The Sheikh Hasina regime collapsed in Bangladesh, faster and more violently than many expected or wished for. This is a major setback for India, since it marks the ending of a golden period in India-Bangladesh bilateral relations. Since 2009, Delhi and Dhaka have achieved what had only been dreamt of after 1971, including connectivity and an economic and security partnership. The partnership was beginning to reshape India’s Eastern periphery as a land bridge to the Indo-Pacific.
Despite such high stakes at play, New Delhi was ominously silent as Dhaka fell, but that should not be confused with passivity. Within the first few hours of the cataclysm, India hosted Hasina, sealed the international boundary, and worked to protect thousands of Indian nationals.
Once the dust settles in Dhaka, beyond these immediate actions, how will India position itself in Bangladesh’s changed political landscape? To understand India’s likely choices in the next few months, it is imperative to understand that the collapse of the Hasina regime is not an Indian failure.
A major setback
This is a popular explanation, suggesting that India should have found ways to either perpetuate Hasina in power or engineer a peaceful transition of power. It’s a perspective premised on the idea of India as a regional superpower, capable of shaping the internal politics of its ‘small’ neighbours, which in this case happens to be the world’s eighth-most populated country, with twice the population of Germany.
This India-centric perspective is tempting but short-sighted: not everything that happens in Dhaka can be traced back to Delhi. While India is South Asia’s predominant country, this broader region is home to nearly one-fourth of the world’s population. It is undergoing unprecedented political and economic transitions under a dire global financial context with—as seen in Sri Lanka last year—fragile states unable to deliver developmental solutions to an increasingly young, ambitious, and impatient population.
That brings high risks of instability and more frequent crises that are caused not by India, but by a highly combustible mix of domestic factors and choices. The same logic applies to policy successes, when so-called ‘pro-India’ leaders are elected in neighbouring countries and many sing ‘victory’ in Delhi.
To avoid falling into the trap of cyclical claims about India leading or losing the neighbourhood every few months, New Delhi would be wise to invest far more resources—both within the government and the research ecosystem—to equip itself with expert knowledge on the increasingly complex politics and economics of this volatile neighbourhood.
So while Prime Minister Hasina’s fall from power was not ‘made in India’, it still represents a major setback for Indian interests. She delivered what no other Bangladeshi leader was willing or able to—she terminated safe havens for anti-India insurgents, extradited terrorists, and finalised the land boundary agreement. While engaging China and other countries in a dangerous balancing game, Hasina always ensured not to cross New Delhi’s red lines.
The most important deliverable was on the economic front, where it led to a record boom in trade and investments and the implementation of India’s long-sought transit rights to the Northeast region through rail, road, and waterways. And, unlike other leaders such as the Rajapaksas in Sri Lanka, KP Sharma Oli in Nepal, or Mohamed Muizzu in the Maldives, Hasina also resisted the electoral temptation to mobilise voters around ‘India out’ campaigns. So while she was losing domestic support in recent years, Delhi found it difficult—if not counterproductive—to ditch her, especially in face of a divided opposition with factions hostile to India.
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The road ahead
Now that Hasina is gone, what is India’s best case scenario? Judging by its long history of dealing with political crises in neighbouring countries, Delhi will likely be aiming for a four-step plan. First, focus on the Bangladesh Army as the only guarantor of essential order and stability, including to secure borders and avoid a state collapse. Second, a clear political roadmap for transition that promises just enough to dissipate the diverse protest movement.
Third, cobbling together a coalition of opposition forces where the moderates and technocrats prevail, including some conservative factions as long as they are not openly hostile to India’s economic, security, and geopolitical interests. And fourth, holding elections whenever this coalition is deemed ripe to win a popular mandate. All this may take up to two years – and the longer the cooling off period, the better in India’s perspective.
But what needs to happen for India to successfully implement this plan B? One, it will have to distance itself from Hasina to symbolically indicate its willingness to move on. That is easier said than done for India’s loyal security establishment. The optics of the first 24 hours did not help, with Hasina hosted by the Indian government in Delhi. This is bound to reinforce Bangladeshi perceptions of Hasina as the embodiment of India’s alleged ‘foreign hand’ and the view that, therefore, New Delhi remains aligned with the Awami League’s old guard. India will now have to work hard to contain this damage.
Two, India will have to increase coordination with other major powers interested in a stable and democratic Bangladesh. The United States, Europe, and Japan are key partners for India, and with Hasina out of the picture, one can expect a growing policy alignment between Delhi and Western capitals. As witnessed in Sri Lanka in 2023, much of this will happen in the background, for example at the Quad sidelines, and through concerted positions and financial inducements that would help enforce a political and economic reset in Dhaka: the bottom line will be to limit China’s influence and push Bangladesh into a post-BRI phase.
And three, India will have to intensify contacts with alternative centres of power in Bangladesh, beyond just the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), in a rapidly fragmenting political environment. This is far from being an impossible task, as seen with India’s outreach to Sri Lanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party or Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.
The history of the subcontinent shows how, after smelling the coffee of power, many so-called ‘anti-India’ leaders and movements have quickly shifted gears to engage New Delhi. India’s diplomatic and security establishment has a long tradition of turning foes into friends. That skill will, once again, be tested in Dhaka in the coming days.
Constantino Xavier is a Senior Fellow, the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP).
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)