Five thousand metres above sea level, late-morning sunlight burning through his eyeballs, Tashi Namgyal surveyed the endless empty whiteness. Far in the distance, he thought he could see the small, black dots he’d been watching out for.
Together with his friends Ali Raza Stanba and Morup Tsering, Namgyal had hiked up the Yaldor ridge, one of the five that descend like fingers from the massive Chorbat-La range. Armed with an ancient muzzle-loading rifle, he was hoping to hunt a mountain goat. When he looked through his binoculars, the truth sank in: The dots were not prey, but Pakistani soldiers.
Twenty-five years ago, on 3 May 1999, a patrol from the 3 Punjab Regiment hastily launched two lightly-armed patrols to investigate the story Namgyal and his friends brought home to the village of Garkhun. Both patrols were ambushed and forced to retreat.
The first few patrols
Following an intrusion in 1996, military historian General YM Bammi wrote, “The then-commander of the XV corps General S Padmanabhan had ordered a company be permanently stationed in Yaldor. Then, in the summer of 1998, Leh-based 3 Division ordered troops to begin trapping local animals, to populate a new zoo in the town. The company was withdrawn.”
Early in June 1998, 3 Division headquarters repeated the instructions, in a stern message marked 6361/9/ZOO/Q1, “Please ensure that various types of wild animals/birds are procured and despatched to zoo at Leh at your earliest. Cages required for transportation of animals/birds will be made under arrangements of respective b[riga]de[s]. No representation will be entertained.”
To the east, 11 days after the 3 Punjab patrols were ambushed, Captain Saurabh Kalia headed up the Kaksar Langpa area to reoccupy a post abandoned during the winter. The Pakistan Army was waiting—Kalia’s mutilated body, and those of his men, were returned weeks later. A second patrol, sent to investigate, was also ambushed, leading to the killing of Captain Amit Bharadwaj and Havaldar Rajvir Singh.
As India prepares to commemorate its victory in Kargil, it’s long past time to assign responsibility for the many failures of leadership that sent hundreds of Indian soldiers to their deaths in 1999.
“The truth about what went wrong, where and why should not embarrass anyone,” former defence minister George Fernandes said on 14 August 2002, “and it is a must so that we don’t repeat the mistakes of the past.” He was right.
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Warnings piling up
The summer of 1998 saw the Intelligence Bureau’s (IB) Jammu and Kashmir station—led by now-national security advisor Ajit Doval—becoming increasingly concerned about the prospect of incursions into Kargil.
The station noted increased military activity in several Pakistan Army forward positions, which later served as logistical bases during the war. Then-IB director Shyamal Dutta took the unusual step of issuing a personally signed warning on 2 June 1998.
It later reported Pakistan’s deployment of M-11 missiles and laying of new minefields. The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) issued warnings about new Pakistan Army formations being deployed, namely the 164 Mortar Regiment, the 8 Northern Light Infantry and the 69 Baloch Regiment.
The Army itself, documents reveal, had similar concerns. In a 30 August 1998 note, Major KBS Khurana wrote, “500 Afghan militants have been brought to Gurikot, NJ 7959, to be further inducted into India in the near future”. This information, revealed by a code-named source, was inaccurate—but, as Tashi Namgyam revealed, men in black shalwar-kameez were indeed used.
Later, the Brigade-Major of the Kargil-based 121 Brigade, Major RK Dwivedi, issued another letter warning, “push by militants across the Line of Control.” The note, despatched on 25 August 1998, speculated the infiltrators would “engage National Highway IA with Air Defence weapons”, “target selected forward posts,” and “hit Kargil and outlying villages” [military abbreviations replaced with full words, throughout].
Although the warnings spoke of infiltrators and not a full-scale military incursion, they should have been indication enough of significant movements on the other side.
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Exercises ignored
From early 1999, war games began to throw up disturbing evidence of weaknesses in India’s posture. In January 1999, Lieutenant-Colonel Oberoi reported that offensive action by Pakistan could render “some posts untenable”. His letter recommended that key points be permanently manned, including Point 4660-metres, which later became famous as Tiger Hill.
Less than a month later, soldiers of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area.
By spring, physical evidence of the incursions emerged when a group of Pakistani soldiers were seen at a bunker to the west of Point 5770. That evening marked the first fire contact of the Kargil War as both sides opened fire.
Field commanders conducted a second exercise in April 1999 to test their defensive systems. The exercise revealed that Pakistan could occupy large stretches of Zoji La and Kargil if it launched a brigade-sized assault. This was, of course, exactly what was underway.
