An anxious friend from Lahore called me Tuesday morning, wondering why security around schools and colleges in Lahore and Islamabad had been beefed up. The concern stemmed from strong rumours of an impending terror attack on educational institutions by the Balochistan Liberation Front, possibly involving a female suicide bomber. Though Islamabad’s police chief refuted it, media channels claimed that educational institutions in the city were being shut down for an indefinite period because of a threat warning.
While a terror threat is not impossible or new to Pakistan, it is equally plausible that such fear mongering might be used by the caretaker government to push out Baloch women protesters from Islamabad. These women have been camping in the capital city for over 15 days, demanding an answer from the government about their missing loved ones. Balochistan’s caretaker information minister Jan Achakzai has been clamouring for public support in Punjab against these unarmed women, claiming that they have links with “terrorists” killed during Pakistan’s retaliatory air strikes in Iran. This stance highlights the military establishment’s discomfort with the Baloch protesters, as their presence tarnishes Pakistan’s international image, especially on the human rights front.
The fear narrative also serves to turn civil society’s attention away from an Baloch issue that has gained traction in Islamabad especially in the context of the recent military escalation between Pakistan and neighbouring Iran.
While Tehran has its own reasons, its missile and drone attacks in Panjgur, Balochistan, on 16 January were unusually aggressive—considerably more so than the last such conflagration in 2017 when it when it deployed a drone at Panjgur that was shot down by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). This time, Pakistan reacted sharply by launching an attack in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province, claiming to have targeted Balochistan Liberation Army and Balochistan Liberation Front hideouts. However, the two neighbours were quick in pulling back from the brink soon after the initial military actions, with more talks to follow as the Iranian foreign minister is due to visit Islamabad on 29 January.
Though the bilateral tension is far from over, it is obvious that neither side desires endless escalation. Both, after all, have experienced in the past that they can aggravate each other’s security situation continuously.
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A long history of conflict
For at least a couple of decades during the 1990s and 2000s, Iran and Pakistan caused severe internal insecurity in each other’s territory through sectarian violence. In Pakistan, this was popularly known as the Saudi-Iranian cold war, waged on its territory. Besides numerous counter-terrorism operations by the military, it took quite an effort for Pakistan to mend relations with Tehran and cool down the temperature at home. After Iran, Pakistan has the largest Shia population in the broader Middle East, which means that Iran has enough leverage to raise the security heat for its South Asian neighbour.
Not that relations were ever perfect even after the lowering of sectarian tension.
Contrary to the claim that the two Islamic states have ‘brotherly’ ties—cited as a reason behind Pakistan not being prepared for the military intrusion across the Iran border—relations between the countries have been fraught with suspicion, especially after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This really turned the tide for Pakistan, which had previously viewed its western neighbour as a source of strategic depth. The overthrown Shah of Iran had not only helped Pakistan during the 1965 war with India but also often interceded with New Delhi on Islamabad’s behalf, according to American-Iranian author Alex Vatanka in his book Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence. Tehran additionally provided Pakistan with military hardware to fight the Baloch insurgency during the 1970s.
These dynamics underwent a drastic shift after the revolution and Pakistan-Iran relations nosedived. There were four key reasons for this.
First, the Iranian Revolution became one of the drivers of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Sunni Islamisation of Pakistan. One of the reasons that he pushed the pedal on this was to appease Pakistan’s religious clergy, who were inspired by the Shia revolution in Iran and desired a Sunni Islamic state.
Second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s politico-military strategy resulted in nurturing Sunni militancy that had an inbuilt anti-Shia sentiment. These include terrorist groups like Jundallah offshoot Jaish-ul-Adl, allegedly involved in carrying out attacks in Iran since 2013, including the December 2023 attack in Sistan and Baluchestan. This and other other terrorist groups, especially those based in Pakistan, are rabidly anti-Shia. Interestingly, even Jaish-e-Mohammed, long dedicated primarily to the Kashmir issue, became vocal against Iran in the past three years, as evidenced by their publications, which I have read.
The two Muslim neighbours have sparred numerous times in the recent past with Iranian forces often crossing the border to pursue terrorists or rescue their kidnapped men. In 2017, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) shot down an Iranian drone flying in Panjgur, where this year’s attack by Iran was carried out. For Iran, Deobandi militancy also poses a challenge because of the majority of Iranian Baluch being Sunnis who contest the state, demanding autonomy and better, less discriminatory treatment. Even Abdolhamid Rigi, the leader of the militant group Jundallah, the parent organisation of Jaish-ul-Adl, never demanded separation from Iran but rather autonomy for the region and improved treatment of the Sunni populace by the Shia-dominated state.
Third, Pakistan has faced problems caused by religious militancy linked with Iran. Unlike the Shah regime, Iran’s Islamic Republic took ownership of Shias around the world. This included backing the pro-Iran Shia militancy in many parts of the Middle East, including in Pakistan. Baloch militancy, especially, has not just proliferated in the last couple of years but created a serious security situation for Pakistan. Islamabad and Tehran have been in regular talks regarding their respective security concerns, with the former complaining about Baloch militants, who have been in a battle against the Pakistani state since the late 2000s, being provided protection by the Iranian state. The Baloch have become increasingly distrustful of the Pakistani state and its high-handed behaviour, opening up the possibility of the insurgents being manipulated by other states.
Fourth, the recent clash and the Iranian versus Pakistani Baloch issue begins to make greater sense when seen in the context of the geo-political competition simmering between the two neighbours. From differences over the future and control of Afghanistan to Gwadar versus Chabahar ports, Iran and Pakistan are highly suspicious of each other. An added dimension is Tehran’s close ties with India, giving rise to speculation around Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Tehran just a day before Iran attacked Pakistan. Since 1979, Tehran has harboured suspicions about Pakistan due to its close ties with the US, with concerns now that Islamabad could be drawn into an American effort to encircle and target Iran.
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Layers to Pakistan military’s response
Conspiracy theories aside, the recent Iranian attack was more serious than its 2017 incursion. This was also probably a signal to Pakistan to not allow militants based in its territory to target Iran and add to the pressure that’s piling up on Tehran in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel conflict.
However, it was not Iran’s attack in Panjgur but Pakistan’s response to it that made the development unusual. Interestingly, Pakistan did not shoot down the incoming missiles and drones like it did the UAV in 2017. Instead, it chose to strike back. Islamabad-based strategic thinkers have suggested that the response was justified as anything less would have encouraged others to attack.
But these commentators tend to evade discussing the internal dimension of the counter-attack, such as the army leadership’s interest in rebuilding its image amid domestic discontent over its handling of the country’s politics and presenting itself as the saviour of the state.
Furthermore, post-attack, Rawalpindi appears inclined to highlight threat from Baloch separatists, not just to push back the protesters sitting in Islamabad but also further subvert the political system, intensify crackdowns on the Baloch, and increase its footprints in the southwestern province.
Baloch human rights activist Mahrang Baloch, with whom I spoke, shared her concerns about the possible threat to her movement as well as fear of a brutal pushback. It wouldn’t be surprising if a terror attack does take place in the coming days, providing a pretext for and justifying more state brutality, framed as a logical state response to defend its right to monopoly over violence. The fact is that while Iran-Pakistan relations are likely to normalise in the coming days, the lives of ordinary Baloch can be expected to turn even more abnormal.
Ayesha Siddiqa is Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)