Jammu insurgency can be fixed by the Army. The real solution is political

There are 3 facets to resolving the crisis in J&K—avoiding outright military confrontation, optimising the counter-insurgency grid, and collaborating with nationalistic politicians.

Representational image | File photo of an SOG police search operation at Khunia forest in the wake of recent terror attacks in Jammu region | ANI

In the last four years, Pakistan has made a concerted effort to resurrect terrorism in the Jammu division, southwest and south of Pir Panjal Range, which separates it from the Kashmir Valley. It began gradually, with increased infiltration and terrorist activity in 2020 after the abrogation of Article 370 on 5 August 2019. In 2021, the first major attack took place from 11 to 14 October in Surankote in which nine soldiers, including two Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs), were killed in action without any loss to the terrorists, indicating a change in tactics, apart from better training, weapons, and encrypted communication systems.

While telltale signs of Pakistan’s changed operational strategy were evident since 2020-21, its grave impact was felt in the last two months with three major terrorist actions. An attack on a pilgrim bus killed nine civilians and injured 33, while in Kathua and Doda ambushes, nine soldiers—an officer and a JCO among them—were killed in action.

It is estimated that 90-100 terrorists including 55-60 Pakistanis have infiltrated through the International Border (IB) in Samba and Kathua districts—possibly also through the Pathankot district in Punjab—and the Line of Control (LoC) in Rajouri and Poonch districts, are operating in the area. The entire swath of mountainous and forested terrain covering Poonch, Rajouri, Samba, Kathua, Ramban, Doda, and Kishtwar has been activated.

The government and the Army have reviewed the situation through high-level political meetings held by the prime minister, home minister, governor of J&K, and the Chief of the Army Staff. Energetic actions have also been taken to strengthen the counter-infiltration deployment along the IB/LoC and re-establish the counter-insurgency grid in the hinterland. Army formations/units up to a division strength (as per my assessment) and one unit of Special Forces have been inducted, apart from additional units of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Assam Rifles. Two Western Command divisions responsible for the Jammu and Samba-Pathankot sectors have also been partially deployed.

How did this happen?

There has been a lot of speculation about the reasons for the resurgence of terrorism in the Jammu division. The simple answer is that Pakistan’s strategy to wage a proxy war in J&K  has remained unchanged for the last 35 years and counter-insurgency grids are dynamic. Terrorists tend to gravitate toward security voids to exploit them and the Army focuses on terrorist activities. The key issue ultimately is who seizes the initiative.

My take is that the government and the military took their eye off the ball after getting carried away by the political rhetoric about Article 370 sounding the death knell for the proxy war. This is more alarming because, over the last four years, all indicators of the alienation of Jammu’s Muslim population, increased infiltration, and terrorist activity in the region were pointing to the revival of the insurgency. Dilution of the counter-insurgency grid due to misconceived relative peace literally invited the terrorists to fill the vacuum. 

Pakistan’s age-old strategy

Despite its economic and political travails, Pakistan’s proxy war strategy has remained unchanged. It has a clear aim of wearing India down to usurp the Kashmir Valley and other Muslim-dominated regions. Its degree of violence and areas of focus are calibrated in keeping with the strategic environment, pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the prevailing situation both at home and in India, and the success of counter-insurgency operations.

India’s concerted counter-insurgency campaign—in effect from 5 August 2019 with additional deployment of security forces, layered counter-infiltration deployment, a tight counter-insurgency grid in the hinterland, and a crackdown on the “terror ecosystem”—reduced the number and activities of terrorists in the Valley.

Considering its now-diminishing returns in the Valley, the opportunity offered by the China-India confrontation in Eastern Ladakh, and the dilution of the counter-insurgency grid in the Jammu division, Pakistan decided to review its operational strategy to reactivate this region in 2021. An additional aim was to explode the myth of the abrogation of Article 370 being the harbinger of peace. Old infiltration routes were reactivated, a network of overground supporters was created, religious indoctrination was revitalised and terrorist activities were gradually increased.

A bonus advantage of this revival is the region’s large Hindu population: 67 per cent. Its vulnerability is an embarrassment for the ruling BJP.

The success of Pakistan’s strategy is evident from the fact that the attack on the pilgrim bus in Reasi took place on the very day the Modi government was sworn in for its third term. For the first time in 35 years, the ratio of soldiers to terrorists killed in the Jammu region from 2021 to 2024 was 1:1, a sharp decline from the empirical 1:5/6 and even steeper from 1:18 in 2020.