These warnings were ignored by XV Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal and Northern Army Commander Hari Mohan Khanna. In fact, the latter pulled out troops from threatened locations such as Mashkoh-Dras stretch and Yaldor.
It is also clear from 1998 onwards that commanders on the ground were complaining about the shortage of troops. Brigadier Singh warned of this in a 12 August 1998 letter, marked 101/GS (Ops)/ANE/R. “While the combating of an insurgency is important, we must not lose sight of our primary role, that of ensuring the sanctity of the Line of Control and integrity of own territory.”
The Brigade did its best with what it had. In 1999, troops were withdrawn from Mashkoh, Yaldor, and Kaksar for far shorter periods as compared to 1998 and 1997.
Even these windows, though, were more than enough to let the Pakistan Army slip through the mountain passes.
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Blind to battle
Well after the fighting had broken out, top Indian Army commanders refused to accept the truth. At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on 24 May 1999, Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal insisted that there “were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes”.
Paragraph 4(v) of the minutes of the meeting records his claim that the “situation was local and would be defeated locally.” This was, as later events would clarify, an appalling miscalculation.
This didn’t stop Lt General Pal from praising his own leadership during the Kargil War as “unparalleled in the history of warfare”.
For the most part, India’s defence establishment has chosen to hush up its failures—ensuring there is no accountability for poor leadership, nor lessons learned. Following the war of 1973, the Israeli Cabinet set up an Inquiry Commission headed by the jurist Shimon Agranat.
Even though Israel won the war, top officials were sacked for mere delays in mobilising reserves. India, in contrast, is yet to declassify its official history of the war of 1962—let alone assign blame for misjudgements by high officials.
In the absence of a proper investigation, there’s no way of telling why the many errors that led up to the Kargil War took place. Leaders might have been beguiled by the ongoing peace process between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf; top commanders reluctant to voice their professional concerns; and intelligence services scared to take on the Generals.
The memory of the 527 Indian soldiers lost in Kargil, though, demands truth-telling—not the shrouding of what happened in syrupy, meaningless words.
Praveen Swami is a contributing editor at ThePrint. He tweets with @praveenswami. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Well, in the field of National Security, one must be open to discussions. I agree with the author that there is a clear need for accountability.
Yes, there was a clear misjudgment of intelligence provided, and some reports were not communicated to the appropriate authorities in a timely manner. However, it was not solely a failure of military leadership. Rather, it was a systemic failure that involved political leadership, bureaucratic and military leadership. All involved must be held accountable for their actions. Bureaucrats and political leaders cannot get away themselves of responsibility simply because they are not directly involved in combat operations. They are the ones who provide direction and oversight to the armed forces. While military commanders are responsible for their actions on the ground, they operate within a framework shaped by political directives and bureaucratic procedures. To effectively address the prevailing systemic shortcomings, it is imperative that we hold leaders at all levels accountable for their actions. Neglecting to do so will perpetuating a cycle of inadequate governance in national security.
It is not about the factual details of the conflict it is about helding the responsible leadership accountable either its from military or political or bureaucratic leadership.
The Kargil conflict starkly exposed the severe deficiencies in the nation’s surveillance capabilities, especially in the realm of satellite imagery. During this critical period, the Indian forces faced significant challenges due to outdated intelligence gathering methods that failed to detect the infiltration of enemy forces into crucial strategic locations.
Forming the Kargil Review Committee was a crucial step, but it alone did not ensure accountability for the systemic failures exposed during the conflict. These deficiencies, rooted in outdated mindsets and inadequate strategic planning, have unfortunately resurfaced in subsequent incidents, such as the standoff in Eastern Ladakh.
The Eastern Ladakh standoff reiterated the persistent challenges in adapting to modern warfare dynamics and maintaining robust surveillance and intelligence capabilities along India’s borders. The mindset reminiscent of past inadequacies continues to pose risks to national security, highlighting the need for sustained reforms and investment in cutting-edge technologies.
Addressing accountability goes beyond committee formations; it necessitates comprehensive reforms in policy formulation, defense planning, and operational preparedness. This includes upgrading surveillance infrastructure, enhancing intelligence-gathering capabilities, and fostering a proactive approach to national defense that anticipates and swiftly responds to emerging threats.
Thankfully the defence environment is changing gradually in India.
