In all the debate on theatre commands, the key aspect of unity of aerospace command has been compromised. Aerospace power is unique and requires an innate understanding for its effective application.
While its initial grandiose promises didn’t quite ring true in their entirety, air power emerged to establish itself as a force that could gravely alter the course of conflicts, if not win them by itself. Paradoxically, the detractors who thought nothing of the tank as a fighting weapon oversaw its birth and initial use. The rhetoric claiming that air power was the panacea to the horrors of trench warfare proved to be its bane with its proponents brushed aside as being given to hyperbole. Thus, it was restricted to minimal roles like recce and observation, firmly in the grips of commanders unfamiliar with its application. Its more imaginative use was to follow after the emergence of visionaries like Liddell-Hart and Douhet, and later, Trenchard and Billy Mitchell, who persisted with the idea of an independent air force under the command of an airman.
From sceptics who argued that aircraft would only serve to startle cavalry horses, to those who today question its independent role, aerospace power has weathered the storm with great aplomb.
As before, the aerospace power’s keystone remains its reach and cover. Its inherent freedom to manoeuvre and ubiquity imply that an aggressor can attack from any direction, forcing a defender to spread out his forces. Speed is an attribute that is almost synonymous with aerospace power. Collectively, these traits bestow upon an air force the ability to carry out distinct operations, as was demonstrated during Operation Instant Thunder during the first Gulf War. The 1981 Israeli attack on Osirak and the American F-111 strike on Libya in 1986, and the Balakot strikes are also cases in point. The latter examples also highlight the political signals that can be produced by a squadron-worth of aircraft.
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Characteristics and limitations
Aerospace power’s potency has resulted in an increasing demand from all arms. However, this demand is fast degenerating into a call for individual command over its assets.
The proponents of such splitting of aerospace power assets are, however, ill-informed of its basic tenets, characteristics and limitations. This is largely because the goal of an air commander is to fight at a strategic level, while forcing the enemy to do so at a tactical level. Contrast this to a ground commander’s view of what is arguably a linear battle. As he matures in service, his Area of Responsibility (AOR) too keeps growing. This AOR, however, is bounded on either side by a friendly commander’s, thus limiting the commander concerned to a ‘Bowling Alley Effect’ — a myopic view of the enemy. Consequently, they are faced only with the immediate problem, losing the larger picture in the bargain. The Indian Army’s insistence on the use of armed helicopters in the initial stages of the Kargil incursions too reeked of the Bowling Alley Effect leading to much heartburn amongst the Service chiefs.
The airman, on the other hand, grows up thinking little of geographical barriers, knowing that aerospace power is never to be used in penny packets and that the results of his effort may not be immediate. Most importantly, his AOR spreads across an entire theatre, maybe more than a Corps Commander’s.
Soviet aerospace luminary Alexander P. Seversky listed ‘unity of command’ as one of the three principles of application of aerospace power. Unity of aerospace command implies directing and coordinating the action of all aerospace forces towards a common objective. This principle ensures that for every objective or aim, there should be a unity of effort under one air commander. In this regard, it must be understood that command need not necessarily imply ownership. Instead, it implies ‘unity of effort’ and that of ‘purpose’.
History is replete with misdirected adventures at splitting aerospace power and/or placing it under the command of a ‘non-airman’. Vietnam and Korea are obvious examples in this regard, where the basic tenet of mass was given the go-by in favour of a gradual incremental approach. Lack of unity in effort and command on part of the US forces also effected the conduct of these campaigns, with the US navy and air force sometimes working at variance with each other.
A slight variation, though involving wilful splitting of aerospace power resources, is found in the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) campaign in North Africa where, initially, the RAF split its assets into penny packets called ‘Mobile Wings’ under direct control of the army. This attempt proved disastrous, forcing reversion of command to the RAF and the subsequent air interdiction effort, which starved Erwin Rommel, the German, of his POL (Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants) supplies. The Egyptian misadventure with air defence in 1973 is another contemporary example of wilfully splitting air power or one of its components, ostensibly for better operational response. A separate Egyptian Air Defence Command hived off the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) and placed subordinate to the army saw the EAF lose 58 aircraft to friendly fire, compared to a total Israeli loss of 102 aircraft.
Such examples, where the unity of aerospace power was tinkered with, abound in military history. Clearly, decentralised application of an air force has always led to an incoherent strategy, which lacks unity of effort. Penny-packet use of aerospace power, as in the past, is never going to yield any results. In a developing country like India, there is a great need to have a unified command over the aerospace power assets because they are limited. The proliferation of aerial vehicles across Services has resulted in duplication of effort, wastefulness and problems in airspace management. It is a dichotomy that the Army, while realising the utility of en mass firepower of an artillery division, does not bestow the same rationale on the use of aerospace power.
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Focus on strategic aim, not means
The air defence of a fleet air arm differs from that of the ground forces in that it is far removed from the TBA (Tactical Battle Area), which is also being used by friendly air assets. Thus, the chances of fratricide are remote, though not entirely absent. However, navies having big aircraft carriers also possess the ability to deliver weapon loads offensively on the mainland. When this effort is in concert with one already underway from a shore-based airfield, the naval air assets should come under the command of one commander, who would then be able to orchestrate the entire campaign, with the forces at his disposal. Such coordination is only possible when all the naval aerospace assets are placed under a unified command. Arguably, the Karachi attack of 1971 is an example in this regard.
As any Clausewitzian student (of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz) would agree, a nation’s military might is a mere means to a larger end. It matters little who contributes how much. What is of importance is the achievement of the strategic aim, maybe at the cost of a few battles. The strategic aim, in turn, can only be achieved by optimum (not maximum) use of military force. Such use is possible only when force is wielded cohesively and by those who are trained to wield it. This glimpse into the past brings forth the fact that aerospace power assets under a commander not versed with its application resulted in stunted growth or misapplication of air assets. It should suffice to say that aerospace assets are best left unified under the command (not necessarily ownership) of an airman. Consequently, the Indian Air Force’s resistance of theatre commands is being trivilised by comparing the air force component of theatre commands to the current operational commands of the IAF, disregarding the overall unity of command, under an airman, that exists in the current setup.
Anchit Gupta @AnchitGupta9 is a finance professional from a military family. He has a deep interest in aviation history, is currently co-authoring a book on the role of IAF in the Kargil war and has been a regular contributor to the IAF section on www.bharat- rakshak.com . Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)