This Kashmir affair has lasted in this present form for nearly four years and nine months. Public memories are short, and many of the honourable Members who have come here have not heard the previous debates on this subject here, and the subject may, in a sense, be new to them. Previously this Parliament, or rather the previous Parliament, has often considered this problem. So far as I am concerned, it is important enough for us to give it as much time as we can possibly give, and I am prepared to say this to honourable Members opposite, that if they wish to confer with me privately, I am prepared. What is more, should occasion arise, and should the House so desire, I am prepared to have a full-dress debate on this issue, so that we may not be hurried about the matter.
It is not the Government’s desire to hurry this through or to follow any policy of hush-hush. There is no secrecy about it. The point is that this problem is a difficult, intricate problem, and no amount of eloquent speeches by me or by the honourable Member opposite will solve the problem. It may influence us for a while. Some of us have faced this problem in this particular way for nearly five years. Some of us have faced this problem in other ways for the last twenty two years. It is a long problem; various types of conflicts — conflicts of the people against their autocratic Government, and a conflict which involved me personally in an incident in which I myself was the prisoner of an earlier Government in Kashmir State. So that there is a history behind this. It is not so simple as the honourable Member makes out. It is a long history. When the time came, in July and August 1947, when Independence was coming and partition was coming, at that time still Shaikh Abdullah and most of his colleagues were in prison. Remember that. They had been in prison for a long time. And when I sought to go there merely to interview him, I was put in prison by the Maharaja’s Government of the day.] That was the inheritance just before partition came.
Ultimately, by pressure of events, the Government of that day released Shaikh Abdullah and his other colleagues. They conferred with some of us. What was the advice that was given to them, by bigger people than I am? The advice given to them was that they must not hurry. It was a difficult problem, this Kashmir problem, and whatever steps they took should be after consulting their people as formally as possible,because we knew that this matter of Kashmir was going to be complicated. So, when the honourable Member referred to that process of accession which went on on a large scale in July and early August, through the great wisdom and courage of Sardar Patel, three states were left out-two major ones and a minor one— the major ones being Hyderabad and Kashmir: Hyderabad for different reasons, and Kashmir for different reasons. This was done deliberately, and our advice to the Kashmir people and the Maharaja so long as he was there was: Do not hurry. It is a difficult problem. Do it soundly and well, and we shall abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir. That is the policy that Sardar and our Government laid down in regard to every state in India. Naturally the question did not arise in regard to most states. But this was the policy in regard to every state: that the people of the state should decide.
Long before the struggle with Pakistan about Kashmir arose, we put it to the Maharaja and, if I may say so, in this connection it is my conviction and an honest conviction that at least seventy-five to eighty per cent of the troubles of Kashmir today and in the last few years have been due to the amazingly mistaken wrong-headed policy that the Maharaja pursued there. Well, there it is. So we put it to him but, what was much more important, we put it to the organization — to the National Conference of Kashmir. It was an organization of Kashmir only but it has been closely associated for twenty years or so with that other great organization which does not function now as such, the All India States People’s Conference and that was closely associated with the people from other States and the people from Kashmir. So the Government of India and others put it to them, to the Maharaja and Shaikh Abdullah, as soon as he came out, that this matter must not be hurried and it was our idea then that a Constituent Assembly should be elected in Kashmir quickly and as soon as possible to decide about these and other questions. We advised them.
Of course, the House will remember that immediately after partition and Independence horrible things occurred in Pakistan on the borders of India. Killings, massacres and migrations took place and we were completely tied up with these things. Then came the news on the fateful day — in the last week of October — about the invasion of Kashmir by those raiders. It was an exceedingly difficult question for us and the honourable Member who spoke about it was a member of our Government then. He might remember how difficult that choice was for us. It came suddenly. We were busy with troubles at home. From a military point of view it was exceedingly difficult to cross over the mountains into Kashmir and to take an effective part. The first day we considered it. We could not come to a decision. We wanted more news. The next day the news was much worse. Mahora Power House was burnt down and so on and so forth and it seemed to us that whatever might be the risks, we had to intervene and intervene by air. We had no air force worth the name at that time. The whole army was split up. Everything was split up and it was rather a fine effort that I think within twelve hours of our decision by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet troops were on their way to Kashmir by air. We stopped all the civil lines overnight and sent some troops — I think the first day about 270 persons and the second day about 200 or 300 of them — and these troops went straight from the airfield to battle near the Srinagar city. However, much happened that day and before we sent our troops an appeal came to us from the Maharaja and an appeal came to us from the National Conference.