Col Vinayak Bhat has explained the ground situation in the most vivid manner. His views are Frank and I agree to each word he has spelt out.
Dalunag is an old conflict point. In 1988 this Post was captured by 15 PUNJAB. I was involved in induction of ZU-23 Twin Guns for direct firing role. Hats 🎩 off to troops of 15 PUNJAB who assisted in manually lifting parts of the gun to designated positions.
The Pakis had always been interested in this sector as the Zojila Leh NH was under their direct observation and they could bring in direct fire with 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm AD guns (of Chinese origin). The Pakistan had deployed 37 mm AD gun to increase lethality and range of fire to engage the Srinagar – Leh National Highway.
Later on in 1992 I was tasked to induct a 40mm L/70 Gun to Choti Post in Kaksar Bn Defended Area. The parts of the gun was broken into many sub loads – manpack, mulepack and heli lifted. Thereafter, we came under intense enemy Arty fire when we were reassembling the gun.
I am convinced that Praveen Swani has no clue of the facts and his article is biased with falsities.
My compliments to Col Vinayak Bhat for giving a detailed account of the events.
The article written by Mr Praveen Swami is based on unverified & speculative pieces of information and is misleading.
The authors piece comes late in the day but he does make a valid point. The cream of the Indian Army, unit Commanding Officers and their officers and men made the ultimate sacrifice not just to regain lost territory but to also protect the reputation of the armed forces. Their bravery, courage and motivation cannot be faulted. In the bargain the top political, military and intelligence leadership that was complacent and wholly bureaucratic in its approach and dealings were able to get away. This was because the government of the day was unwilling to take the blame for what occurred and for their their own failings. In the bargain it was in no position to hold those down the line accountable either. The KRC was set up not to pin blame but to correct systemic failures, and incidentally many of its recommendations are yet to be acted on.
The bigger problem is that the manner in which the Kargil issue was dealt set a very poor precedent, which we saw play out in Eastern Ladakh where neither Mr Modi’s government took responsibility for the lapses nor held anyone else to account.
PRAVEEN SWAMI OF THE PRINT HAS HURT EVERY INDIAN IMMENSELY
Background
Where is the accountability? Anybody with a pen can write anything in this free democratic country of ours. But telling lies is something that can not be condoned.
The article in The Print yesterday written by Praveen Swami was crassly nonsensical. Rather than writing such a negative post, blaming leadership, commanders, intelligence, he could have remembered the exceptional victory the great Indian Army had achieved with their arms tied behind with a caveat of NOT crossing the line of control (LC).
Anybody who has served in that area like me will certainly be hurt deeply and would like Praveen Swami be held accountable for parading naked a blatant lie.
He claimed “it’s long past time to assign responsibility for the many failures of leadership responsible for hundreds of soldier deaths in 1999” and “In the absence of a proper investigation, there’s no way of telling why the many errors that led up to the Kargil War took place.” Both sentences are outright lies.
Praveen Swami doesn’t seem to have read about “The Kargil Review Committee” (KRC) and the kind of powers that were vested upon K Subrahmanyam to call even the Prime Minister Of India for questioning.
Asking for “a proper investigation” after 25 long years and after the Kargil Review Committee report has been submitted, would be anathema of justice, disrespect to the KRC Chairman and members and a disservice to the great organisation called Indian Army.
The system in the army is quite fair especially during war time. It does not spare anyone, whether he is the GOC of a division or a corps. Their lapses were not hidden, in fact they were most stringently scrutinised and I am certain appropriately punished too.
Drass Tenure
I was commissioned in Dec 1982 into 2 Assam Regt which moved to Drass within a few months. I was in the advance party to take over area of responsibility from the unit being relieved.
The Unit covered 56km of LC which today is held by more than a division. Temperatures could not be measured as the best of thermometers could only measure upto minus 35°C. We had our own markings on the thermometer for -70°C and -105°C.
The windchill effect due to incessant winds from three valleys made Drass the coldest inhabited place in the world.
We climbed all the posts and held them all even during winters.
We received the ONLY battalion to have crossed the Zojila on foot in peak of winters to occupy the Siachen glacier. The snow at Zojila in winters is anywhere from 120 ft to 150 ft.
We got ourselves trained for “High Risk Mission” (HRM) cadres and. Later trained many other battalions at Machoi glacier.
We established new posts like Rhino Ridge and Bimbat LC, patrolled Mushko to Kaobal Gali into Gurez to reach Abdullian Post, almost a 100km route and also attended UN crossings and held flag meetings hosted by Pakistan.
