It has been 25 years since General Krishnaswamy “Sundarji” Sundararajan faded away to Valhalla. He had a chequered and tumultuous tenure as the 13th Chief of the Army Staff and left behind a fiercely disputed and controversial legacy. He conceptualised, planned, and began the transformation of the Army to fight the wars envisaged for the next 15-20 years. Simultaneously, on all fronts, he was engaged in war-like confrontations with China in the north, Pakistan in the west and our own little Vietnam in Sri Lanka in the south.
Even his worst critics agree that no other General of the Indian Army possessed his intellectual depth, strategic perspective, and the will to transform. In his two years and four months’ tenure, he dragged the Army by its bootstraps into the 21st century.
Soon after taking over, General Sundarji wrote a vision paper with a 15-year perspective—Indian Army Perspective Plan 2000—virtually spelling out the contours of national security strategy, defence policy, and military strategy. He personally signed the document—the first, and so far, the last time by any service Chief. The paper unambiguously laid down the military strategy to cater to the threat from both Pakistan and China and the framework of the Army’s transformation required to execute it.
Perspective Plan 2000
The strategy against Pakistan was to create and maintain an “offensive deterrence” to destroy its military potential and seize large swathes of territory to impose political will. Against China, the strategy was to maintain a “dissuasive deterrence” due to the qualitative, quantitative, terrain and communications disadvantages. “Dissuasive deterrence” meant that the Army will move from a depth defensive posture, followed since 1963, to a forward defensive posture on dominant terrain close to the LAC to safeguard our territory and give the Chinese a bloody nose. Tactical offensive was built into this strategy.
The government, without formal approval, supported Perspective Plan 2000 as far as Pakistan was concerned, but remained apprehensive about disturbing the status quo on the northern borders. Both by design and due to strategic circumstances, General Sundarji got a chance to test his military strategy simultaneously on both the fronts.
A major mechanised forces predominant exercise—Brasstacks (November 1986-Match 1987)—to test the “offensive deterrence” against Pakistan was converted into a quasi war-like situation in the form of Operation Trident due to an apprehensive Pakistan’s counter moves and allegedly due to perception management by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). In Operation Trident. objectives ranged from capturing Skardu, destroying mechanised forces, and capturing a large swathe of territory in the desert/semi-desert terrain of South Punjab bounded by rivers Indus and Sutlej apart from limited territorial gains all along the front.
On the northern front, near simultaneously with Brasstacks/Operation Trident, a minor intrusion by China in Sumdorong Chu river valley in June 1986 gave General Sundarji the opportunity to post haste adopt the forward posture and force a stalemate on China in the ensuing confrontation that lasted until mid-1987.
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Execution of “dissuasive deterrence” strategy
Since 1962, our main defences were well in the depth on dominant terrain with a very large un-held buffer zone patrolled by the ITBP and Assam Rifles with effect from 1980. Little or no effort had been made to develop the roads in the buffer zone due to the fear of annoying the Chinese. The deployment of the PLA followed a similar pattern across the LAC, but with good communications for rapid deployment.
The plan until 1986 was to delay the enemy in the extended forward zone and fight the main battle from well-prepared defensive positions up to which roads had been constructed. In 1983, the Cabinet Committee on Security had taken a decision to defend Tawang, but the same could not be fully executed due to tardy development of roads.
India had established an observation post in the Sumdorong Chu valley manned by the Special Service Bureau, in 1984. The post was vacated in the winter. The PLA claimed that it was on their side of the McMahon Line/LAC and preempted its occupation in June 1986. Despite India’s protests, the Chinese continued to deploy more troops and built permanent defences.
On the face of it, it seemed to be a localised incident with the Chinese seeking to reimpose their version of the ML/LAC. In reality, there was a bigger motive. India and China had been engaged in border negotiations since 1981. In the first four rounds of talks, from 1981 to 1983, the discussions focussed on evolving a framework for concrete negotiations wherein China wanted to swap its gains in Aksai Chin and Eastern Ladakh for giving up claims in the Northeast by accepting the McMahon Line as was its stand since 1959. India wanted a sector by sector approach to which China agreed in the fifth round in 1984.