I do not wish to go into the past history or to cast blame on people for past events but when crises came to Kashmir in those days, the part played by a number of leading persons was not creditable. In fact, it was very discreditable and it was in ultimate analysis — even before the Indian Army got there — the common people of Kashmir who stood the strain and faced the enemy. It was not the big people there who faced the enemy. It was this organization — the National Conference-and their volunteers, without arms of course, who stood the strain and stayed there even when the enemy was ten miles away. Not a shop in Srinagar closed. It was really astounding how they showed their courage. So that way this story of invasion started.
Now, in accordance with our previous decision — quite apart from Kashmir and Pakistan — a declaration was made by Sardar Patel and us that every state where there was a difference of opinion will be allowed to decide by popular verdict, if necessary. When this question of accession came before us, if the Maharaja only had asked for accession we would have hesitated unless we had known there was some popular backing behind it. We knew that the Maharaja had no popular backing. Hence it was not for the mere asking of the Maharaja that we could agree to a thing like this. It was only because of the popular organization there that we decided to accept it. Even so we repeated what we had said previously. We accepted it and of course the accession was complete. It was not a kind of partial accession or limited accession. The accession was complete. But we said that we will abide by the verdict of the people whenever the chance or the opportunity comes to take it.
Later we referred the matter to the United Nations. It is very well for honourable Members to be wise after the events or for us too and realize what we should have done four years ago. But the position as we saw it then, it seemed to us a wise thing to do. And in those days we had also the high advantage of taking counsel from the Father of the Nation and in this matter too — I do not wish to drag his name because it is not fair to do so, but I do wish to say that I took counsel with him because we were in a state of great difficulty and perplexity. We did not want war all over just at the beginning of our career as an independent nation. And yet we had to defend Kashmir and there was a possibility of that war spreading and becoming a major one. Now, regardless of the question as to who was right and who was wrong, there is no doubt about it that if that war had spread, it would have been disastrous for us — more so for others but disastrous for us also — and would have stopped all our ideas of progress and development. So we decided — to stop the war spreading — to refer this matter to the United Nations. May I say that honourable Members sometimes ask us to withdraw this question from the United Nations? I do not understand that. I do not know how it can be done. Of course, we can break with the United Nations when we want to and we can say to them and tell them, “We leave you, we go away from you and take the consequences.” If you are prepared for that, well, I do not think that will be a right step. That will be a wrong step from many points of view— either broader grounds of policy or narrower opportunist grounds, call them what you will. Therefore, the question of withdrawing something does not arise in that way. We have made it perfectly clear to the Security Council and the United Nations that we went there with the particular appeal. We did not go there to seek their arbitration or to be ordered about. Our original request to them was a very simple one and that was: Please ask the Pakistan Government not to aid the raiders. That was our sole request that we made. So since then several resolutions have been passed by the United Nations or the Security Council with or without our agreement. One at least — and a major one — has been passed without our agreement and we have not accepted that. And we have made it perfectly clear that we cannot accept it or a large part of it. There the matter stands. So that there is no question of our submitting to any direction which we consider wrong. But apart from that we have made it clear that we will, in our desire for peace, accept any advice or mediation, if you like. And even though it is awful enough, rather distressing and disheartening, to carry on these interminable talks without end when often enough the major issues are put aside and long arguments take place over trivial details.
So this story continued and about fifteen months after that came the truce. The honourable Member, Mr Chatterjee, said this was our second bungling— error — that we agreed to the armistice then. Well, I do not know where Mr Chatterjee was at the time and how far he was acquainted with what was happening, but I was acquainted with every full stop and comma and semicolon of what was happening and what was being done, and all I can say is that the inference he has drawn is completely unjustified from the position. It may be good to be wise after the event. And there is no doubt about it, and I am free to confess it, that always our desire has been to stop fighting wherever possible with honour and self-respect and with the preservation of our freedom. We do not want unnecessary war. After judging the situation very carefully we came to that decision. It was the depth of winter, the 31st of December 1948. All over Northern Kashmir, fighting itself was not too easy because of heavy snow and all that; of course, fighting was nevertheless taking place. It was only in the South that really effective fighting could take place and was taking place.
I really am very sorry, I apologize to you, Sir, and to the House, for going into this past history. I shall briefly refer to some of the matters that have been raised. So far as the strict law is concerned, my colleague, the States Minister, is obviously an infinitely better lawyer than I have ever claimed to be, but it is clear that when this accession took place it was an accession of the same kind as in the case of the other states in the first stage — accession on three subjects. Now, in regard to the other states later on various processes of integration took place. Obviously, in regard to Kashmir they could not take place because the position had been petrified because of various things happening: a war happening, the reference to the United Nations happening, and the undertaking and assurances given by us. It could not change until some other step was taken. So that it became inevitable that the position in regard to Kashmir was limited to the accession on these three subjects. Of course, the rest we might confirm, we might decide by conferences, by friendly reference; that is a different matter. But strictly speaking it was only that and that position had remained and it had to remain until some major change in the other circumstances took place. Because all these years — it is now three years since the ceasefire-we have not been assured at any time whether there would be a resumnption of military operations or not.
