The recent events in Myanmar, including hundreds of soldiers fleeing to India and Bangladesh and Shan state armed groups blocking trade routes with China, indicate the collapse of the Myanmarese junta across the country.
The Tatmadaw, or Myanmarese military, always operated as the ‘high class’ of Bamar society, insulated from the general populace. However, a series of stunning defeats at the hands of ethnic insurgents has had a devastating impact on its morale. Even though the junta still has superior firepower and access to a lot of exportable resources, such as timber, jade, gems, and fish, the status quo is unlikely to return despite the decision to make military service compulsory. For the first time, the People’s Defence Forces of the National Unity Government (NUG), representing the majority Bamar population, has been fighting alongside ethnic insurgents in a unified front against the junta.
Among Myanmar’s neighbours, China is the least affected by the ongoing crisis, followed by Bangladesh and Thailand. However, India’s entire eastern front has suddenly become even more vulnerable than the western front, where Pakistan faces debt default amidst a fractured verdict while the Taliban is yet to fully consolidate its control in Afghanistan.
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Bangladesh, Myanmar & the challenge for India
Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, is expected to fall in weeks and most foreign diplomats have been evacuated. It effectively ends the already stalled Kaladan Port project with the emergence of the insurgent China-backed Arakan Army (AA) as the de facto authority of the Rakhine State.
It is a case of déjà vu—India is once again likely to be dependent on Bangladesh for mainland access to the North East. This compounds the still-fresh wound caused by the stalling of the Chabahar port project in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Bangladesh, meanwhile, is navigating its responses to the Myanmar crisis and will likely extract its pound of flesh. Despite India’s support of her, Sheikh Hasina, remains unlikely to endorse India’s approach to the escalating crisis in Myanmar, such as launching attacks on the Arakan Army from Bangladesh territory. In September 2019, Bangladesh walked away from United Nations mediation efforts and on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly chose to form a tripartite joint working mechanism with China and Myanmar for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees.
This refugee crisis continues to grow, with an estimated birth rate of 35,000 children per year among the Rohingya and dwindling funding for humanitarian aid. On 3 June 2021, following the latest coup d’etat, Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) released its policy position on the Rohingya, promising citizenship, full rights for those pledging allegiance to Myanmar, changes to the divisive 1982 Citizenship Law, and assurances of “voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation for Rohingyas displaced by Tatmadaw violence”. Bangladesh fancies the repatriation of the Rohingyas by engaging with the NUG, while the its Army has been using Arakanese armed groups to counter Chakma-led groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs).
China factor
India’s challenges in Myanmar are complicated by two factors— its position on the Rohingya refugees and its lack of influence on all actors besides the Tatmadaw. Conversely, China has significant control over all insurgent groups in Myanmar, including the powerful Arakan Army. In June 2020, The Eurasian Times reported that Brig Gen Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson of the Tatmadaw, obliquely accused a “foreign country” of backing the Arakan Army, also stating that most weapons were Chinese and “the total value is high”.
In contrast to China’s hands-off approach, India and the Tatmadaw have carried out joint military operations against insurgent groups after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1993. For instance, ‘Operation Leech’ on 11 February 1998 saw India’s tri-services (Army, Navy and Air Force) apprehend 73 Arakanese rebels on charges of gun-running and killing six leaders of the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) from Andaman’s Landfall Island. Restoring the trust of the ethnic Arakanese will not be easy for India given the history of Operation Leech, the alleged closeness of the AA with China, and geopolitical competition between China and India in Rakhine province with the Chinese-built Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port being just 100 kilometres away from India-built Kaladan port.
India’s response to the collapsing Tatmadaw appears insufficient in addressing the security challenges presented by a classic failed state. Measures like scrapping the Free Movement Regime (FMR) between India and Myanmar are unlikely to have much effect on the ground as formal routes are not used for the movement of people. And the proposed fencing of the Indo-Myanmar border, if agreed to by Mizoram and Nagaland, will take years, if not decades, to complete.
India’s problems have further been compounded by China’s dramatic inroads into the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Mirroring its cultural strategy in Nepal, Chinese government representatives are teaching Mandarin to tribal girls through the Bangladesh government’s technical training centres in the CHT districts of Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachari. The hill tribes’ social media is flooded with controversies over local women’s marriages with Chinese nationals. More than 1,000 hill tribe girls have reportedly married Chinese men, with many said to have become victims of trafficking. Many Chinese nationals are reportedly living in the CHTs, even as other foreigners are required to get permission to enter the region.
Following the 7 January 2024 elections in Bangladesh, both local authorities and the powerful military have reportedly been wooing Chinese investment in the CHTs. In February 2023, the Bangladesh Tourism Board identified 1,051 tourist spots across the country, out of which 85 are spread across the three hill districts of Bandarban, Rangamati, and Khagrachari. Many of these tourist spots are near the Indian borders in Mizoram and Tripura. China has shown keen interest in the tourism sector after entering the 2023-2027 Culture and Tourism Exchange Programme with Bangladesh in August 2022 during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Dhaka. Bangladesh President Mohammed Shahabuddin’s visit to Sajek near the Mizoram border this month also underscores the strategic importance of developing tourism in the CHTs.
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A need for assertiveness
As China effectively makes inroads to the North East through the CHTs amid the deteriorating situation in Myanmar, India must adopt an assertive, hard-nosed approach. It needs to treat the challenges arising from the instability in Myanmar in the CHTs of Bangladesh, Tripura, and Mizoram as distinct from the issues in Nagaland, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh.
In Nagaland and Manipur, India has been holding peace talks with most insurgent groups, many of which have bases in Myanmar. Arunachal Pradesh, in contrast, faces no active insurgency. Meanwhile, Mizoram, though not currently experiencing active insurgency, has close ethnic links with the Chin community in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. India has not only made substantial investments in Rakhine but also has a history of conflict with insurgents in the area, along with ongoing strategic competition with China.
Moreover, the CHTs are a base for various insurgent groups. These include Rohingya armed factions and some Indian insurgent groups. The failure of India and Bangladesh to broker peace with these insurgent elements in the CHTs and Tripura during the last 15 years of Sheikh Hasina being in power has only heightened security risks.
Suhas Chakma is director of Rights and Risks Analysis Group. He tweets @ChakmaSuhas. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)