Nothing illustrates the declining utility of the India-Russia relationship than Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s just-concluded visit to Moscow. Beyond the symbolic, which had its own downsides, the visit demonstrated few tangible results. That said, the visit still raises some questions about India’s foreign policy strategy and Russia’s place in it.
At the symbolic level, the Prime Minister’s tradition of hugging other leaders, probably an attempt to convince his less-than-bright peanut gallery back home that he is actually bosom pals with other leaders, may not have served him or the country well because of the split-screen with Russian bombing of a children’s hospital in Kyiv. That’s unfortunate, but scheduling visits of national leaders is always difficult, especially when there’s an ongoing war. In this case, the unfortunate juxtaposition of the bearhug and dead children, which recalls former Indian foreign minister IK Gujral’s infamous bearhug of Saddam Hussein during the Kuwait war, probably drew more unwanted attention to India’s foreign policy contradictions, if not hypocrisy.
On the substantive side, there was little of note. India, in any case, has been moving away from Russia for weapons, partly because it had become over-dependent and partly because Russia has few next-generation weapons that can tempt Indian military services. Moreover, the existing relationship itself does create some problems for India’s relations with its far more important Western partners. There was an attempt at sorting out some problems, such as the trade imbalance resulting from India gorging on Russian oil for the last couple of years, and the issue of Indians being tricked into fighting for Russia in Ukraine. These are bureaucratic messes that need clearing up, not issues of grand strategy, and the fact that they now occupy such a prominent place in India-Russia discussions is itself a pretty good indicator of the state of the relationship.
A wedge between India and Indo-Pacific
That said, there is still cause for some concern. For example, on the larger issue of Russia and India’s China problem, New Delhi appears to be still pursuing a failing strategy. There’s definitely some logic to attempting to split Russia from China, but Vladimir Putin’s strategically idiotic invasion of Ukraine has made that task well-nigh impossible. It has made Russia so dependent on China that there is little India can do currently to drive a wedge between the two. The joint statement reveals more than one concession that India has made, but little by way of any Russian nod to Indian concerns regarding China. For example, India has basically accepted the Russian line on Ukraine, calling for “peaceful resolution . . . through dialogue and diplomacy including engagement between both parties”, with nary a word about issues of territorial sovereignty. More critically, giving in to Russian and Chinese preference, there is no mention of the Indo-Pacific, but rather a cumbersome formulation of the “regions of Indian and Pacific oceans”.
Thus, far from driving a wedge between Russia and China, India’s Russia gambit is now possibly threatening to drive one between New Delhi and its Indo-Pacific partners.
The fact that this is not a particularly successful strategy appears to be clear even to Indian officials, considering their own lack of enthusiasm as illustrated by the low deliverables and ambitions. It can be seen in the underwhelming “outcomes” document, filled with yawn-inducing MoUs between low-level government departments and commissions.
Nevertheless, if India appears to be unable to entirely wean itself away, the reason is not all choice but rather a bit of compulsion too. And it illustrates another serious Indian strategic failing: New Delhi’s overwhelming dependence on Russian arms and as a consequence, on Russian spares and resupplies. How, despite all the talk of ‘non-alignment’ and ‘strategic autonomy’, India dug itself into such a strategic hole remains a question that is unlikely to be investigated from within the government. This is a contribution of successive governments, though saying this only makes the Indian foolishness even greater. But the result is plainly visible: Even if India wants to change course, it simply cannot because it has its head in a noose and it’s going to stay there for a while.
This is an ‘era of war’
Equally problematic is India’s repeated invocation of the idea that this is not an ‘era of war’. It is likely that this formulation came up as a typical fence-sitting way to express disapproval without joining the West’s condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But sticking to this formulation suggests some difficulties. If Indian officials actually believe such nonsensical propositions, it would suggest far greater problems with Indian strategy than has been suspected so far.
The reality is that this is an era of war, a period that is marked by rapid changes in global and regional balances of power, which presages tumultuous times. And we are definitely seeing that in both Europe and in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has deepened European security concerns, led to further expansion of NATO, and raised the likelihood of more intense arms races and the increased likelihood of an even more widespread war. Putin has shown himself to be as strategically inept as China’s Xi Jinping, adding to his enemies, draining Russia’s strength, and painting himself into a corner. If Donald Trump were to win the United States presidential election in November, which looks increasingly likely as the Democratic Party tears itself apart, tensions in Europe may worsen as European powers attempt to figure out how to deter Russia on their own. Three decades ago, John Mearsheimer predicted that the end of the Cold War would lead to instability in Europe, one of his many mistaken predictions. But instability could return to Europe, though for very different reasons.
Asia and the Indo-Pacific is in an even worse shape, obviously, as China’s growing power and aggression creates ever more problems. India’s Indo-Pacific partners are going to be none too pleased that India cannot even use the term “Indo-Pacific” in a joint statement, giving China atleast a symbolic win. That Russia has conducted dozens of military exercises with China, many of these in the Indo-Pacific, is one reason why the region is ramping up its military preparations with bilateral and minilateral treaties without waiting for India. India’s reluctance is now baked in, and even the Quad is largely now about non-traditional security issues.
In other words, all the conditions that we see point to this being an era of war. War is not inevitable, but prudence would suggest that India prepare for it. But so far, New Delhi appears to think that clever diplomatic formulations will be sufficient.
Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)