Many of us did get chill blains and frostbites especially the ones who had walked over the Zojila Pass in winters. I was one of the three from 2 Assam to suffer frostbite and lose my toes during the same tenure.
In the most inhospitable terrain and weather conditions we could barely survive doing all these things of immense significance to the country’s safety and security.
Saurabh Kalia’s Unit and Sacrifices
I was posted at Pithoragarh in 1997 where Saurabh Kalia’s Unit was also posted just before moving to Kaksar sector.
I knew each officer like my own unit officers. The CO had his unit in control with the bravest and most charged officers.
When the war boke out, it was bodybags arriving in the Dev Bhumi. There I was consoling the parents of these young men who had fought valiantly and made the ultimate supreme sacrifice for their motherland.
Nobody can ever forget the one liner reply to Barkha Dutt “Yeh Dil Mange More!” by the bravest officer of Indian Army Capt Vikram Batra PVC (Posthumous).
Everyone of those young brave hearts who laid down their lives was a leader and their leadership was unmatched.
People who have lived on to tell the tales of their bravery can go on and on about how each and every inch of Kargil mountains was recaptured.
The artillery shells couldn’t reach the targets. The chance of our own troops coming under own artillery fire were more than the enemy who was holed up in bunkers.
The caveat of not crossing the LC was the biggest hurdle because that meant it had to be a frontal daylight attack. The enemy could hit us even with stones and we could not retaliate with even rifles. Enfilade defilade combination had to be used to move forward literally by inches.
The Indian Army fought in an exceptionally brave and valiant manner despite all the constraints.
Lack of Intelligence and Equipment
The intelligence was found wanting before and during the operations. The available information possibly could not be sifted, corroborated or confirmed from other sources.
Many commanders cried “intelligence failure” but who really needs intelligence agencies when the enemy is inside your own area of responsibility (AOR).
Our unit was holding 56 km of LC with three companies only. Fourth was reserve company looking after the defence of Drass. We had established new posts to cover the likely gaps.
Over a period of time many things had improved and more units were holding LC. However, the deployment was still extremely thin, so as to allow infiltration almost at will of the enemy.
Very vague intelligence was also available but no corroboration could be done. The first patrols after winters in Mushko and Shingo Valleys came under fire.
India did not have satellite images of this area. The only country ready to provide satellite images asked for massive amounts of money. What we got after paying literally through our noses was five years old images.
The IAF did not have laser guidance kits for their bombs. They had to be again procured urgently at a very high cost. The results were seen by all to remember: the terrorists running helter-skelter to take cover before being hit by the bombs.
Indian Navy played its role very well despite being much away from the actual site of operations.
Thus the Indian Armed Forces and Ministries in Delhi did work together as a well oiled machine.
The famous episode of our External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh releasing Kargil Tapes is one of the biggest intelligence achievements of modern India.
Rumours Floated
The Pakistan Army being shamed by the entire world for planning, instigating and conducting a lost war wanted to do something more to convince probably themselves.
They started floating rumours to demoralise Indian Army and creating fissures amongst the branches.
They claimed Pakistan Army personnel before the war broke out, were catching bus to Srinagar from Kargil to visit tourist places and return by evening.
This was proven false as the road remains closed in winters and no buses can ply on the route.
Another claim was that Pakistani soldiers used to buy regular amenities from Kargil CSD. The claim was based on some vague statement that CSD receipts were found in the abandoned bunkers.
This again was proved wrong by producing those receipts which were from Pakistani CSD and NOT from Kargil CSD.
Greatest Victory of Last Century
Kargil War victory was one of the bravest and most tough victories ever known to the world. No one else had ever fought hand to hand battles at heights above 5000m before Kargil War and possibly no other country ever will.
Indian Army proved to the entire world that neither the resolve of the soldiers nor the political will was anyway lacking.
Knowing fully well with self experience as to how difficult it is even to walk in the area where our brave hearts fought and won exceptionally difficult war, I bow down to them who gave their today for our tomorrow!
Jai Hind!!
Death of soldiers is tragic. What is more tragic is vultures feasting on death of soldiers and trying to be virtuous. Where is accountability for 1962 war? Or is there a selective statute of limitation when it comes to certain dynasty?
Like how Nehru and Congress won’t be held accountable for deaths due to socialism, this too shall not be accountable. RIP bravehearts.
This virtuous creature is waking up little too soon.