The House will remember that we declared clearly more than a year ago that in spite of the fact that our territory had been invaded and part of it was actually in enemy occupation, we would not resume military operations unless we were attacked and we would rely upon a peaceful settlement of that problem whether it is through the United Nations or otherwise. The honourable Member asked me a question: How do you hope to get back those territories? Well, my reply then was and now is: By peaceful means. Because I think that resuming war for them would mean disastrous consequences which we do not wish to face. However, I am not going into that question. Then we made it clear, first of all, that we would not start military operations unless we were attacked. Secondly, we made it perfectly clear that if an attack took place in Kashmir by way of Pakistan, any kind of attack, then the operations that would ensue would not be limited to Kashmir State. This was made perfectly clear. We were not going to be tied down if Pakistan attacked Kashmir State thinking it could confine its operations as previously to Kashmir. That could not possibly happen. That declaration of ours I believe had a salutary effect and probably prevented attacks in Kashmir in the last year or two.
Now, that has been the position. Constitutionally the position continues and no doubt it is desirable, and I wish it as much as Dr Mookerjee, that the constitutional position should develop, should be clarified. Certainly, and we shall try to have that done, but it must be remembered that the basic causes which prevented it from developing still continue to a large extent and that is the difficulty. We have not got a clean slate to write upon; we are limited, inhibited by the United Nations, by this, by that. But, nevertheless, the basic thing still remains, that we have declared, and even if we have not declared, that fact would remain-that it is the people of Kashmir who must decide. And I say with all respect to our Constitution that it just does not matter what your Constitution says; if the people of Kashmir do not want it, it will not go there. Because what is the alternative? The alternative is compulsion and coercion, presuming, of course, that the people of Kashmir do not want it. Are we going to coerce and compel them and thereby justify the very charges that are brought by some misguided people outside this country against us? So the question becomes one of having the closest possible union with the people of Kashmir, with their goodwill and our goodwill. Therefore, any action taken which frightens, irritates, brings suspicion in the way, comes in the way of that very thing that we desire. And that is why I venture to say that some of the advisers of my honourable friend opposite, maybe with all good intentions, but nevertheless have been acting in a manner which has come in the way of the very thing they may desire. Now, it is clear that today the accession of Kashmir is in regard to three subjects and the idea was and is that the matter should be looked into when the time comes, extended, or whatever it is, but for the moment it remains in those three subjects. Of course three subjects as interpreted can mean much more or a little less; but the accession is complete, it is not partial. And when we said that the people of Kashmir will decide, that did not limit in any way the accession. It only meant that for other reasons — not constitutional, not legal; but we placed them on higher ground, if such a contingency arose. Let us suppose there was a proper plebiscite there and the people of Kashmir said, We do not want to be with India. Well, we are committed to it, we would accept it. It might pain us, but we would not send an army against them; we would accept that however much hurt we might feel about it and we would change our Constitution about it. We do not think that would happen — that is a different matter-because even previously and in the last few years, numerous bonds have arisen which bring us together, the people of Kashmir and the people of India.
So Kashmir, obviously, is a constituent unit of the federation or the Union of India, but a difference has arisen — subsequently arisen, you please remember that, not originally — between Kashmir and the other states because subsequent to the earlier accession the other states have become integrated more which Kashmir has not and could not in the circumstances as I have tried to point out. But, nevertheless, it is a full constituent unit of India. Various things flow from it, various consequences — consequences, for instance, in regard to the President of the Republic. The President has certain authority which he exercises on behalf of the Republic and wherever the constituent unit may be the President will exercise that authority in that measure. Of course, the President exercises that authority on the advice of his advisers. That is a different matter. The President may recognize or not recognize a Rajpramukh or someone else like that. That presidential authority, therefore, applies to every State of India in that sense. It may be exercised on a recommendation after some choice by others, whatever it may be. But the President’s ultimate right has to remain for a constituent unit of India.
The honourable Member referred to the flag, and he was good enough to refer to what I said long ago in the Constituent Assembly.] But there can be no doubt that in any part of India it is the flag of India that must prevail and that must be dominant. But remember that in some States in India even now — or till recently — there was the State flag. In the State of Mysore, till a few days ago (till four or five days ago), every public building displayed apart from the national flag the State flag also which was the Maharaja’s flag really but which the State had adopted as its own. It so happened that just four or five days ago, the Mysore Government, with the concurrence of the Maharaja, decided not to display the State flag. I welcome that move. What I mean to say is that it is not such an extraordinary thing for a State flag to be there in a subordinate position, provided the flag of India is the dominant flag and represents the Republic of India all over the territories of the Union. These are matters of importance, no doubt, but not of great difficulty, matters which we can consider and settle amongst ourselves.
