Ukraine aims to join NATO for its security and the European Union for its prosperity. The former pursuit remains mired in complications because, beyond prophesying, no one knows how and when the Russia-Ukraine war will end. The latter, though, seems more feasible.
In a historic move notwithstanding Hungary’s antics, the EU-27 opened accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova in December 2023.
However, things remain radically different in the case of NATO. Despite its misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the alliance has played a cardinal and unprecedented role in the European security theatre of the post-World War II and post-Cold War era. It is widely regarded by all of its Central and Eastern European members as the only guarantee to sustain their territorial sovereignty after 1991, which remains a rather less understood proposition by countries outside of Europe.
Ukraine’s fight to join NATO
There are two dominant positions on Ukraine’s quest to join NATO. One, it is argued that this very pursuit has triggered the nation’s conflict with Russia; a position endorsed by Moscow and rejected by Kyiv. Two, had Ukraine already been a member of NATO, its territorial integrity would never have been compromised. This position is rejected by Russia and endorsed by almost all the Central and Eastern European countries that are either NATO members or seek NATO membership.
A study of Eastern Europe’s security situation after 1991 indicates that the second argument is indeed true.
The Ukrainian side has made its efforts and intentions clear from the outset and is paying a huge price for it too, but NATO’s stance is far from lucid. This reflects a fundamental problem with the semantics of supporting Ukraine – as long as it takes – which has been called out for its lack of clarity and commitment several times now. Therefore, a compromise was made at the last NATO summit held at Vilnius in December 2023, where a joint declaration of support for Ukraine was adopted by the G7.
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Patchwork securitisation
After extensive deliberation on the West’s apparent lack of will to set up a timeline for Ukraine to join NATO, consensus was reached at its Vilnius summit last year. The G7 decided to give security guarantees to Ukraine until it joined the alliance. Subsequently, at least 25 European countries agreed to sign security deals with Kyiv.
On one hand, it seems like a compromise, and on the other, it’s a Pareto optimal situation given the current circumstances. Joining NATO, or setting up a timeline is contentious because until the country’s borders are recognised legally by all parties, particularly Russia, there exists a perpetual risk of repeatedly invoking the collective security clause, enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty.
Therefore, until the war ends, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remains zilch, regardless of repeated commitments to its open-door policy. That said, Ukraine and several European countries remain resolute that when the war is over, the former will be a member of NATO.
In the interregnum, however, the second best solution for Europe is to develop a grand strategy for new security architecture. Part of it can be achieved through stand-alone security deals between European countries and Ukraine, which will focus on different vectors of empowering a war-tattered but battle-hardened country. None, however, give Ukraine explicit guarantees of sending troops on the ground. Even then, these security arrangements attain added significance as the US multi-billion military aid package to Ukraine is still stuck in the web of American domestic political turbulence.
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Myriad deals
So far, three European countries have signed separate long-term agreements with Ukraine. The first was signed between the United Kingdom and Ukraine during British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s visit to Kyiv on 12 January. The next two came a month later, with France and Germany signing separate security agreements with Ukraine on 16 February.
Ukraine’s security arrangement with the UK builds on a 2020 bilateral strategic partnership agreement. The UK has been one of the most steadfast supporters of Ukraine since its war with Russia began. The agreement reaffirms the UK’s military support, lethal weapon deliveries and capacity building of Ukrainian forces. London has committed itself to contributing to Ukraine’s maritime fleet development to empower Ukrainian successes in the Black Sea. The text also commits to easing supply chain bottlenecks that impede the development of capacity and capability for manufacturing priority weapons and ammunition.
The agreement also focuses on securing critical infrastructure, bolstering cyber security, and fighting disinformation. The UK has pledged £2.5 billion worth of military aid in 2024 in addition to £4.6 billion in military assistance since 2022. It has also provided macro-financial assistance to the tune of £4.2 billion to Ukraine since the war began in 2022. The agreement comes with a term of 10 years but can be extended until Ukraine joins NATO.
The German security assurances, too, come with a term of 10 years and commit delivery of German military aid to Ukraine in compliance with the United Nations charter and International law. The main focus remains on capacity building. Despite the 10-year term, financial backing has only been provided for one year with €7.1 billion. Berlin also mentions the deepening of bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, protection of critical infrastructure, information security and the fight against crime.
The exchange of intelligence and counter-espionage measures are underscored in the document too. The most important contribution, however, is Germany’s training of Ukrainian armed forces synergistically in the framework of the EU’s military support and the efforts to promote defence industry cooperation between Germany and Ukraine. But that is not all.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has additionally announced a new €1.13 billion military package for Ukraine including dozens of howitzers, 120,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition, two Skynex air defence systems and additional missiles for the IRIS-T air defence system that has performed well for Ukraine so far.
However, Kyiv’s expectations of receiving the much-requested Tauras long-range missiles have not yielded results as German lawmakers are still holding on to their disapproval. Despite these setbacks, with its total military assistance amounting to €28 billion, Germany has emerged as the second largest provider of military aid to Ukraine after the United States.
Ukraine also signed a separate bilateral security arrangement with France on the same day as Germany. Just like its German and UK counterparts, the French arrangement also mentions a 10-year period that can be extended and promises support to Ukraine as long as it is not a part of NATO. As per the agreement, France pledged another €3 billion in military aid to Ukraine in 2024, in addition to €3.8 billion worth of military aid in 2022 and 2023. This military aid is complemented by humanitarian and legal aid.
Notably, all three agreements include sections on bilateral cooperation in the event of a future armed attack on Ukraine. All three countries commit themselves to providing swift and sustained security assistance and equipment across all domains while also leaving room for further aid. Part VIII in the UK-Ukraine agreement, part III in the France-Ukraine agreement and part VI in the Germany-Ukraine agreement are almost identical.
After the big three European powers, Denmark and Netherlands have also announced signing a similar security arrangement with Ukraine. The rest of the G7 members and about two dozen European countries will follow suit.
The money and effort that these countries are investing in Ukraine show that the country’s security is very much a part of Europe’s grand strategy for securing the continent. It also shows that perhaps for the continent today, the path to strategic autonomy has to be moored firmly in strategic solidarity, especially among the bigger European powers.
These deals signal Europe’s long-term support to Ukraine until it becomes a NATO member but remain a patchwork in the absence of an explicit timeline for Kyiv to join the alliance. The momentum seen in bilateral security arrangements also indicates that the upcoming NATO Washington summit is unlikely to make tangible promises to Ukraine.
Finally, their military, economic and political relevance notwithstanding, these security arrangements do not compensate for the US military assistance to Ukraine. In the mazes of complex geopolitics, the goals Ukraine is pursuing remain veiled.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)