No single power—be it the United States, China, Russia, Iran, or India—can fundamentally change the reality of Balochistan or the lives of its inhabitants on either side of the border. Borders always divide; they are never as “organic” or as “natural” as we imagine them. Balochistan remains a complex geographical and ethnographic conundrum.
In Interviews I have conducted with Baloch human rights activists, a stark reality often emerges: the people are not regarded as citizens, and their lives are not valued. This is not merely a humanitarian crisis—it is a strategic condition.
For security analysts, mastering the terrain is half the battle—after all, geopolitics is quite literally the politics of geography.
Challenge of liminal geopolitics
The shared challenge facing India, China, Pakistan, and Iran is that, contrary to the neat abstractions of the nation-state, their borders stretch into regions better described as frontiers—zones of transition rather than lines of separation. These areas are dynamic, expansive, and marked by extreme poverty and shifting norms. The issue is not the rule of law, but the absence of it.
This civilisational challenge defines Balochistan, as it does Kurdistan and, for decades, Afghanistan. How India engages with this liminality carries strategic consequences.
Baloch militancy can be broadly divided into two ideological currents: First, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a secular ethnonationalist insurgency opposing both Pakistan and China, echoes the outlook of the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria. Second, Jaysh al-Adl (Army of Justice), a Sunni-Jihadi group operating from the Iranian side of the border and a successor to Jundallah, resembles Al-Nusra Front in its tactics and ideology.
Despite their ideological differences, both the BLA and Jaysh al-Adl groups engage in similar tactical operations. Across Balochistan, irregular forces compete with Pakistani and Iranian security services for control over territory, populations, smuggling routes, and revenue. Control remains fluid.
Recent developments
The US designation of the BLA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) ostensibly responds to attack patterns. Yet, the focus on secular insurgents rather than jihadist actors creates a paradox—especially given the tactical symmetry across the border—emerging from overlapping identities, pulls and pressures.
Baloch groups are held together by tribal, kinship, religious, and paramilitary networks.
This creates a dynamic balance of power, but leaves little chance of building a strong, centralised state. What really matters is how these groups see themselves—and that depends on the local context.
For instance, in Iran, they rally Sunni opposition to a Shi’a theocracy, sometimes with Pakistani support.
However, in Pakistan, they mobilise ethnonationalist resistance to an Islamic state, occasionally with Iranian backing.
India’s Interests: tactical and strategic
India, unlike the US, is directly involved in the region, but Balochistan’s uncertain and unstable and liminal status still attracts global powers, reinforcing its complexities.
To understand the Indian angle better, I would argue its relevance at both tactical and strategic levels.
Tactically, perceived Indian support for Baloch forces could stretch Pakistani military capacity, limiting its ability to project power along the Indian border—a posture sometimes described as “offensive defence.”
Strategically, Balochistan is a transit corridor between Afghanistan and Chabahar. Therefore, it becomes central to India’s ambition to establish an alternative route to Central Asia that counters China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This vision mirrors the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which positions Balochistan as a link between Xinjiang and Gwadar.
But the latter utility of Balochistan remains limited too. At present, there are only two conceivable ways to use it as a transit region—colonisation, through top-down development, or integration, via local empowerment. Needless to say, both pathways remain complex.
Resistance to externally-led colonisation is fierce in the region. Baloch fighters routinely sabotage connectivity projects.
In my discussions with British, Turkish, and Iranian experts, a common concern emerged: while infrastructure projects promise investment and better living standards, they usually rely on foreign workers and offer little benefit to local people—appearing instead like a new kind of colonisation.
Transborder smuggling and proxies
There is yet another issue that complicates Balochistan’s connectivity potential. Investment in connectivity threatens the transborder smuggling economy that sustains the region. Afghan opium, ephedra-based amphetamines, Iranian diesel, Russian arms, and human trafficking.
Regular state armies are frequently entangled in smuggling and other informal networks that sustain frontier politics and economy.
Confronting only secular insurgents in Pakistan, while overlooking jihadist groups operating from Iran, will do little to change the broader strategic equilibrium. History underlines this point.
A 2012 British inquiry found that Mossad secretly engaged with the militant group Jundallah by posing as CIA operatives to build influence over Iran, a method also used in Kurdistan. Similarly, Iran’s own “forward defence” strategy—projecting power through proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas—demonstrates how states manipulate irregular actors to shape favourable regional dynamics.
India’s posture in Balochistan echoes this approach. Tactically, its role in the transborder conflict is not fundamentally different from that of the US or Israel. It reflects the old “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” dictum—a rationale that may yield short-term gains. But such tactical wins mean little without strategic vision.
The familiar proxy dynamics of Syria and Iraq now play out between Pakistan and Iran, as seen in the December 2023 killing of 11 Iranian policemen by Jaysh (operating from Pakistani soil), followed by Iranian strikes in Panjgur and Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar airstrikes.
States are not merely players in frontier politics—they are often captive to irregular actors who create strategic facts on the ground. The key takeaway is—liminality is contagious. India could find itself reacting to facts on the ground it can neither create nor control. It is as dangerous a game as supporting the Taliban against the USSR.
Also read: Balochistan Liberation Front seeks global backing for ‘war of liberation’ against Pakistan
The road ahead
India lacks the financial and military capacity to rival China’s footprint in Balochistan. Its deliberate ambiguity is diplomatically understandable, but increasingly ineffective. The Chabahar narrative as a counterweight to CPEC is ageing poorly, with limited trade outcomes. India cannot compete for the colonisation of Balochistan. Tactical engagement in tribal warfare may yield short-term gains but lacks strategic depth.
A sustainable approach to Balochistan must address the human realities that enable informal governance. The focus should be on political initiatives, not just military solutions. While irregular governance will continue to challenge the nation-state, the nature of support should go beyond short-term expedience. The Baloch diaspora’s presence in India should not be only “a lever” but also a broader opportunity for political empowerment.
At present, India’s use of economic and military resources remains largely reactive, not part of a coherent vision for the region. How does India—the largest democracy in the world—view the future of the region, including Balochistan? Without a clear narrative, India cannot build long-term momentum, let alone mobilise international support.
In a volatile neighbourhood, articulating a clear political vision may carry risks, but the dangers of strategic inertia are even greater.
Ilya Roubanis (PhD, European University Institute, Florence) is a security studies analyst specialising in the Caucasus and the Broader Middle East. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of International Relations (IDIS) in Athens and a member of the Caucasus Watch (.de) editorial team. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)