The third anniversary – if it can be called that – of the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 has passed without a whimper. A world caught up with the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflict in Gaza and its fallout on Red Sea shipping has no time to spare for any crisis in a so-called ‘third-world’ country. Yet, for India, the situation in Myanmar, which is almost like a civil war, is perhaps the graver threat to national security. Any instability or unrest in a country that shares land or maritime borders with us invariably has a fallout on our own security—not just affecting the bordering states but the entire nation.
The current scenario in Myanmar has many complexities and sub-plots, with differing short-term and long-term ramifications. Friends and allies in the short term could well become foes and vice versa. This is on account of the divergent agendas of key stakeholders, such as the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the Pro-Democracy Alliance (PDA)/National Unity Government (NUG). It is not necessary for their interests to always align.
A complex history
Before Burma (now Myanmar) attained independence in 1948, an important conference took place at Panglong in the Shan State in February 1947. Held between the Burmese government under Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi) and representatives of the Chin, Kachin and Shan communities, the conference resulted in the Panglong Agreement.
It was agreed that independence could be more expeditiously achieved if all groups and ethnicities cooperated and presented a unified front to the British.
The British also supported this idea as they could then grant independence to a single entity – namely Burma – rather than a conglomeration of independent states. Post-independence, these minorities staked their claim for independence as their interpretation was quite different from the Bamar (Burmese) majority. They expressed that the Panglong Agreement was only to seek independence from the British, and in no way meant that they had agreed to become a part of the Union of Burma.
The Karen (Kayin) who were not part of this agreement started their civil war against the government in 1949, a year after Burma gained independence.
Following differences in perception regarding the spirit of the Panglong Agreement, other groups also started waging armed conflict against the central government. All these groups – the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Shan State Army (SSA), Arakan Army (AA), United Wa State Army (UWSA) and many more – are collectively called ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). In the current conflict in Myanmar, these EAOs are not only fighting the central government—that is, the Myanmar Army—but are also fighting for the independence of their respective communities.
Even if the military government were to be toppled, this demand would remain to be addressed by a democratically elected government. With the Myanmar Army simultaneously embroiled in tackling the PDA, these groups sense an opportunity to wrest control from a weakened Myanmar Army and proclaim independence.
That is not in consonance with the aim of a united Myanmar, irrespective of whosoever is in power at the Centre, be it a military or civil government. Hence the EAOs and the PDA/NUG are only allies in the short term, as whenever a civilian government returns to power, they will have to tackle these very same EAOs. The recent announcement about making military service compulsory for all young men and women attests to the criticality of the situation.
Myanmar has seven administrative divisions —Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magwe, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon—with a Bamar majority. There are seven states based on ethnicity — Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan.
After the 2021 military coup, Myanmar saw widespread protests by pro-democracy groups, which coalesced into the PDA under the umbrella of the NUG. Unlike in the past, they took to an armed confrontation with the military junta in their bid to restore democratic rule. Demonstrations and armed resistance seeking restoration of democracy, however, are more pronounced in the divisions that have a Bamar majority as opposed to the states composed of ethnic minorities. Hence, although both parties seem to be fighting the Myanmar Army, they are doing so with different end-states in mind.
The dispensation that prevails in the long run will still have to bank on the Myanmar Army to safeguard its national interests. This will be a bitter pill for a civilian government to swallow as it will have no option but to make peace with the Myanmar Army, the very people it is fighting against now.
After coming to power in 2015, the National League for Democracy (NLD) developed a working relationship with the Myanmar Army, evident in Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence on its actions against Rohingya Muslims. This evoked severe criticism from Western countries, with some even advocating for the recall of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to her in 1991.
However, differences soon arose between the NLD and the military hierarchy, ultimately resulting in the coup. The Myanmar Army will not only have to rebuild trust with a democratically elected government and the people, but also forgive and forget without resorting to reprisals against civilians who are fighting with them right now, and vice versa. This process of reconciliation will be a difficult transition phase as and when peace and tranquillity return to the country.
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India’s balancing act
India, therefore, must play a balancing game and fine-tune its responses in this complex environment. Keeping channels of communication open with the NUG is of paramount importance for ensuring cordial relations in the future. While India always supports a return to civilian rule, it can’t extend support to the EAOs seeking independence. Doing so would greenlight the claims of some Indian insurgent groups, who also seek separation from the Indian Union.
There is also a need to differentiate between the military junta at the Centre and the rank-and-file of the Myanmar Army, who are caught in the crossfire. Since the Myanmar Army will play a significant role in shaping the future, India can’t afford to burn its bridges with the military junta either.
Another track that needs to be followed is the people-to-people connection. For this, we must leverage our strong historical, cultural, and religious linkages, as ultimately it is the people who will decide the future of their country.
India cannot afford to shut its doors to its neighbour in their time of need and must engage with all stakeholders to seek a peaceful resolution, even offering to mediate if necessary. Whatever path we choose, it must be done keeping our national interest in mind.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)