Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India from 18–20 August, for the 24th round of Special Representative Talks, has been portrayed in Chinese discourse as a signal of warming ties. This is Wang’s first visit in three years. On Weibo, the hashtag “Wang Yi holds talks with Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar” drew 1.2 million views, reflecting widespread domestic interest.
Across Chinese strategic commentary, Wang’s presence in New Delhi is interpreted as evidence of a cautious but discernible thaw. Social media narratives highlight India’s alleged reiteration that Taiwan is part of China—a point included in Beijing’s official readout but absent from New Delhi’s. One Weibo user wrote, “This time, India was finally forced to reiterate that ‘Taiwan is part of China,’” while a commentator framed the visit as “a new script in Asia, without a place for the United States.”
Rationale for the thaw
Long Xingchun, director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, argues that India-China relations have been on an improving trajectory since last year’s BRICS summit in Kazan. Recent months, he suggests, have brought visible progress.
From the Chinese perspective, India’s outreach looks like a pragmatic response to trade tensions with Washington, slowing economic growth, and growing strategic isolation. Engagement with China is interpreted as a balancing act, even as Beijing reassesses India’s strategic significance amid its rivalry with the US and a complex regional environment.
Domestic Chinese discourse presents American pressure as both constraint and opportunity. The Quad is frequently dismissed as largely symbolic, and the US’ efforts to draw India into an anti-China alignment are portrayed as overambitious and self-defeating. By contrast, India’s engagement with China and Russia is framed as a measured assertion of strategic autonomy, rather than mere compliance or alignment.
Viewed this way, US President Donald Trump’s policies offered Beijing an opportunity to create strategic distance between India and the US. Chinese commentators increasingly emphasise potential win-win outcomes grounded in mutual respect. A video on Weibo even suggested that India seeks Chinese support to counterbalance US influence.
While some Chinese analysts view US policy under Trump as accelerating rapprochement, commentators such as Qian Feng, Director of Research and Development and Senior Research Fellow at the National Strategy Institute, Tsinghua University, stress that India-China relations possess intrinsic momentum. Both sides, he notes, have “met halfway,” gradually returning to a path of stable engagement, with shifts in India–US relations playing a secondary role.
Managing persistent differences
Chinese analysts acknowledge enduring obstacles, with border management as the most pressing challenge in ties with India. Lin Minwang, professor, Centre for South Asian Studies, Fudan University, notes India’s interest in reducing military presence along the frontier but warns that substantive agreements will be difficult, even if incremental progress is achievable.
Similarly, Zhang Jiadong, Director of the Institute of Strategy and International Security and Professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, observes that while economic frictions with the US are inevitable, they remain tactical rather than strategic. In Chinese narratives, India occupies a liminal position: selectively supported by the US, constrained domestically, and watched warily by China as it modernises its military and asserts regional influence. Domestic limitations, from infrastructure to industrial capacity, further restrict India’s ambitions, portraying it as navigating a tightly managed strategic space.
Weibo commentary reflects this perception with a mix of irony and superiority: “The Chinese foreign minister seems to be giving orders to the Indian foreign minister… If there is a face for flattery, it is the face of India.” Social media users and commentators also highlight a paradox: anti-China sentiment amplified by the Modi government in previous years now limits New Delhi’s diplomatic flexibility, demonstrating how domestic politics shape and constrain international engagement.
Cautious optimism and strategic signalling
Even as Chinese discourse celebrates rapprochement, commentators stress its fragility. A thaw does not equate to normalisation of bilateral ties. Border frictions persist, and India’s efforts to balance engagement with China and the US, exemplified by military posturing in the South China Sea alongside diplomatic outreach to Beijing, underscore the complexity of its position.
Whether Wang’s meetings yield tangible outcomes—or direct flights between India and China resume in September—remains uncertain. What is consistent in Chinese narratives, however, is the emphasis on a shift from confrontation to pragmatism.
In sum, Chinese discourse constructs Wang’s visit as a marker of cautious progress, an opportunity to consolidate gains, and a reflection of India’s recalibrated diplomacy under external pressure. While both differences and areas of cooperation are acknowledged, Beijing appears to view the visit as a chance to reshape India’s position, or at least project a narrative in which India, after years of fence-sitting and alignment with the US, is now seen as extending an olive branch to China.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)