Political and military strategy falters

It is empirical wisdom that the solution to resolve an insurgency lies in the political realm—the military merely creates an environment for it by neutralising the armed militants/terrorists. India has generally followed this principle albeit with a painfully slow process since 1956. Long after the military had stabilised the situation in the Northeast and created a conducive environment, the governments dithered and failed to find political solutions. However, by default, fatigue forced the insurgent leadership to reconcile and negotiate.

The approach in J&K has been no different. But due to the religious factor and Pakistan’s relentless pursuit of its strategy and ability to pump in coreligionist (Pakistani) terrorists, the morale of both the terrorists and their supporters gets easily revived and resilience reinforced. For the last decade, the government, for ideological reasons, has focused on constitutional and military management without any political solution to the problem. A long-overdue constitutional amendment to abrogate the moth-eaten Article 370 was mistakenly viewed as a political solution due to the uneasy silence of the sullen population.

To compound the problem, the Army too became complacent instead of remaining vigilant in preventing the resurgence of terrorism. The prolonged relative stability of the Jammu region since 2007 and the confrontation in Eastern Ladakh led to a dilution of the counter-terrorism grid in the Jammu region. In early 2008, additional forces of nearly two divisions that operated in this region post-Operation Parakaram were gradually withdrawn. Out of 26 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions, four were diverted to the Valley. In 2021, one Counter Insurgency Force HQ and RR Sector with 2/3 battalions were diverted to Eastern Ladakh. No effort was made to fill the void with CAPFs. 

Further, ideological and neo-nationalistic bashing of Muslims in political, media, and public discourse; a flawed reservation policy for the Pahadi population at the perceived cost to the Gujjar and Bakarwal communities; high handedness of the Army and police in dealing with local people; and Pakistan’s concerted communal campaign alienated the otherwise friendly population, drying up intelligence. Two cases—the communalisation of the horrendous rape of a Bakarwal minor girl in Kathua in 2018 and the killing of three Gujjars in military custody in December 2023—prove the point.

The way forward

There are three facets to addressing the current crisis in J&K. The first is to deter Pakistan using all instruments of national power. Despite the jingoistic political and public clamour, using the military instrument is fraught with uncertainty. Pakistan has developed adequate conventional capability to avoid a decisive defeat in a limited war below the nuclear threshold. In response to any declared punitive surgical strikes, it has selectively upgraded its military technology to defend itself and respond in a quid pro quo manner. Covert and deniable human and technology-driven operations remain effective tools. However, even rhetorical political ownership, as is the wont of our political leaders, is best avoided. The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran should serve as a benchmark for India.

The second facet is to militarily bring down the upsurge in insurgency to a sub-critical or manageable level. The government and the military have already taken the right steps to reestablish the counter-insurgency grid by inducting additional forces. It is important to extend the grid to the densely forested and mountainous areas to the southwest and south of Pir Panjal Range. Extensive use must be made of the Special Forces. Human intelligence also requires revitalisation. Village defence committees must revitalised and modernised. As a radical departure from the past, it would be prudent to establish a genuine and credible unified operational command for better coordination between the Army, CAPFs, and the Jammu & Kashmir Police (JKP). Continuous tactical lapses have an adverse effect on morale—given the worse-than-ever soldier-to-terrorist kills ratio, there is a need for the Army, CAPFs, and the JKP to get back to the basics. India must also exploit technology, particularly drones, for both counter-infiltration and counter-terrorist operations.

The third and most important facet is political strategy. A genuine effort must be made to win the hearts and minds of the people. The statehood of J&K  must be restored and elections held as soon as possible. It was done at the peak of insurgency in 1996, 2002, and 2008, and it can be done now. Having failed to find any alternative, there is a need to hold the hand of the much-maligned mainstream political parties, else the political space will be taken over by the radicals. It is preposterous for a serving DGP to call Kashmiri mainstream politicians “leaders of terror networks”.

I have no doubts that the insurgency will be brought down to manageable limits in the next six months and kept at that level thereafter. However, a nation is not about controlling real estate, but about the collective soul of its people. The lasting solution has to be political.

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (Retd) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post-retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)