The first half of the 1960s was a turbulent period in India’s history. The overall morale was low after the setback to Indian forces in the 1962 war with China at the North-East Frontier Agency – now Arunachal Pradesh. Internally, there were agitations on linguistic and ethnic issues in Punjab, Assam, and Madras. Jammu and Kashmir was on the boil, and the menace of dacoity was rampant in the ravines of Chambal in Madhya Pradesh. The state governments responded by seeking expansion of police forces at a time when the country’s economy was under severe stress.
At the meetings of the zonal councils, which were established under the States Reorganisation Act of 1956 to foster cooperative working, then Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri proposed the establishment of a ‘reserve police force’ that would be funded by state governments and would be available for use within zones when needed.
LP Singh, an additional secretary in the ministry who looked after zonal councils and later became India’s longest-serving home secretary (from 1964 to 1970), wrote in Portrait of Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Quintessential Gandhian. “It was [a] practicable idea as every state in a zone does not normally need reinforcement at the same time…the arrangement would have prevented some avoidable expenditure in each of the participating states besides promoting harmony and cooperative relations among states.” However, the proposal was not carried through. Singh further wrote: “If Shastri had stayed longer as Home Minister or lived long enough after becoming PM, he may have secured an agreement among the states.”
But with the launch of Operation Desert Hawk — a codename for the Pakistan Army’s 1965 military operation in the Rann of Kutch — the limitations of guarding the international border with different state police forces became quite apparent. After Pakistani incursions on 20 January 1965 near Kanjarkot on the Gujarat-Pakistan border, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) outposts were established to secure the area. The next violation took place on 18 February 1965, and the Indian government lodged a formal complaint with Pakistan. But the Pakistan foreign office denied the violation, instead making the contrary claim that Pakistan had been in possession of the territory since 1947.
Pakistan did have an advantage in terms of terrain and logistics: while their closest railway station (Badin) was just about 42 km north of Kanjarkot, Bhuj was located 177 km from the border, and the nearest Indian Army formation, the 31 Infantry Brigade, was stationed in Ahmedabad, roughly 258 km east from Bhuj.
Guarding the border
The zeitgeist of the era was best captured in The British, The Bandits and The Bordermen, the memoir of KF Rustamji, the first Director General (DG) of the Border Security Force (BSF). “It all began with intrusions across the cease-fire line. It was not so easy because the Army was readily available to repel the invaders, and the UN observers were quick to point out that the aggressors came from Pakistan. From January 1965, there were intermittent skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch. On the Ramanavami day of 1965, which fell on 9 April that year, the Pakistan Army attacked the Sadar post held by the CRPF. The police units warded off the attacks but were overwhelmed. Soon, the border became active, and several retaliatory attacks were launched from both sides.”
The Indian government formed a committee immediately after that to “examine and recommend the most effective way of manning the entire Indo-Pakistan border”. A study group under Lt Gen PP Kumaramangalam, the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, submitted a report that was examined by LP Singh and Chief of Army Staff Gen JN Chaudhuri, who then briefed the Prime Minister. An ‘in-principle’ decision was taken to establish a new border force under a senior police officer, which would, according to Chaudhuri, be tasked “mostly with police duties”, but “expected to work under the command of the Army during an outright war.”
Gen Chaudhuri, who wrote a column for The Statesman under the non de plume ‘our military correspondent’, covered the formation of the BSF in two articles that appeared on 22 April 1965 and 8 July 1965. He spelt out the objectives of the new border force and why a policeman and not an officer from the Army should head it. “This may cause a bit of disappointment in army circles, as obviously some covetous eyes have been cast on this post, but as a decision, it is correct. The head of a police force must be an able policeman,” he wrote in one of his columns.
Decision-making was quick during Shastri’s time. Within a few days of the discussions within the Ministry of Home Affairs, a meeting of the home ministers and inspector generals of state police (IGPs) was convened in the first week of May to discuss the “possibility and desirability of a border force.” The PM addressed the meeting and dwelt on the Pakistani troop movement on the Gujarat border. Most of the home ministers and IGPs nodded in agreement because the groundwork had already been done. However, in an irony of sorts, Rustamji objected on behalf of the Madhya Pradesh government as he had been instructed to do so by then chief minister DP Mishra.
There are two plausible explanations for this objection: the first being that, as Madhya Pradesh was not a border state, it was not directly affected by these incursions. The second reason was political. Many Congress leaders, including Mishra, had not reconciled to Shastri becoming the PM and wanted to exert their independence. Sensing that the discussion might take a turn against MHA’s attempt, Shastri took the microphone. After summarising the gist of the discussions, LP Singh wrote in his book, he announced: “Gentlemen, I am glad that you all agree. We will go ahead and raise a new Central Border Force.”
Also read: Servants of People Society, organisation that made Lal Bahadur Shastri a national missionary
Rustamji becomes BSF DG
On 17 May 1965, LP Singh held a meeting with COAS Chaudhuri and defence secretary AD Pandit. After the meeting, he submitted the minutes for approval to the HM and the PM. Rustamji was anointed BSF’s first director general, with stars and stripes equivalent to a lieutenant general of the Indian Army. One reason for selecting Rustamji was his excellent rapport with Gen Chaudhuri. In May 1948, he was posted to Akola, a district bordering the former princely state of Hyderabad. He took part in the Hyderabad Police Action, ordered by the Indian government because the Nizam of Hyderabad was unwilling to integrate with the Indian Union.
Although Rustamji reported for duty to the MHA, and his services were used for coordination among the different police forces along the Pakistan border, the actual raising of the force had to wait until after the end of the India-Pakistan war. This is why 1 December became the BSF Raising Day, which has been celebrated with gusto every year since.
In a lighter vein, Rustamji recalled his contribution to the name of the force. He nudged LP Singh that an ‘S’ had to be inserted between B (Border) and F (Force), or else the acronym would read BF!
Disclosure: My father SK Chopra and father-in-law SN Misra (IPS) served the BSF in its formative years. I grew up in the BSF campus at the Jalandhar cantonment in Punjab and was educated at the BSF school in Jalandhar.
Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was Director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. He tweets @ChopraSanjeev. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)