Two years after the latest Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a decade after the original incursion in 2014, Kyiv appears to be in a grim situation. Though Ukraine is not about to be defeated, Russian forces have made some worrying gains, capturing the town of Avdiivka last week.
Territorially, and even strategically, Avdiivka’s capture neither puts Russia in an advantageous position nor removes any tactical disadvantages for it on the frontline. As with Bakhmut earlier, the prize appears to be more symbolic than strategic.
Moreover, as with most Russian gains in this war, Avdiivka came at a much higher cost for Russian forces, though probably not as high as Ukraine claims. Moscow’s Avdiivka pursuit reportedly cost it 16,000 soldiers and at least 400 armoured vehicles of various kinds. Ukrainian losses are heavy too. These setbacks indicate a change in the relative balance of forces, with Ukraine suffering significant shortages in ammunition, particularly artillery and air defence.
With neither side possessing the capacity for rapid, combined arms movement, the war has become an artillery slugfest. Here, the loss of Western—especially American—support for Ukraine has been critical.
Ukraine lacks sufficient artillery ammunition, especially for its 155 mm long-range guns, which is why its forces couldn’t tackle Russian infantry assaults. Russia is also overwhelming Ukrainian air defences, with attacks across the country and on the frontline. Both scenarios can be attributed to Republicans in the United States Congress—especially the House of Representatives—who prevented additional military aid to Ukraine.
Ukraine has had some successes in holding Russia back and destroying a big chunk of its Black Sea fleet. So great has been the Ukrainian naval success that Russia has withdrawn its fleet from Crimea. Ukraine has also had some triumphs in the air. It has shot down many Russian fighter planes and even managed to destroy the S-400 air defence systems around Crimea. Valuable as these victories are, the ultimate fate of the war rests on the ground, where Russia has the upper hand for now.
‘Biggest mistake’ and its impact
The state of the war and Russia’s advantage raise a number of questions about strategies toward the conflict, especially by Ukraine’s Western allies. The biggest mistake in this war has been the slow rolling out of Western military assistance to Ukraine due to a fear of nuclear escalation by Russia.
Every major type of equipment that Ukraine needed—from artillery to longer-range missiles, tanks, and combat aircraft—has been supplied only after long delays, if at all, thereby aiding the Russian invaders. The US is now considering supplying the longer-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), but the effect of such belated assistance remains unclear. Similarly, though F-16 fighter jets may finally be delivered this year, it is uncertain how impactful they can be in light of recent Ukrainian losses. The fear of nuclear escalation was likely exaggerated, yet the adverse impacts from the equipment delays have become fully evident.
First, Russia was able to recover from its initial losses, rebuild, and sustain the war effort. While Russian human resources are not infinite, they drastically exceed what Ukraine can muster. Moreover, the country’s industrial capacity has ramped up to support military operations. A prolonged conflict allows for such factors to come into play. The war may be costing Russia a lot, but President Vladimir Putin clearly seems prepared for the long haul irrespective of domestic repercussions.
Additionally, Russia has had time to secure external assistance from Iran, North Korea, and China, compensating for some material weaknesses. Delaying full support for Ukraine has resulted in a drawn-out war, eroding Kyiv’s earlier advantages.
Second, Western nations are now tired of this prolonged conflict. Shifting domestic, economic, and political conditions have also raised doubts about the durability of their backing for Ukraine. Key European powers, especially France, face no immediate danger, which is why they have largely passed the buck to the US. Germany’s contributions have increased but remain far from satisfactory.
Conversely, weaker European states nearer Russia have been more forthcoming with aid, having greater sensitivity to the threat on their doorstep. Moreover, if Donald Trump returns as US President in November 2024, America’s support for Ukraine will likely cease.
Finally, even if the West ramps up support to Ukraine, the situation is now much more difficult considering how the West has ceded momentum to Russia. Reversing the Russian gains will be that much harder.
Ukraine has made some tactical errors as well, though none were strategic blunders such as over-reliance on Western support. A country facing an existential threat has few options when surrender is off the table, and it could do little about the limitations and mistakes of its allies. But Ukraine did err in attempting to hold certain territories, such as Bakhmut and now Avdiivka, which ultimately caused it unnecessary damage. The losses in trying to hold on to these towns do not appear to be commensurate with their strategic importance.
Also read: Securing Ukraine is very much part of Europe’s agenda. But when will Kyiv join NATO?
What would India’s options be?
For India, one of the potential problems to think about is the underlying assumption about any war being a short one. No one thought there would be a full-scale, high-intensity war in Europe that lasts for years. It is unclear if India is prepared for such a long war along the northern border. These are obviously not easy outcomes to prepare for, but New Delhi should reflect on its potential options if it were to find itself in such a long war.
On the diplomatic side, it also illustrates, yet again, the hypocrisy that states engage in. Sovereignty is a value that most countries swear by, especially postcolonial nations in the so-called Global South. But most have stood on the sidelines as the supposed post-modern, post-sovereign states of the West supported Ukraine.
An anti-West sentiment is the primary driver here rather than any specific commitment to values such as sovereignty. This should also concern New Delhi. If India should find itself in a war with China, most of the ‘Global South’ will sit on its hands or even support Beijing because it is a true anti-Western power.
This also raises questions about India’s supposed diplomatic successes over the last two years, in navigating between the West and the East, and the North and the South. Diplomatic support, a lot of cost-free words made in peacetime, is neither lasting nor of much value in an actual test of arms. Which of India’s many, many friends will actually step up is something to consider.
The author is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)
Интересно, автору не стыдно столь явно целовать ноги англо-саксам, которые колонизировали и убивали его предков, привязывая их к пушкам?… Вы жалко и убого выглядите, автор.