely facilitated by local support for logistics and intelligence about troop movements and activities. In no case of an action initiated by them, have the terrorists suffered any casualties.
The timing of these attacks is also noteworthy. There has been a notable spike in terrorist attacks since the results of the Indian Lok Sabha elections were declared in June. What is interesting is that there was almost a lull in activities during the elections. This seems to be planned so that the ruling dispensation does not get an opportunity to demonstrate political will as it did with the 2019 Balakot airstrike and surgical strike after the 2019 Uri attack. However, the complex mandate of 4 June allowed the Pakistani establishment to embarrass the Indian government of the day by showcasing their inability to respond. In effect, the intent of the Pakistani terror handles is to push the government and Indian security forces into a Business as Usual (BAU) mode. This is akin to the situation in the 2000s, the pre-Modi era.
By maintaining a low-scale targeting profile and primarily attacking security forces—which is considered fair game in any conflict—they have limited the retaliatory options of the Indian security establishment. Because the intensity of violence is controlled in these incidents and the attacks are dispersed in geography and time, the Indian government is constrained. This calibration, when coupled with a ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC), nullifies any tactical advantage Indian Forces may possess in dealing with Pakistan. It’s almost as if Pakistan wants to counter the Indian government’s narrative in Kashmir by restoking violence or nudging New Delhi to resort to overt military action, thereby signalling to the world that Kashmir is not a finished agenda.
Also read: Reasi carnage is a message from ISI—it can step up the pain for India in Kashmir
Time to bite the bullet
As any security watcher will tell you, the defensive approach in counter-terrorism operations is a losing mindset. If the Indian establishment slides into BAU mode, it will be on a very slippery slope. While the armed forces will lose combat ascendancy over the terrorists, the central government will lose the moral authority to govern the people. Most victims of vicious terrorist activities, fence-sitters, or soft-sympathisers would gravitate toward the ascendant. In effect, all the politico-military gains of the last two decades would be undone. The government of India needs to bite the bullet and take action to restore its moral ascendancy in the eyes of the people in Kashmir and the rest of India.
India has a few options to control this beast, but it needs some innovative thinking. New Delhi possesses the diplomatic and economic heft to weigh down Pakistan, but it will come at the cost of India parlaying its strategic autonomy to the West. Moreover, it might push China back toward Pakistan, from which it seems to be slightly decoupling, given the less-than-enthusiastic response to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief in China during their visit between 4 to 8 June.
In the recent joint declaration as part of the visit, China noted that it would not push businesses to take unwarranted risks or concessions to Pakistani companies and would support business investment in Pakistan in line with market and commercial principles. In effect, this is indicative of a lack of Chinese interest in Pakistan as an investment destination, which negatively impacts the future of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
In the kinetic domain, the options are slightly better, though they might be bitter for those expecting the LoC ceasefire to lead to lasting peace. It would be advisable for India to disregard the ceasefire without officially cancelling it. The LoC allows Indian forces to leverage their conventional superiority, and a hot LoC poses a bigger problem for Pakistan, especially with its western border also threatened by the Taliban. An active LoC also adds to the problems of the Pakistani establishment in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Alongside heating up the LoC, the Jammu Sector of International Boundary needs to be activated. Pakistan considers this a “Working Boundary,” and in that spirit should be able to accept an aggressive Indian posture. The rationale of proportionality of response in scale and effects does not hold here, as India does not have a policy or the wherewithal to execute political gains through deniable assets.
Additionally, Indian security forces need to refill the minor vacuum created by moving some forces from the Jammu-Reasi region to the northern borders. This gap could be filled by the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) given the distance from the LoC and the low intensity of violence in the region. It could well be a test bed for transferring more such areas from the Army to CAPF.
Lastly, the tough question of dealing with local populace that is inimical to the nation’s interests. The government needs to come up with some measures to incentivise people to keep them from supporting cross-border terror. This may be done by positive reinforcement in the form of rewards and economic opportunities, and negative reinforcement by speedy trial of the Over Ground Workers.
Unless the Indian side takes action now, the Pakistani terror machinery will grow in its activity footprint within Indian territory. There is no guarantee that, emboldened by their success and the lack of retributive cost incurred, Pakistan won’t restart operations pan-India.
Colonel Nikhil Apte served in the Indian Army for over 20 years. His service profile includes a tenure in the Military Operations Directorate, New Delhi, where he dealt with apex-level national strategy development and management of sensitive & volatile international relations. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)