However, in the sixth round in 1985, China took a U-turn and sought substantial concessions in the Northeast, which subsequently included the whole of then-North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and now Arunachal Pradesh. With our defences in depth, it would have been a cakewalk for China to seize the entire Tawang Sector without a fight.
Keeping these factors in mind, General Sundarji seized the opportunity to implement the “dissuasive deterrence” strategy to occupy a forward posture in the whole of Tawang Sector. In September-October 1986, he ordered mobilisation and lifted a brigade by helicopters to Zimithang and quickly occupied the dominating Hathung La and Langrola Ridges, making the Chinese intrusion untenable if hostilities began. Precautionary deployment was carried out all along the front including Eastern Ladakh.
China was taken by surprise by India’s operational strategy and it mobilised 53 and 13 Army Groups (equivalent of a Corps each). Deng Xiaoping twice issued a warning to “teach India a lesson” in October 1986 and March 1987. The Indian government was alarmed by the bold operational strategy, which could have led to war. However, General Sundarji stood firm, reminding the government of its own 1983 CCS decision and the consequence of not adopting a forward posture to safeguard our territory. As a result, the dissuasive deterrence strategy got whole-hearted political support. Arunachal Pradesh was created in December 1986.
The confrontation continued throughout the winter and until May 1987 when the visit of the Indian foreign minister paved the way for disengagement, but final de-escalation took place only in 1995. General Sundarji gave the final shape to the “dissuasive deterrence” strategy and forward posture in 1987 by conducting Exercise Chequerboard apart from the ongoing Operation Falcon, for which 10 divisions were mobilised.
On the eve of his retirement in April 1988, he moved a combat group of mechanised forces to both Eastern Ladakh and North Sikkim, and left a blueprint for additional induction as the resources became available to not only strengthen the dissuasive deterrence strategy but also take the battle to the Tibetan Plateau.
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Did the ‘dissuasive deterrence’ fail in 2020?
A question often asked is, why did the dissuasive deterrence fail in 2020, resulting in the loss of 1,000 square km of territory and China re-securing the 1959 Claim Line for the first time since 1962? Unlike the Northeast, where the forward posture was on ridge lines dominating the ML/LAC, in Eastern Ladakh, vast frontage and disadvantageous terrain configuration of the LAC precluded deployment along the LAC and the forward posture per force had to be in relative depth on dominating terrain.
The key to the execution of the dissuasive deterrence was to keep the forward zone under fail safe surveillance and domination with mechanised forces predominant covering troops. Based on surveillance, contingency plans were required to preempt the PLA by securing areas on/across the LAC. The author had the privilege to induct and command the first combat group into Ladakh in July 1988 and conceptualise the employment of mechanised forces.
All that happened in April-May 2020 was foreseen and planned for 32 years ago. For example, Sirijap, east of Finger 8, was a preemptive task for my Combat Group through an amphibious operation across the Pangong Tso lake. Also, there was a need to reorganise the forces in Ladakh into combined arms grouping in the form of Integrated Battle Groups with additional induction of mechanised forces.
What happened in 2020 was not a failure of the “dissuasive deterrence” strategy, rather it was the execution that failed. We started constructing roads in sensitive areas without precautionary forward deployment of combined arms units. Our surveillance and reconnaissance failed and allowed the PLA to achieve absolute surprise. Consequently, contingency plans could not be executed. The formations were not reorganised as combined arms groupings and the available mechanised forces were inadequate.
Even after the Galwan clash, when adequate forces were available, the riposte in form of a quid pro quo on/across the LAC was timid. Rather than secure the entire Kailash Range from Helmet to Changla Pass in the Indus Valley, it was restricted to a 30 km belt up to Rechin La.
The “dissuasive deterrence” strategy has withstood the test of time and remains our best bet to stalemate China albeit with necessary modifications.
t Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)