Take the Supreme Court. Undoubtedly, in regard to matters concerning which a State is associated, or has acceded, there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court only can decide. I am not for the moment referring to other matters. The matter is not clear in my mind. It is a matter for the lawyers and others to consider. But it is obvious that within that sphere of accession, the Supreme Court must come in. It may come in otherwise too.
The honourable Member referred with great force to the Fundamental Rights of citizens. It must prevail all over. The Fundamental Rights which we have, have ensured the liberty of the individual here certainly, but the House will remember that they have also ensured the continuation, for some time at least, of certain systems which we wanted to get rid of: for instance, the landlord system in this country; for instance, the zamindari system. For years we have been trying to get over that difficulty and the Fundamental Rights came in our way. I wonder how many honourable Members present today, if we have the framing of the Fundamental Rights, would have anything to do with the Fundamental Rights which restrict our social and economic progress. Certainly, I would not. So that having gained this experience of the Fundamental Rights we had to amend the Constitution ourselves a little while ago. Having gained this experience, would you like us to push that on to Kashmir in regard to land reform and other things? I feel that it would be improper for us to do that.
I am not talking about other Fundamental Rights, but that particular one about land reforms. As a matter of fact, as the House knows, considerable land reform has taken place in Kashmir with advantageous results. Some individuals no doubt have suffered, as they must when there is any big scheme like this. But the whole scheme has been considered to be a great success. I wish, if I may say so, that we in the rest of India could make as rapid progress in land reform.
There are many small matters to which the honourable Member referred— Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani, etc. The House will remember that the honourable Member mentioned that the language is written both in the Devanagari script and the Persian and Urdu scripts. So it is the content of the language that he objected to. Now, I have not seen the book and it will not help me even if I see it. I take his word for it. But may I point out to the House that the kind of language which perhaps the honourable Member might approve is totally incomprehensible in Kashmir. Nobody understands it. What the future will bring I do not know. But we are overwhelmed with complaints even from Eastern Punjab to the effect that they do not understand this new language that is growing up. Even they say so. They say that they cannot understand our Radio and that they have to listen to Pakistan Radio which they do not like, because Pakistan Radio curses them. But that is the only one they can understand. It is no good your imposing Banaras Hindi on Kashmir. It is not the language of Kashmir at all.
First of all, the language of Kashmir is Kashmiri. Kashmiri is a language of not any particular group or religion. It is the language of Kashmir — Hindu, Muslim or Sikh; they talk in Kashmiri.
Kashmiri is a mixture of Sanskrit, Persian, Pushtu and quite a number of nearby languages. There is a good deal of Persian in it. It has nothing to do with Muslim or Hindu. You can talk to anybody there. Maybe a particular textbook is not good; maybe the language of it can be improved. But that is not the point. Please remember in regard to this language matter, our friends from the South raised the issue in another context. This vast territory from Central India to the tip of Ladakh in Kashmir, you may call vaguely a Hindi-speaking area. But it varies very much and a person right in the North does not understand, or otherwise struggles to understand, the Hindi that is spoken elsewhere. So you will have to find out a middle language. There is no doubt that this type of Hindi is not understood by one per cent of the people in Kashmir — Hindu or Muslim. I include in that the vast number of Hindus of Jammu too.
So one has to develop a language. There may be errors in the textbooks or mistakes. Get over them; simplify them. If that is a grievance, it is a far greater grievance all over here, including my own province of Uttar Pradesh. The language they use is largely in comprehensible to me today. What am I to do about that? The sign-boards on the roads I do not understand. I do not know what they are.
So, may I finish by again saying that this matter is an important matter. It is not a matter ultimately of eloquent speeches, but of dealing with a situation which is very delicate, very difficult, and the decision for which ultimately lies with the few million people in Kashmir, not even with this Parliament. That is the important thing. And if we seek to gain their goodwill, we should act accordingly. Remember also that India is a great country, spreading right from Cape Comorin to Kashmir. And if you look at the map, Kashmir is almost the heart of Asia. There is an enormous difference, not only in geography but in all kinds of factors there. Do not think you are dealing with a part of UP, Bihar or Gujarat. You are dealing with an area, historically and geographically, and in all manner of things with a certain background. If we bring our local ideas and local prejudices everywhere we will never consolidate. We have to be men of vision and there has to be a broadminded acceptance of facts in order to integrate really. And real integration comes of the mind and the heart and not of some clause which you may impose on other people.
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