Among heated debates in both countries regarding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US, a prominent aspect of the analysis revolves around whether India would become an American ‘ally’. Experts refer to history to illustrate India’s aversion to alliances, which is indeed true. However, this begs the question of whether a formal alliance is desirable or even possible. This is especially pertinent considering the realities in the subcontinent, and that treaty allies do not always agree on critical matters, including the contours of basic common defence. When analysing the India-US relationship, it’s important to get the terminology right.
Allies for a ‘common threat’?
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines an alliance as “a sovereign or state associated with another by treaty or league”. As a verb, it means to “unite or form a connection’. The most rock-solid alliance in the world today is that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), born out of the turmoil of the Second World War and the rise of the Soviets. Unsurprisingly, there were differences within the State Department regarding the need for such a treaty, with George Kennan, chief of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, and Charles Bohlen, the chief Soviet expert, arguing that such an action would actually worsen the US-Soviet divide.
Later, strong differences regarding its text, particularly on ‘common defence’, led to the insertion of a qualifying clause, ‘as it deems necessary’, in Article 5, which requires members to take action, “including the use of armed force”, in the event of an attack on any of the parties. It was a resolution by the previously strictly isolationist Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg that led to Congress allowing collective defence, thus ending a policy of isolationism and solidifying the US as a trans-Atlantic power. Congress, however, continued to demand strong oversight to ensure that the US was not dragged into a war not of its own making.
In other words, alliances are serious business, requiring extensive political consultation and a strong sense of common threat. But that was in the past. Currently, even a sense of (apparent) common threat has not led to an extension of NATO’s defence clause to Ukraine. In fact, all sides are exercising extreme caution to ensure the inviolability of Russian territory. If this is the situation in Europe, which is of vital importance to US security, anyone who thinks that the US Congress will extend a mutual defence clause to India, during an ongoing conflict with China, misinterprets history. China may be a ‘common threat’, but its nature is different. India’s threat from China is one of territorial integrity; while to the US it is a threat of erosion of its global dominance. That’s not a common threat; it’s a shared one.
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Alliances are never rock solid
True, NATO has endured to date. But support was never a given. For instance, strong differences emerged on the nature of deterrence in Europe, while President Kennedy’s last-minute sharing of his plans during the Cuban missile crisis caused severe rifts within the Alliance.
Bickering got worse as the Soviet Union collapsed, and US op-eds backed the Democrats’ plans for a ‘peace dividend’ to allow the US economy to grow. Operations in Yugoslavia, which American foreign policy expert Michael Mandelbaum called the “perfect failure”, and the sudden pull-out from Afghanistan by the US without so much as a nod to its NATO allies, all served to underline differences. Then there was President Trump threatening to leave NATO if it did not ‘pay its bills’.
If NATO is now alive and well, and spending more on defence, it is due to the Ukraine war. Even there, differences are apparent, for instance, French President Macron’s call for Europe to stop becoming America’s followers, and Germany trying its best to broker peace with Putin. A RAND report also finds little likelihood of support among Pacific allies for war in Taiwan or elsewhere.
Being an ally does not always mean guaranteed agreement on all issues. Far from it. And don’t forget, the whole alliance thing is underpinned by the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe. That’s unimaginable in India. Besides, we have our own weapons, and enough to make China pause.
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NATO’s office in Asia
The same post-war situation determines the US-Japan alliance. There are 85 US military facilities in Japan as part of their mutual defence treaty. The mutual defence clause only covers territory “under the administration of Japan” (and not its many claims which lead to the war) and twins with Japan’s pacifist constitution. This is a unique relationship, but what is relevant here is that, as Japan takes on a larger defence role — amid the threat of a rising China, a nuclear weapon-armed North Korea, and uncertainties on US commitment — it is in talks for a NATO liaison office, the first of its kind in Asia, to coordinate with other ‘partners’. They include Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Pakistan, who came together through a programme that began in 2016. Partners have access to the full range of activities NATO offers, including military exercises and training. But on a bilateral basis.
Partner countries interact at various levels with NATO. At the senior-most level, the Secretary-General, the Chair of the Military Committee, and NATO’s Strategic Commanders meet with partner countries’ Heads of State and government, foreign ministers, and defence ministers.
This model bestows no specific advantages to India. It is already part of military exercises with QUAD ‘partners’ under the ‘Malabar’ rubric. It has no such exercises with other groupings that it is accused of ‘double laning’ with, like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
The signing of all foundational agreements with the US, especially BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) will allow joint mission planning with allies who operate the same US systems. Again, India has no such agreements with other countries, not even Russia, though it does take part in Russian-hosted multilateral exercises like Vostok where it sent a small contingent of 200 army personnel last year.
The recent suggestion by a Congressional Committee for India to be part of a ‘NATO Plus’, to “strengthen global security and deter the aggression of the CCP” has little practical value. The grouping includes Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and South Korea and intelligence sharing with some of these countries is already on.
And here’s the reality. No one is offering India a seat at ‘Five Eyes’, the intelligence-sharing alliance between Anglophone countries (US, UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand). This has since been expanded to nearly 14 countries, all European. That seat will likely remain elusive.
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What’s possible and practical
In terms of what is practical on the ground, a US-India mutual defence treaty — or a NATO linkage – would mean recognition of those territories claimed by China as part of India. The US Congress has recognised Arunachal Pradesh as part of Indian territory, but its position on Ladakh is unclear, and it is highly unlikely to back India’s claims on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or the areas occupied by China. A similar clause to the Japan Treaty is theoretically possible but would be unacceptable to Delhi given that it would be an erosion of claims.
Mutual defence would also require US ‘boots on the ground’ in India in large numbers, to give it credibility. Again, this would not be popular in either country. Besides, we have enough ‘boots’ already. What is vital for both is technical intel and logistics, including technology for alternate access to the borders, and a strong partnership in maritime domain awareness. Maintenance and repair of US Navy sealift ships and fuelling is already taking place in India. The range of cooperation is already considerable. The trouble is that not many are aware how close this is on the ground, which is beneficial to both.
Then there’s the question of India ‘assisting’ on Taiwan. First, the US is highly unlikely to wage a conventional war against China given its huge economic interdependence, and the clear reluctance of allies to support such a conflagration. If treaty allies hang back, one can hardly expect a non-treaty ‘friend’ like India to clamber in.
In all fairness, no one in government expects it, given in particular the ‘hot border’ with China. A status of a ‘partner’ would again put India on the front lines of Chinese suspicion, to no tangible benefit.
Considering how multiple lines of cooperation have opened up after PM Modi’s visit, the present reality of ‘friends with benefits” seems to be the best bet. This means India and the US operating closely across multiple fronts but on a loosely structured series of agreements, including close coordination between the armed forces.
Some of these agreements are also being extended to Quad countries, and this should be pursued. A Quad version of ‘Five Eyes’ might be considered.
In sum, a formal treaty between India and US may actually have negative consequences. The hugs, backslapping, and plenty of economic, financial, and technological linkages work just fine. It will alarm Beijing nonetheless, especially since US media is determined to make the China link. For the Modi government, its future electability depends on the economy, not on far-off battles with China. That doesn’t require a formal treaty. And that’s the finality underpinning ties with the US. The trouble is someone has to translate this reality into Chinese characters.
Tara Kartha is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)