Exchange of blows from a distance was the prime characteristic of the latest bout between Iran and Israel. Firepower expressed itself through drones and missiles launched from aerial or land-based platforms. The main difference this time was that both nations attempted to apply military force at targets directly inside the opponents’ territory. The immediate trigger was Israel’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Damascus on 1 April. Iran considered it a violation of its sovereignty according to international legal norms and agreements.
Iran reacted on 13 April by launching about 300 aerial platforms that included drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles. Israel claimed that 99 per cent of these weapons were intercepted and there was hardly any damage.
A few hours later, Iran’s mission to the United Nations, in a post on X stated: “The matter can be deemed concluded”. It was a clear indication that Iran wanted the ongoing action-reaction cycle to end.
On 19 April, explosions were reported in Isfahan. Many have assumed that it’s part of Israel’s reaction to Iran’s 13 April attack. Israel has not taken any responsibility for the strike. However, Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said the United States told the G7 foreign ministers that it had been “informed at the last minute” by Israel about an attack on Iran.
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No ‘free will’
A statement by the Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian downplayed the explosions in Isfahan. He said that drones took off from inside Iran and flew for a few hundred metres before being downed and that it has not been proved that there is a connection with Israel. More importantly, he warned that if “Israel retaliated against and acted against the interests of Iran, Tehran’s next response would be immediate and at a maximum level. But if not, then we are done. We are concluded”.
From Israel’s silence about the Isfahan attack and the Iranian Foreign Minister’s remarks, it is apparent that neither side wants to escalate the situation. The reasons for such an approach by both sides, probably lie in the political and military context of the strategic situation in West Asia within the larger global geopolitical framework. In both these contexts, both Israel and Iran do not have ‘free will’ to act as they want to in the ongoing confrontation. Let me first explain what free will means in Clausewitzian terms.
Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian General and a military theorist who wrote On War; it has been acknowledged as a treatise whose core concepts have endured. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” he wrote. But he qualifies this oft-quoted statement by asserting that “Will is not sovereign”. No one is in full control, the enemy too has free will and can also dictate the issue at stake. Actions and decisions taken by any of the parties in a war are determined by the autonomy and responsibility of one’s own will, they also have to be weighed against possible consequences.
In the case of both Iran and Israel, the space for free will is curbed by the constellation of both political and military forces at play.
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The political context
Israel’s war in Gaza and the support of the US are politically organic. However, Israel’s free will is curbed by its dependence on US support. The US is catalysing Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan to put up a united front against Iran. But this is not solely due to its support for Israel. The US also perceives Iran as a significant threat due to its alignment with China and Russia in the global geopolitical arena. Both the Gaza war and an Iran-Israel war could have adverse implications for the US’ effort to isolate Iran.
Of course, the US-Israel relationship is underpinned by the clout of the Jewish lobby in the former’s domestic politics. It certainly emboldens Israel to act according to its will as it did in Gaza.
However, the situation is politically and strategically different in the case of Iran and probably has long-term implications that could pose a greater threat to Israel in the long term.
For Iran, which has been under sanctions from the West for a long time, an escalation of a war in West Asia could draw in the US and its allies on behalf of Israel and it could lose all the gains it has made in strengthening its proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and several other entities in Syria and Iraq. Iran would prefer that Israel’s manner of prosecution of the Hamas war results in the prevention of the US-Israel-Arab states’ rapprochement.
For the US, the war in Ukraine and the turmoil in West Asia would detract from its efforts to deal with China, which is considered its primary long-term threat.
This political context is shaping the approach of the parties concerned. But it is also influenced by the military context. Iran has displayed its potential for using military force against Israel, which is in normative terms much better equipped and is ostensibly better prepared.
Also read: Israel-Iran conflict is bad news for Russia. Moscow is dependent on Tehran for drones
The military context
Iran and Israel are not contiguous neighbours. Iran can, however, disrupt Israel’s trade by the use of proxies in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and Strait of Hormuz. Such a disruption would also impact nearly all countries. The impact on global trade personifies the adverse economic fallout of military conflicts.
The main contours of the Iran-Israel military clash are now drawn with the lines that emanate from the attack on 13 April. Iran’s intended strategic communication about its capability through the medium of air was evident. It gave some warning before the attack, and even when the attack was ineffective it immediately called for the ‘matter to be treated as concluded’.
The main capability it displayed was its reach into Israel through the aerial medium. More importantly, it is an indigenous capability that has been developed despite the sanctions from the West. The per weapon effect would be small but when used simultaneously in large numbers the effect could be strategic—this trend in strategic affairs is gaining recognition. If Israel has to tackle this capability, it will have to eventually attack the infrastructure in Iran that develops such capability and deploys it. It could lead to a major war that nobody seeks.
Not ignoring the vicissitudes of Israel’s domestic politics and the issue of Netanyahu’s political survival, it should take the Iran signal. The impact of this could be manifested in Israel’s future actions in Gaza, against Iran and in dealing with tensions in West Asia.
Just as Clausewitz wrote nearly 200 years ago, free will in war, in an interconnected world, is definitely not sovereign.
Nearer home, one hopes India and Pakistan have hopefully inhered the truism from their historical experience.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)